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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse the role of sectoral innovation systems in the emergence and 
catch-up of aerospace industries in latecomer economies. We argue that the aerospace 
sector is characterized by a process of interrupted innovation. Competitive pressures 
and the cyclical nature of the industry not only require shifts in the direction of 
innovation and changes in the production system, but also periodical restructuring of 
the whole sectoral system of innovation.  
 Aerospace manufacturing requires advanced technological capabilities at the 
earliest stages of the emergence of the industry. Producers immediately need to comply 
with high international technology, quality and safety standards. Stage models of 
gradual technological upgrading in the process of catch up are therefore not 
appropriate to analyse the evolution of this industry in latecomer economies. The model 
of interrupted innovation developed in this paper provides an alternative perspective. 
 In country case studies of Brazil, China, Indonesia and Argentina, we show how 
changes in the global competitive landscape and major political developments trigger 
crises in the industry, with which existing systems of innovation are unable to cope. 
Competitive pressures periodically require the industry to reinvent itself almost from 
scratch. 
 We conclude that the emerging economies that have succeeded in catching up in 
aerospace are those that have established a competitive industrial sector with a sectoral 
innovation system which is able to adapt flexibly to radically changing circumstances. 
 
Keywords:  aerospace manufacturing, sectoral innovation systems, system dynamics, 
latecomer industrialization, technological capabilities 
JEL Codes: L62, O14, O31, O32, O33, O38 
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1 Introduction: Aerospace industries and the Model of 
Interrupted Innovation 
This paper analyses the emergence and evolution of the aerospace manufacturing 
industry in a number of developing countries in the post-war period. We argue that an 
understanding of success and failure in establishing and sustaining growth in this 
industry in latecomer countries is not possible without a joint analysis of both the 
production system and the innovation system. Building on the innovation systems 
literature, the paper develops a model of interrupted innovation, which focuses on the 
ability of the actors in the sectoral innovation system to radically shift course when 
faced with the periodical crises that characterize the aerospace industry. This model has 
been developed on the basis of four country case studies and serves to structure the 
presentation of them. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 documents the entry of developing 
countries into the global aerospace industry. Section 3 discusses the literature on 
latecomer industrialization and the specific characteristics which make the aerospace 
sector different from other sectors and affect its role in catch up. In Section 4, we 
construct a conceptual framework of interrupted innovation which allows us to compare 
various modes of innovation system change; in sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 we discuss four 
case studies of Brazil, China, Indonesia and Argentina. The Brazilian and Chinese case 
studies are based on primary field visits to Brazil and China as well as on secondary 
data and literature.  The case studies of Indonesia and Argentina are based on secondary 
materials. The first two cases are cases of successful development of the aerospace 
industry in a developing country context. The last two cases are cases where the 
aerospace industry has so far failed to take off. Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2 Emerging economies in the global aerospace industry 
The global aerospace industry has undergone a number of transformations throughout 
the second half of the 20th century. The arrival of the jet age in the 1950s, the increasing 
global flows of people, commodities and services and the gradual liberalization of the 
air transport market resulted in rapid growth of air traffic around the world, although 
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primarily between the advanced economies. In the last two decades global aircraft 
manufacturing experienced a period of shakeout and consolidation, with the emergence 
of global supply chains and with large-scale mergers and acquisitions taking place in 
Europe and North America (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). Apart from the traditional 
industrial clusters2, only a few new ones have emerged.3 
 
For decades, the aerospace industry4 has been dominated by first mover manufacturers 
from North America, Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Over the second half of the 
20th century, a number of newly industrializing countries have attempted to set up 
production facilities, mainly driven by military considerations (Goldstein 2002). These 
include Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, South Africa and 
Turkey as well as P.R. China, Singapore and Taiwan. Following initially mixed results, 
a few emerging countries, including Brazil and China, have developed their capabilities 
for aerospace production and have successfully entered the global market. Our data 
show that they have experienced accelerated growth and catch-up in aerospace 
industries. Catch-up is understood here as a narrowing of the technological gap resulting 
in substantial gains in global value added shares of latecomer economies compared to 
their advanced country competitors. 
 
Figure 1 Value Added in Aerospace Manufacturing (1980-2007)  
(Billion USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Notes: Emerging economies include Brazil, Colombia, P.R. China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Rep. Korea, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey and Singapore; Aerospace refers to ISIC 
Rev.3 class 353; Europe is an aggregate defined by the geographic area. 
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 60-Industry Database (GGDC), OECD STAN, 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), UNIDO, Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
(CNBS), various yearbooks; industry of origin conversion ratios applied from GGDC. 
 
Figure 1 compares the emerging economies with the leaders. Compared to the United 
States, aerospace manufacturing value added in emerging countries amounted to less 
than 6 per cent in 1990. It grew rapidly to 20 per cent by 2002, before declining again to 
                                                 
2 For a study on why spillovers favor clusters in the sector, see Niosi and Zhegu (2005). 
3 A first historical sketch of catch-up in aerospace was presented by Niosi (2009). We came across the 
paper while finalizing this study. 
4 The aerospace industry is defined as the manufacturing of aircraft, spacecraft, their engines and 
propulsion systems, parts and components. The focus of this paper is primarily the aircraft which is the 
bulk of the industry. 
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14 per cent in 2007. (The decline in relative shares was driven by growth of US output 
after 2003. In absolute terms developing country value added grew threefold from 1990 
to 2007, reaching 13.5 billion USD in 2007).  
 
Figure 2 focuses more on dynamics of latecomers. In terms of sales volume and value 
added the most successful emerging economies have overtaken incumbent producers 
such as France and Italy by the year 2000. They are now challenging Canada and Japan. 
The share of emerging countries in global value added doubled in a decade to nearly 10 
per cent by 2000. Global value added shares peaked at 13 per cent and subsequently 
declined to 10 per cent in 2007. The most successful of the late entrants, Embraer of 
Brazil is now among the top five commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world. The 
figures for China need to be regarded with caution. Chinese aerospace conglomerates 
produce a range of products outside the aerospace classification. If commodity based 
figures were available similar to what is reported for Brazil, Chinese value added would 
presumably be lower than that of Brazil at the turn of the millennium. The fact that 
Brazilian value added has recently been declining, even while Embraer’s turnover has 
been increasing, indicates that the sector is facing a competitive challenge.  
 
Figure 2 Value added in aerospace, selected emerging countries (1970-2007)  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Sources: GGDC and OECD STAN; IBGE, UNIDO, CNBS, various yearbooks; industry of origin 
conversion ratios applied from GGDC. 
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3 Catch Up in Aerospace: A new perspective on the 
dynamics of sectoral innovation systems 
3.1 Latecomer trajectories and competitiveness 
 
The Gerschenkronian tradition has emphasized the possibility of accelerated growth and 
catch up in follower economies due to access to global technology, without having to 
bear the cost and risks of developing this technology (Gerschenkron, 1962). All 
examples of accelerated growth in manufacturing in developing countries fit the 
Gerschenkronian pattern. Some catch up countries have succeeded in entering high-tech 
industries (e.g. the South East Asian tigers and their entry into electronics). They have 
benefited from higher value added output ratios associated with the technology-
intensive production (Fagerberg, 2000). Aerospace is such a high-tech industry, but as 
will be shown in this section, it differs from other high-tech sectors. 
 
Historical evidence shows a great variety of trajectories from infant industries to mature, 
competitive ones. The strategies governments and firms devised and implemented in 
order to accumulate the capabilities required for growth also varied significantly. 
Nevertheless, observers of the successful catch-up of latecomers in high-tech industries 
in Southeast Asia have been keen to find commonalities between the country 
experiences. While it is fiercely debated whether more general lessons can be drawn 
from the East Asian experiences (Hobday, 2009), there is a broad consensus how the 
successful latecomers have reached technologically more advanced stages of production. 
This has resulted in a number of stage models. 
 
In the model of Kim (1980), South Korean firms first had to implement imported 
technologies before the scientific and engineering staff could assimilate them and 
acquired the capacity to improve them. Throughout this process, firms became 
increasingly competitive, although not without considerable government support in the 
early phases. The learning trajectory described by Dahlman et al (1987) runs from 
production capabilities through investment capabilities to innovation capabilities. Lall 
(1982) emphasized that industries progressed from elementary through intermediate to 
advanced learning capabilities. Hobday (1995:1185) has argued that progression is not 
necessarily linear, since research and development (R&D) may be undertaken at an 
early stage. Nevertheless, he found a general tendency of firms starting up simple 
activities systematically at an early stage and gradually accumulating capabilities to 
perform complex activities at a later stage. Chaminade and Vang (2008) argue that 
developing country ICT firms start with competing with low-cost products and advance 
to become knowledge providers in the global value chain. In this transition regional 
innovation systems play a crucial role. 
 
Compared to other industries, aerospace has some very distinctive features. Hardly any 
other industry experiences such severe demand fluctuations, which are so closely 
correlated with fluctuations in global economic growth. Aerospace firms need to be 
prepared for cyclical changes in demand and recurrent crises within the lifetimes of 
their products.  
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Aerospace manufacturing is a leader in technology intensity (Smith, 2005) and is also 
highly capital intensive. New entrants face a steep learning curve (Frischtak, 1994). 
Access to technology for latecomers is limited by the very high entry costs, rather than 
through patents. The industry is characterized by imperfect competition, non-
homogenous products and major economies of scale. Fixed initial development costs are 
extremely high (Beaudry, 2001). To overcome private underinvestment in new 
technology, governments support manufacturers, either through launch subsidies, export 
subsidies, military procurement or market protection. To justify support, governments 
argue along the lines of national security, prestige and expected spillovers 5  to 
downstream industries and services 6  and to other sectors of the economy. Finally, 
aerospace stands at the intersection of different kinds of policy interventions: industrial 
policies, higher education policies and science and technology and innovation policies. 
 
The aerospace industry presents latecomers with a special challenge because of its 
technologically complex products. At the core of many stage models of catch-up models 
there is a tradeoff between cost and quality. A cheaper but less reliable or less advanced 
consumer electronics product can be sold in large numbers if the cost is low enough. 
This trade-off does not exist for aerospace products. Quality standards for firms entering 
the market, even at the lower end, are higher than in any other sector, given that an 
aircraft or spacecraft is as reliable as its weakest component. Latecomer firms cannot 
sell their products unless they successfully meet the high standards set by the global 
industry leaders. Intensive technological learning and local adaptation are needed even 
in cases where only foreign technologies and designs are applied. The production 
processes of component suppliers are meticulously screened by the system assembler 
companies; governments cannot (temporarily) relax standards for new producers 
without jeopardizing public safety. Consequently none of the stage theories discussed 
above are applicable to the aerospace industry. To start up series production in 
aerospace, firms need to possess advanced learning capabilities from the very beginning. 
They need to have assimilated and adapted a wide range of relevant technologies. Firms 
or the governments supporting them need to have the resources to make huge launch 
investments.  
 
Designing a new prototype of an aircraft or a component does not yet ensure that it will 
be a successful product. Without successful securing orders to support series production, 
there can be no catch-up; without competitive products, there can be no series 
production. Competitiveness requires the production of technologically complex 
products at an early stage in the evolution of the industry. Even if these products are not 
at the technology frontier, they may be new to the market7 they are serving. Unless 
latecomer, state-sponsored producers find enough customers other than their respective 
governments to become financially sustainable, they will become too big a burden for 
the public to support. Ultimately, their governments and domestic firms will be forced 
to purchase high quality aerospace products from competitors.  
 
                                                 
5 Measuring spillovers effects related to the aerospace industry remains difficult, especially in emerging 
economies. In the case of the Swedish JAS Gripen fighter program Eliasson (2010) applied a spillover 
multiplier and estimated that the social returns above the opportunity costs were at least 2.6 times greater 
than the original investment. 
6 Downstream industries and services include transport, telecommunications, navigation, media or earth 
observation, many of which also offer benefits for public bodies. 
7 Market in the case of this industry includes not only civilian but military as well.  
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The central question is not what stages a latecomer aerospace industry needs to go 
through along its development trajectory, but rather,  
- how firms can acquire the set of capabilities required to compete in the market 
segment they aim at, at the time of entry; and  
- how it can develop self-sustaining mechanisms to generate the capabilities to 
continue to compete in a changing and volatile environment? 
 
Firms that succeeded in sustaining their competitive edge over time were innovators 
who launched new products (even if that meant applying already existing technologies 
in new combinations), introduced new methods of production or organization of 
production and sales activities. They could not have done it without a supportive 
environment – an innovation system – that offered firms access to resources8 they 
required to innovate. The emergence of sectoral innovation systems provides the key to 
catch-up in latecomer aerospace. 
 
In our view, it is sufficient to distinguish only two “phases” in the evolution of 
latecomer aerospace industries. An emergent phase in which some countries find a 
niche for their products, and the subsequent drive for sustained competitiveness. It is by 
no means guaranteed that the second phase follows progressively from the first one, or 
that competitiveness can be sustained. In successful cases, there is a transition to 
sustained competitiveness. But this transition can also fail in which case the industry 
will languish or disappear altogether. Whether the transition can be made depends on 
the flexibility of the innovation system.9 This will be further elaborated in sections 3.2-
3.4. Section 4 presents a conceptual framework for the analysis of such transitions, 
referred to as ‘the framework of interrupted innovation’. 
3.2 Emerging industry and innovation system 
The emergence of an industry and its sectoral innovation system in a late industrializing 
economy is a special phase within its overall evolution. Latecomer firms face 
disadvantages in terms of having to overcome both technology barriers and market 
barriers (Hobday, 1995:1172). 
 
What characterizes the initial phase is a gradual overcoming of competitive 
disadvantages stemming from lack of technological and market capabilities. On the one 
hand, firms are dislocated or isolated from sources of technology, R&D, and a supply of 
adequately trained and skilled labor and they lack linkages with advanced country 
markets that they wish to supply. The firms’ primary aims thus focus on acquisition of 
technology, human capital and access to markets. On the other hand, being a latecomer 
offers a potential for accelerated growth and catch-up by being able to avoid the risks, 
uncertainties and costs of innovation at the frontiers of knowledge, by having potential 
access to already available technology and knowledge (Gerschenkron, 1962). But 
reaping these opportunities and accumulating the required capabilities is a costly and 
difficult process (Perez and Soete, 1988).  
 
Choices facing governments and entrepreneurs in this phase are related to finding ways 
to benefit from technological backwardness and profit from a variety of knowledge 
                                                 
8 Such as access to a pool of skilled labor force, credits, tax incentives, etc. 
 
9 Achieving sustainability is not a once and for all achievement. The industry is faced with recurrent 
challenges which may threaten its future competitiveness unless new adjustments are made.  
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spillovers. These choices include whether a technology should be acquired from outside 
or developed locally (“make or buy” dilemma), what market segment(s) to focus 
operations on, what financing mechanisms to set up and how to educate and train 
scientists, engineers and managers.  
 
It is important to emphasize the evolutionary nature of this phase. Actors have to cope 
with a high degree of uncertainty, and have to take risks and prepare for an iterative 
process. For instance, Hobday (2009) argues with regard to Asian development that 
what would turn out to be successful was not foreseen or meticulously planned in 
advance.  
 
Historical evidence varies hugely how long it takes for an industry to go beyond the 
emerging phase, especially because it is hard to find a distinct dividing line. The length 
of the emergence phase depends on the one hand how successfully the new products sell 
(initially profiting from subsidies and government support) and on the other hand on the 
readiness of competitors and trading partners to accept infant industry protection. 
Formal international trade disputes may be good indicators of the end of the emergence 
phase. These will force governments to shift to more subtle forms of industrial support.  
 
By the end of the emergent phase, firms in the industry need to have learnt not only to 
produce but also to compete by innovating. This learning process takes place within the 
realm of a sectoral innovation system, which faces challenges such as: (a) bringing 
together and ensuring a sustainable supply of inputs, including physical capital and 
human capital, the technological base; (b) organizing learning and search directions for 
further technology and (c) fostering interactions (d) devising appropriate institutions, 
given the historical context and conditions of demand and competition. The 
development of the innovation system will be discussed later in this section. 
 
3.3 Sustaining competitiveness  
By the end of the emergent phase, the industry is assumed to have developed a leading 
segment and its main focus will be to sustain competitiveness. In 2000, both Japan, the 
producer of aircraft parts and components (including those made of composite 
materials) and Brazil, the assembler of regional jets (mostly from parts made elsewhere) 
had a value added in aerospace production of around 2.5 billion dollars (see Figure 2). 
In their own segments, both countries were highly competitive, yet these segments are 
vertically dependent on one another. Both require a complex, but very different set of 
technological capabilities which their firms have evidently mastered. It matters less in 
which specific segment of the industry a country produces, more how successfully it 
does so. What matters is the degree of competitiveness. A competitive segment of an 
industry is characterized by competitive prices, ability to meet international quality 
standards, increasing volume of production and growing global markets shares. 
 
Competitiveness in a technology intensive industry is more than merely having a static 
competitive edge based on factor endowments such as low wages. In a dynamic 
perspective, it refers to increasing value added per person while wages rise, 
diversification into more complex activities and increasing technological and 
organizational capabilities (Lall and Mortimore, 2005:3). 
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Given the fact that no aerospace producer has ever achieved market success without 
some form of government intervention, it is national sectors rather than single firms that 
compete with each other in various market segments. Thus shifting from the emergent 
phase to the phase of sustained competitiveness requires the reconfiguration of both 
firm strategies and the role of the government. It does not necessarily imply a complete 
withdrawal of government intervention. Rather it implies that protectionist policies and 
inward looking import substitution policies (that were deemed acceptable on the part of 
a newly industrializing country) are replaced by more subtle forms of government 
support. This policy shift is also imposed by competitor firms and countries. As 
mentioned above, international trade disputes are good indicators of competitiveness in 
aerospace industries. They provide an indication of a country’s success in the eyes of its 
competitors. The outcomes of these disputes also shape the “standard” of what is an 
acceptable degree of intervention in the international community.10  
 
Sustained competitiveness has to be supported by a well-functioning sectoral innovation 
system, characterised by dense and multidimensional interactions between actors 
(including market- as well as non-market interactions, through both formal and informal 
knowledge channels). If competitiveness is understood in the dynamic sense, the 
innovation system should be able to respond to (and spur) changes in demand and be 
able to supply leading firms with an adequate knowledge base to compete successfully 
on the market.  
 
3.4 Failing to sustain competitiveness 
It is not inevitable that the emergent phase of an industry is followed by a sustained 
competitive phase. Governments can distort market signals (e.g. through military 
procurements) and motivate favoured domestic firms to produce products that cannot 
compete on foreign markets in the absence of continued support. Firms can fail with 
their innovation, or more advanced competitors can abuse their market and political 
power. To sustain competitiveness, firms need constantly to expand their technological 
capabilities. If the technological gap vis-à-vis leading foreign competitors widens 
during a given phase, insufficient capabilities limit latecomers’ competitiveness. 
Regaining competitiveness requires additional financial inputs, yet this needs to be 
recovered from future sales. The continuous lack of market success (either civilian or 
military) thus potentially leads to unsustainable development.  
Had the innovation system functioned properly, it would respond to competitive 
challenges leading to a narrowing of technology gaps. But structural problems and 
institutional rigidities may result in an innovation system that is not flexible enough to 
adapt effectively to changing market conditions.  Missing actors or blocked linkages 
between actors result in a slowdown of the provision of technology, ideas or finance. In 
such situations radical institutional reform is required to overcome stagnation or falling 
behind. Lack of competitiveness will potentially escalate to a crisis where financing 
production and innovation becomes unsustainable. Avoiding these crises and achieving 
a system-wide response is crucial to decrease excessive dependence on government 
funding and provide sustained growth for the latecomer aerospace industry.  
 
  
                                                 
10 For greater details on international trade disputes of aircraft manufacturers, see Pavcnik (2002) or 
Goldstein and McGuire (2004). 
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4 A conceptual framework of interrupted innovation  
4.1  Sectoral innovation systems  
The competitiveness of an industrial sector is closely related to the performance of its 
sectoral innovation system (Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Malerba, 2002). From a 
dynamic perspective, the competitiveness of a productive sector depends on its firms’ 
ability to accumulate technological capabilities in a changing environment. Firms learn 
how to respond to demand, how to produce. While doing so, their capabilities co-evolve 
with the scientific and technological knowledge frontier, with the institutions that 
regulate access to and appropriation of such knowledge, and with change production 
and trade regimes. This co-evolution between production system and innovation system 
is apparent in the interactions between firm and other organizations and institutions11. 
Such processes of co-evolution differ from sector to sector (Malerba, 2002). 
 
In accordance with Malerba’s definition of a sectoral production and innovation system 
(2002), the aerospace industry is characterized by its products, inputs, actors (firms and 
other organizations), its scientific and technological (S&T) knowledge base and the 
interactions between the actors and organizations. Innovative and productive activities 
co-evolve given that actors simultaneously introduce carry out both innovative and 
productive activities. Malerba proposes that “for analytical purposes one could examine 
separately a sectoral innovation system, a sectoral production system and a sectoral 
distribution-market system” (2002: 251). We follow Malerba in distinguishing a 
separate sectoral innovation system. But since our ultimate goal is to explain sectoral 
growth and catch-up, will explicitly link developments in a more narrowly defined 
innovation system to developments in the production system. 
 
A sectoral system of innovation is the source of technological change in an industry. 
(Innovations may include blueprints of new products, modification to existing 
blueprints and designs, a new ways of production or organizing industrial activity. They 
may originate in R&D departments designed explicitly to generate innovations but also 
derive from non-R&D employees as well as from the users of the industry’s products. 
The information and knowledge exchanges of the innovation system are closely 
connected to the production activities of the industry. These relationships between firms, 
organizational and individual actors within an innovation system adhere to a set of rules, 
considered as the institutions. For innovation systems to function, these rules need to be 
clearly defined and acted upon. This means that the functioning of the innovation 
system – or at least its core – requires continuity and stability in the medium term. 
However, from time to time, components of the system, including actors, their 
capabilities as well as the institutions defining their relationships need to change 
radically. The framework we present below sheds more light on these changes. 
 
                                                 
11  Institutions are understood in the sense of being “rules of the game” that are “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions” (North 1990). They are not to be confused with organizations 
(such as R&D research labs, educational institutes) which have formal purpose and structure. 
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4.2 Incremental and Radical Changes in innovation systems  
Analysis of the emergence and dynamics of an industry also implies the analysis of the 
corresponding emergence and dynamics of the sectoral innovation system. However, the 
existing literature rarely makes this relationship explicit, leaving the dynamics of 
innovation systems under-researched. There are especially large gaps in our knowledge 
concerning innovation systems in developing countries.12  
 
From the very origins of the concept, innovation systems have conceptually been 
associated with socio-economic change. With the increasing availability of longitudinal 
data on innovative performance of interrelated actors, there is increased interest in 
understanding how systems change over time, both in qualitative and quantitative terms 
(Lundvall et al, 2006; Dodgson et al, 2008). Fundamental changes in the economy as a 
result of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934) or the emergence of new technological 
paradigms (Dosi, 1982; Freeman and Perez, 1988) have been widely discussed. These 
theoretical works focus on an aggregate level. We still need to expand our 
understanding of the co-evolution of science and technology, innovation and production 
and the relevant institutional arrangements at sectoral levels. In other words, how are 
changes in the innovation system connected to changes in a sector’s physical 
production? 
Evolutionary aspects of innovation systems have received increased attention in recent 
years.13 Two distinct patterns of system change are crystallizing from these works. The 
first type of change refers to incremental changes along a given trajectory (bounded by 
path dependence). The study of the Taiwanese integrated circuit industry by Lee and 
von Tunzelmann (2005) provides useful insights into this type of dynamics, in which 
the interplay of sub-systems and major actors are at the core of a more gradual system 
change. 
 
The second type of innovation system change refers to a more fundamental system 
transition.  In the ‘appreciative theorizing’ model of Galli and Teubal (1997) 
paradigmatic changes and structural adjustments of national innovation systems are 
driven by exogenous environmental pressures. The changes involve restructuring of 
networks, changing openness to the outside world, increased interactions between the 
subsystems (i.e. inter-firm relations evolve beyond simple market-based transactions), 
and the creation of new technology interface units. Lundvall et al (2006) single out the 
institutional set-up as the key barrier to growth of a NIS beyond a certain point. System 
transitions refer to changes in the “constellation of institutions” and changes “in the 
relationship between producers and users of knowledge”. A system transition is required 
to overcome a contingency mismatch (when change in the environment makes the 
existing institutional set-up ill-suited) or when a system reaches its inherent limits as a 
result of endogenous growth. In the domain of technological systems, in the multi-level 
framework proposed by Geels and Kemp (2006), transitions are shifts between 
technological trajectories, which involve the emergence of a radical innovation 
incubated in a ‘technological niche’. The functional dynamics literature discusses a 
                                                 
12 As Lundvall recently noted: “Notwithstanding the clear links between innovation system research and 
evolutionary economics, understanding the dynamics of different innovation systems and different 
evolution paths still remains a major research challenge in innovation system research, particularly when 
dealing with developing countries.” (Lundvall et al, 2009:30-31). 
13 Most relevant studies are Galli and Teubal 1997, Lee and von Tunzelmann 2005, Lundvall et al 2006, 
McKelvey and Holmén 2006, Geels and Kemp 2007, Edquist and Hommen 2008, Dodgson et al 2008, 
Dolata 2009, or Malerba and Mani 2009, 
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similar kind of transition, although the authors associate the fulfillment and interaction 
of functions as a prerequisite for systemic change (Hekkert et al 2007, Bergek et al 
2008). Considering that functions are inherent in all institution, it is fair to say 
regardless of the perspective, all strands of literature appear to agree that following a 
successful transition, the basic functions or structure (or architecture14) of a new system 
will look fundamentally different from the previous one. 
 
The cyclical nature of the aerospace industry requires a model that incorporates not only 
incremental but also radical innovation system change to explain latecomer 
development. Recurrent booms and slumps in demand regularly pose challenges to both 
production and innovation. It is reasonable to assume that not only firms, but the system 
as a whole is affected by demand fluctuations. The industry’s performance depends on 
how the innovation system as a whole manages to cope with these fluctuations. 
 
A central problem with quantitative analysis of radical and incremental innovation 
system changes is often the lack of detailed long-term data. Nevertheless, change in 
inputs, demand and output; changes in the number of actors or changes in the intensity 
of interactions (network characteristics) are indicative of the dynamics on innovation 
system. But in addition to looking at such indicators, qualitative analysis is required to 
highlight changes in the knowledge base and learning processes, changes in the nature 
of interactions among actors (including change network hub change), institutional 
change, changing processes of variety generation and selection. 
 
The framework outlined below takes a structural approach and focuses on changes in 
the main building blocks of a system (á la Malerba 2002). 
 
4.3 The main components of the framework of interrupted 
innovation 
The size of an innovation system is defined by the input of resources into innovation and 
technological change (investment in R&D, human capital engaged in the development 
of new products and processes or organizational change as well as marketing or 
economically applicable knowledge).  
 
We refer to the performance of the innovation system as the supply of innovative 
outputs which can be applied in production (knowledge about new products, new 
processes, organizational innovations, discovery of new resources, patents, etc.). The 
maximum innovative performance a sectoral system of innovation can attain with a 
given combination of inputs under a given institutional structure defines the 
performance frontier of the system. 
 
Innovation performance is difficult to measure in an unambiguous fashion.15 Indicators 
characterizing innovation performance could include the number of new product 
                                                 
14 The management literature offers interesting insights as well. The concept of architectural innovation, 
introduced by Henderson and Clark (1990) originally refers to changes on the product level in the way the 
main components are linked together. Consider the product design architecture as a simple system, a 
structural change of the linkages of the system that offers a competitive edge to a firm is analogous to 
architectural innovation in a national or sectoral innovation system. 
15 The literature does not provide a clear definition of the performance of an innovation system. Nor does 
it provide simple ways to measure it. 
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designs, the share of new products in sales or the number of patents, citations and 
trademarks. In the absence of direct performance measures, one could use proxy 
indicators of productive performance such as the industrial sales performance (including 
sales on domestic and export markets) and market shares of final products. 
 
When the innovation system is supplied with additional resources, innovation 
performance will increase. But within the constraints of a given innovation system, 
long-run performance is constrained by diminishing returns – similar to a production 
function with diminishing returns to scale.16 The larger the size of the system, the more 
complex it becomes, and the more costly and difficult it will be to coordinate the use of 
resources effectively. 
 
Below, we attempt to visualize the relationship between size and performance of a 
sectoral innovation system and the effect of institutional change in a set of graphs. 
These graphs should be seen as metaphors, given that we do not yet have precise 
operational measures of aggregate innovation system performance.  
 
4.4 Learning within an innovation system 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the performance frontier curve p in relation to 
innovation system size (resources available for innovation) increases. There is no reason 
to assume that the sectoral innovation system in any country performs at the maximum 
of its potential capacity. As it has been often shown since Nelson and Winter (1982), 
“producing” innovation is difficult. It requires tacit and codified knowledge. Agents 
make choices based on imperfect information. Whether the effort brings successful 
outcome is uncertain. How close a country performs relative to the innovation 
performance frontier thus depends on the amount of learning taking place in the system. 
Learning takes place through interaction of the actors in the system. In a simplified way, 
a country’s vertical movement from point A to B on the graph corresponds to increased 
intensity of interactions among actors. It shows the system’s success in learning the art 
of innovation given the amount of resources invested in the system (horizontal axis). 
 
                                                 
16 New growth theory (see Romer 1986, 1990, Lucas 1988) states that there are no diminishing returns to 
increasing knowledge inputs. We argue that this view needs to be modified. Increasing inputs into a given 
static system of innovation are subject to diminishing returns. Only if the innovation system succeeds in 
continuously reinventing itself and changing its nature dynamically will diminishing returns be overcome. 
This requires a kind of transitions from one innovation system to another.  
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Figure 3 Performance in a given innovation system 
 
 
 
4.5 Movement of the innovation system frontier 
The performance frontier can shift as a result of two kinds of change: (A) incremental 
and (B) radical institutional changes. 
 
A. Incremental Shifts 
The first type of change refers to smaller adjustments to the setup of the innovation 
system itself that influences the performance. Small, often iterative improvements and 
changes in the nature and organization of interactions within a system, possibly as a 
result of institutional learning within the system, but can also happen due to factors that 
are exogenous to the system which increase performance (e.g. spillovers from other 
systems). For instance, smaller changes in tax or trade law are institutional changes that 
might positively affect system performance. Yet they are limited in scope and do not 
alter the fundamental structure and interactions of the system.  
In Figure 4, this is illustrated with a relatively small vertical shift of the performance 
frontier curve (from p to p’). The key point is that because of the creative forces in the 
system, a race to the frontier is a race to a moving finish line. However, the main feature 
of such incremental changes is that the core resources and key institutions of the 
sectoral system of innovation remain essentially the same.  
Incremental shifts can be distinguished from learning and increased interaction within a 
given system, as depicted in Figure 3. Incremental change involves a measure of system 
change and institutional learning; refers to learning to work a given system. 
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Figure 4 Incremental shift of the innovation system 
 
 
B. Radical shifts 
A more radical shift of the system is caused by a more fundamental, qualitative change 
in its constitution. These changes include the entry of new actors with new capabilities 
that affect existing relations, a significant change in the technological base of the system, 
and, crucially, a change of institutions. Figure 5 shows this radical change as the 
transition from frontier curve I to II. Such a shift to a higher performance frontier curve 
will not only allow an industry increased competitiveness, but given diminishing returns 
to innovation inputs, it is the only source of knowledge-based competitiveness gain 
beyond a certain size of the innovation system. This is why continued advance in 
innovation performance requires periodic radical restructuring of the innovation system.  
 
There are a number of empirical issues of innovation system dynamics this simple 
model can illustrate. Analysis of industrial development can reveal for instance how 
regularly these shifts occur, what triggers them or what the direction of changes was. 
 
The aim of any competitive industry is to continue to increase its innovative 
performance, in other words, to shift the innovation performance curve upward. But, the 
establishment of a new system based on new combinations of resources and new 
institutions is a very uncertain and risky process, which may well fail. If the institutional 
memory is destroyed due to external shocks and the inflow of recourses is drastically 
reduced, the system may not be able to transform itself. The actors in the system may 
realize that change is necessary, but they also will only be able to realize change if the 
institutional set up permits them to do so and new resources are forthcoming). 
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Figure 5 Radical Change of the Sectoral Innovation System: Transition 
 
 
The causes of radical innovation system change in a latecomer industry are most likely 
exogenous to the system. External macroeconomic, political or technological shocks 
cause crises and interruptions in the productive activities. If these events are longer 
lasting private and public financial resources available for innovation will be depleted. 
This depletion can also happen if the innovation system fails to meet the demands of the 
competitive environment. Technological change outside the system (i.e. in leading 
countries) can similarly be detrimental to competitiveness of the latecomer system as 
such changes make the existing knowledge base obsolete.17 In a behind-the-frontier 
latecomer system exogenous causes of interruption are more likely to happen than 
creative destruction caused by endogenous forces, which presumes that the industry has 
already reached the global technological frontier. 
 
4.6 Innovation system trajectories 
Graphs 6, 7 and 8 plot how the size and performance of a sectoral innovation system in 
a country changes over time as a result of learning and institutional changes. The 
trajectory of a country is indicative of the way its institutions function and reveals the 
major constraints to and opportunities for industrial competitiveness, related to the 
functioning of the innovation system. In this section we disregard incremental shifts and 
only discuss learning with a system and transition to another system. 
 
Let us consider a latecomer industrializer for an example (Figure 6). As resources 
available for the sectoral innovation system increase, its actors learn to utilize the 
institutional setup to reach near-frontier performance with their interactions. The system 
will move closer to the frontier (movement over time from T1 to T3). What happens 
when the system reaches the frontier? Assuming that its aim is to increase performance, 
                                                 
17 We refer to a radical technological change on the frontier if we assume that the latecomer system is 
closing the technology gap. But of course, this is not necessarily the case and if the system is not catching 
up and the gap is widening, even incremental change can result in excessive mismatch. 
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staying on a frontier where the returns to additional resources decline to zero, will 
marshal internal forces for institutional change.  
 
If these changes can be realized in a short time, the sectoral system could smoothly 
jump to a new growth path without significant performance loss and any further 
increase will be relative to the new performance frontier.  
 
But such a smooth transition is very unlikely in an industry prone to huge sudden 
fluctuations in demand. A decline in demand will indirectly result in shrinking resources 
available for innovative activity, which provide an exogenous shock to the innovation 
system. Thus the system is faced with a double challenge: changing external 
circumstances and diminishing returns to investment in innovation within the existing 
system. The innovation system’s performance will decline and an interruption occurs. 
This is illustrated by the movement from T3 to T4 in Figure 6. 
  
Should the drop in innovative performance in a latecomer country become too big and 
should the chances to mobilize resources for a recovery be too dim, the interruption may 
result in the abandonment of further efforts to develop this industry. Both the innovation 
system and the productive system will collapse. The emergence of an aerospace 
industry has then failed. 
 
Figure 6 Interrupted innovation 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the case of a successful transition to a new system defined by frontier 
curve II. Recovery after an interruption will not immediately show higher performance 
even if a successful transition to a new system of innovation has been achieved. 
Increased performance can only be realized over time as the actors learn how to achieve 
best practice relative to a new performance frontier. Note that at T5, the new system will 
not necessarily be performing better than the old one at T3.  The new system will only 
start to perform better than the old one as the actors learn to work the new system and 
we approach T6. 
 
Figure shows the trajectory of a given 
country in the innovation system 
performance space between points of time. 
T1 Æ T3 = increased performance due to 
size growth and increased knowledge 
flows; T3ÆT4 = interruption  
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Figure 7 Interrupted innovation followed by transition to a new innovation system 
 
 
In Figure 8, we plot innovation system performance of a country against time on the 
horizontal axis, rather than against size as in the previous graphs. Here, the development 
trajectory of a successful transition from one innovation system to another will take the 
form of a set of S-curves. Up to the point of interruption, the industry follows a learning 
curve in its attempt to approach frontier performance. The interruption results in an 
abrupt fall in innovation performance. 
 
In figure 8, L refers to the actual learning trajectory of the country (frontier performance 
is not reproduced here).  The interval T1 to T3 refers to the learning curve of an emerging 
system prior to the first transition. T3 to T4 refers to an interruption. T4 to T6 refers to the 
successful transition from the innovation system with performance frontier I to a new 
innovation system with a performance frontier curve II. At T6 we see the beginning of a 
new learning curve.  
 
In the interruption period T1 – T4 there is a crucial challenge for the relevant actors to 
react to the crisis by reconfiguring the institutions in an innovation system and possibly 
expanding it with new resources. This is necessary in order to redirect learning efforts 
onto a trajectory that produces the supply of innovations required by the changed 
demand conditions facing the industry. After the system transition, the actors in the 
sectoral system of innovation try to move towards a new performance frontier, hence 
the emergence of a new S-curve. 
 
The time between the point of interruption and that of system change depends on the 
readiness and capability of the actors to react to changes in the environment. It is thus 
an indication of the flexibility and adaptability of the innovation system of an industry.  
 
A crucial difference between well established or mature innovation systems 18  and 
emerging ones is the greater vulnerability of emerging innovation systems to external 
shocks. These shocks cause interruptions during which previously acquired 
                                                 
18 Chaminade and Vang (2008) use the term ‘mature innovation systems’. 
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technological capabilities are lost. Even leading producers have found to be prone to 
‘organizational forgetting’.19 
 
Figure 8 A learning trajectory: interruption and transition 
 
 
 
4.7 System performance and competitiveness 
Long-run competitiveness of a high-tech industry depends on the capacity of its sectoral 
innovation system to provide cost-cutting and productivity-increasing innovations and 
products with technological features superior those of its competitors. How does 
competition feature in our framework? 
 
Competition is a key driver behind improvements in innovation system performance. 
Suppose that industries from two different countries competing to supply the same 
market face similar frontier curves for innovation performance. The industry that is 
closer to the frontier has a higher propensity to innovate, hence a higher chance to be 
more competitive.  
 
However, the performance frontier curves differ from country to country. Countries 
may not only compete in their relative distance from a given innovation performance 
frontier, but also in the position of the frontier itself (e.g. innovation frontier I and 
innovation frontier II in figure 7). They can increase their competitiveness in three ways. 
First, by learning within a system, which corresponds to moving closer to an existing 
performance frontier as shown in Figure 3. Second, by incrementally shifting the 
performance frontier through incremental institutional changes (Figure 4). Third, by 
making the transition to a new performance frontier which is superior to the previous 
one (Figure 5).   
 
This implies two different kinds of costs: first, the learning costs associated with 
narrowing the distance to the frontier; and second, the transition costs from one frontier 
                                                 
19 Production experience can depreciate, not only appreciate over time (Benkard, 2000) 
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to another. These costs have to be borne by the entire innovation and production system. 
Only if the industry is selling competitive products can these costs be recovered. A key 
dilemma for system governance is to find the most cost-efficient way to manage system 
transitions. Incremental change will not bring about as great gains as radical ones, but 
the costs of institutional change are much higher. Path dependence, the comfort of 
established routines, the lack of information about the alternatives, the uncertainty 
concerning outcomes of institutional change reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of 
major institutional changes.  
 
Finally, there is another element of competitiveness: the speed of reaction to a global 
drop of demand for products, in case of crises. Competitiveness in these instances is 
measured by the flexibility of the industry, or its ability to respond timely to the 
changing demand conditions by changing institutions. McKelvey et al (2006a,b) discuss 
rigidity and flexibility of innovation systems and identify the period of adjustment to 
new demand conditions (both external and internal to the industry) critical moments. 
Also at firm level, Yuan et al (2010) showed that strategic flexibility matters; it is 
reasonable to assume that a first movers’ advantage exists when it comes to competition 
of industries. The one that is set on the new path first has the highest likelihood to 
recover from the depth of an interruption. 
 
4.8 External causes of interruption 
A major difference between innovation system change at the technological frontier and 
in latecomer countries is the potential cause of interruption. Latecomers by definition 
enter an industry characterized by Schumpeter Mark II competition20 and focus their 
learning efforts on acquiring and improving already proven technologies. This entails 
investment in physical and human capital which, especially during the early phases 
depends on government’s financing abilities. Consequently macroeconomic and 
political crises and changing competitive environment are all potential external causes 
of interruption and have a far greater likelihood of causing interruptions than 
endogenous technological ones.  
 
4.9 Questions for case studies 
Times of crisis offer ideal points of entry to observe innovation system change. The 
drop in demand puts both the production and the innovation system to a test. Since it 
jeopardizes survival, it triggers responses from the system. As pointed out earlier, crises 
are cyclically returning challenges in the aerospace industry, and stakeholders need to 
be prepared for slumps and need to learn how to respond and find innovative solutions 
to weather the crises and set the industry on a growth path more rapidly than its 
competitors. 
 
In the following section we present four country case studies of how crises triggered 
changes in of the sectoral innovation systems in the aerospace industry. The cases are 
those of Brazil, China, Indonesia and Argentina. The first two cases are cases of 
                                                 
20 ‘Schumpeter Mark II’ refers to a consolidated structure where a few large firms make benefit of 
economies of scale and finance R&D investments to maintain their leading position (Nelson and Winter, 
1982 and Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
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successful development of the aerospace industry in a developing country context. The 
last two cases are cases where the aerospace industry has so far failed to take off. 
 
Based on the conceptual framework of interrupted innovation developed above, we 
examine the following analytic questions in the country case studies:  
 
1. What trajectories did the latecomers in aerospace follow?  
a. How can these trajectories be measured and analysed? 
b. To what extent is the end of the emergence phase associated with 
interruptions and transitions?  
2. What caused the interruptions in the development of the sectoral innovation system? 
What is the balance between internal endogenous sources of interruption and 
exogenous system shocks? 
3. What were the characteristics of the transition period?  
a. How did interruptions and transitions affect the accumulation of latecomers’ 
technological capabilities? 
b. Who where the actors governing the transition period? 
c. What were the factors contributing to the success or failure of transition from 
one innovation system to another? 
d. Are there ways in which ‘transition-institutions’ can minimize the negative 
effects of interruption causing erosion of capabilities in an innovation 
system? 
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5 Brazil21 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In 1969 a state-owned enterprise, Embraer was established by a presidential decree to 
produce and market commercial aircraft. By 1980 the company has grown to nearly 
6000 employees and has manufactured over 300 of a locally designed 15-19-seater 
twin-turboprop aircraft, the Bandeirante, more than 400 of a single-seater agricultural 
piston plane, the Ipanema, and launched the pressurized executive twin-prop, the Xingu. 
In 1981, the company earned some 190 million US dollars from exports, and nearly 440 
million dollars from sales (Figure 9), and made a profit of 26.5 million dollars.22 
 
Figure 9 Embraer’s sales, exports and number of employees, 1970-2007.  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Sources: Embraer, Frischtak 1992, Ramamurti 1987, Cassiolato 2002. 
  
 
 
5.2 The emergence of a sectoral innovation system 
The successful launch of Embraer marks the end of a transition period. The Brazilian 
aircraft industry was in a crisis after the Second World War. During the war Brazilian 
factories produced hundreds of small military trainers for the Allies (Figure 10). By the 
end of the 1940s the competition of technologically more advanced US producers drove 
the four local aircraft factories23 out of business. Why did it take over 20 years before a 
new company could emerge from the ruins? 
 
                                                 
21 The case of Brazil and the history of Embraer has been widely discussed in the innovation systems 
context (to highlight but a few studies, c.f. Cassiolato et al 2002, Marques 2004, Marques and Oliveira 
2009). 
22 Figures are from Ramamurti (1987); values adjusted to constant 2000 US dollars. 
23 The four companies were The National Air Navigation Company (CNNA), Companhia Aeronautica 
Paulista (CAP), Fabrica de Galeao and Fabrica de Avioes de Lagoa Santa. 
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Figure 10 Aircraft production in Brazil 
 
Source: own compilation based on Cabral (1987); Cassiolato et al (2002), Embraer Annual Reports, The 
Airlinerlist database <http://www.airlinerlist.com> (downloaded 2009 Feb); Flight International, various 
issues. 
Note: When exact annual production data are lacking before 1969, we divided the total number produced 
by the years of production.; Embraer Legacy executive jets are included in the ERJ-135 series; figures 
after 1970 exclude general aviation aircraft, including license-produced Pipers and the upgraded versions 
of the Ipanema (EMB-201 and 202). 
 
 
First, there was a lack of overarching strategy on how to develop the sector. It was clear 
that Brazilian firms did not possess the capabilities to produce what was locally 
demanded. Previous experience in producing small, propeller-driven planes was 
insufficient to meet the demand of commercial aviation for larger planes to serve 
transcontinental routes and smaller passenger planes to provide access to the vast inland 
areas of Brazil with poor airport infrastructure. The military needed planes to provide 
effective control of the country’s airspace and train pilots. The provision of trainers was 
easier to meet making use of existing capabilities. However, the benefit of local 
production over importing planes from more efficient and thus cheaper suppliers was 
debatable. The sheer size of investment required for educating and training the required 
human capital, for machinery and equipment, or to develop new designs explains partly 
why the government was hesitant in outlining any strategy and appropriating large sums 
in the budget. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Technology Institute of 
Aeronautics (ITA) and the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) or the procurement of a 
team of German aeronautical engineers in the early 1950s indicated the government’s 
dedication to maintain and improve technological capabilities in the field of 
aeronautics24 and pleased those lobbying for a grand strategy to develop the industry 
(among them industrialists in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and officers, 
pilots and aircraft engineers from the Brazilian Air Force (FAB)). 
                                                 
24 ITA not only provided a constantly growing, well-trained stock of aerospace engineers and 
techniciansm, but also maintained active linkages with leading foreign technical institutes, ever since MIT 
faculty assisted its establishment. 
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Second, the accumulation of technological capabilities always takes time. The constant 
flow of graduates from ITA as well as the arrival of experienced European aircraft 
designers25 with new ideas contributed to increased experimentation with small aircraft 
designs mainly at CTA’s R&D department (IPD) and at a very few private enterprises. 
However, aircraft design remained a small-scale activity, relying mostly on limited 
military orders. Production and maintenance activities could only keep two private 
light-plane producers in business, Aerotec (a spin-off of CTA) and Neiva. Producers did 
not take part in global competition and remained well behind the technology frontier in 
their market segment. Capabilities were still not in line with the market demand. 
General aviation was insufficient to provide an opportunity for producers to learn to 
compete. Access to technology was limited to what was public knowledge (through 
linkages with foreign universities and research institutes) or “embodied” in skilled 
individuals (foreign aircraft designers).  
In short, during the 1950s and 60s the basic tenets of a sectoral innovation system were 
established. The emergence of its main actors and linkages happened slowly and 
without a clear central mission. For a sectoral innovation system to reform and provide 
the impetus for industrial growth and catch-up, the emergence of an entrepreneur or 
innovation system broker was essential. 
The system broker was Ozires Silva26 and his team at CTA who played a central role in 
(1) finding a market niche (commuter aircraft capable of serving airports with poor 
infrastructure) and (2) channelling finance and design efforts to successfully develop a 
new product for this niche (IPD-6504); (3) establishing a company to ensure 
commercial valorisation of innovations (Embraer, 1969); (4) creating new linkages to 
provide capital (government launch support, commissioning 80  Bandeirantes and 
subsequently new planes, and a corporate tax incentive scheme channelling private 
capital to Embraer) and technology (through an exclusive contract with Piper or a deal 
with Italian producer Aermacchi, an offset contract with Northrop and collaboration 
with the Canadian engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney).27  
The empirical evidence of successful system transition is ample. On the output side, 
Figure 10 shows the production cycles of major new products: the EMB-110 
Bandeirante 19-seat commuter plane, the EMB-312 Tucano (single-engine military 
basic trainer), the EMB-121 Xingu (a pressurized executive twin-turboprop), and the 
EMB-120 Brasilia (a pressurized 30-seater twin-turboprop commuter). Figure 9 shows 
the increase of sales revenues of Embraer (to a historical maximum of 924 million USD 
in 1989) and the growth of exports (nearly two-third of sales revenues by mid-1980s; 
growing to 486 million USD in 1989). This shows that Embraer’s strategy of aiming at 
the commercial commuter market28 paid off, especially after the liberalization of the US 
market (in 1981, Bandeirante had a 37.8% share in the 15-19 seat segment29). Brazilian 
                                                 
25 Foreign designers included Heinrich Focke, who collaborated with CTA; Willibald Weber and Joseph 
Kovacs who worked with the industrialist Jose Carlos Neiva; or Max Holste, who helped design the first 
commercial plane for CTA, that became the Embraer Bandeirante. 
26 An air force pilot, ITA (and later Caltech) graduate aeronautical engineer, founder and president of 
Embraer (1969-86), who also played a key role in its privatization in 1994.  
27 (Due to space limitations, we refrain from presenting the history in greater details, but there is an 
extensive literature to cover these points: Silva, 2002, Cabral, 1987, Ramamurti, 1987, Frischtak, 1992, 
Cassiolato 2002, Embraer.) 
28 Already at the development of the Bandeirante, US FAA guidelines were fully observed to facilitate 
certification, which is essential for exports. Airworthiness certificate was given by France in 1977, by the 
UK and the US in 1978. Feedback from regional airlines and other users was considered seriously for the 
development of subsequent models. 
29 Sarathy, 1985 
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aerospace value added grew to 220 million by 1980 and 790 million USD by 1989. This 
growth is especially remarkable contrasted to the global industrial landscape, shaken by 
the oil crisis. Brazilian growth in aerospace was nearly 10-times the growth of the 
global industry (in capitalist economies) during the 1970s. Even after the start-up 
decade, the 258% growth between 1981 and 1989 still overshadows the global average 
of 122% (and 125% of the USA), providing a clear evidence of catch-up (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 Trends of catch-up: aerospace value added of Brazil, China and Indonesia  
compared to the US, 1970-2007 (%) 
 
Sources: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, IBGE, UNIDO. 
 
We argue here that the emergence of the innovation system and its institutional set-up 
was a necessary precondition for the accelerated growth of the industry. We do not 
debate the crucial role of Embraer’s management in successful formulating and 
executing a sound strategy for the increased sales performance and growth. However, 
the physical and human resources and the general institutional arrangement for 
performing innovative activities were available before the creation of Embraer. The 
government and other systemic actors provided key elements such as affordable skilled 
labour, R&D activities (and results which Embraer commercialized), openness to 
foreign technological sources, practices of military procurement for new aircraft 
development and export credits, or protectionist trade policies. 
The establishment of Embraer as a state-owned enterprise30 was the final institutional 
innovation in the formative phase of the SIS. A national champion allowed Brazil to 
reap the benefits of an already existing SIS and to set the forces of innovation in motion. 
It was a necessary condition for the increase of innovative performance, since much of 
the tacit knowledge required for competitive production based on up-to-date technology 
needed to be acquired through ‘learning by doing’. 
State ownership did not preclude the Embraer management from governing certain 
functions of the innovation system. The successful emergence of the Embraer-
championed aircraft industry in Brazil – what Ramamurti (ibid) aptly refers to as a 
combination of public power and private initiative – was in fact the result of shared 
governance of the innovation system. Certain functions (following the typology of 
Hekkert et al, 2007), such as ‘knowledge development’, ‘knowledge diffusion’ were 
shared between CTA and Embraer’s R&D departments or foreign sources. ‘Guidance of 
                                                 
30 State ownership was a last resort to overcome the lack of private venture capital (Silva, 2002) 
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search’ for new technologies and ‘market formation’ were jointly influenced by the 
marketing strategy of Embraer and the procurement policies of the Air Force or the 
Aeronautical Ministry. The government played a more decisive role (especially at the 
beginning) in ‘resource mobilization’ (including capital, skilled labour and technology), 
Embraer (and other smaller companies) provided ‘entrepreneurial activities’ for the 
system.31  
This governing structure remained in place until the next major transition of the SIS. 
Over the years as production increased smaller adjustments or iterations were made in 
the institutional framework (often to meet the needs of Embraer). This indicates an 
incremental ‘co-evolution’ of technology, institutions and organizations. However, the 
performance of the innovation system increased and so did its size, without any 
significant trend break.  
 
5.3 The Crisis 
 
The period 1990-94 marks the second crisis of the Brazilian aircraft industry. While 
global recession caused value added for the global aerospace industry to decline by 30%, 
Brazil was hit more severely. Sales plummeted by some 75% and export by 80% from 
the level of 1990. Figure 10 reveals not only the reduced production of the EMB-120 
Brasilia, but also a gap where no new aircraft was introduced to the market. This 
therefore indicates a crisis of the innovation system. 32 
The primary cause of the crisis was a daunting lack of financial resources. The 
preceding years saw the end of the military dictatorship and a financial and economic 
crisis in Brazil. The previous practice of financing new product development with 
government launch support was no longer an option. Financing R&D for a new regional 
turboprop plane from own resources was beyond the capacity of the heavily indebted 
Embraer, and collaboration with the Argentinean FAMA turned out to be too costly. By 
1994 R&D expenditures of Embraer exceeded 30% of its sales (Figure 12). The 
company had to reduce its workforce to less than half the 1989 levels.  
 
                                                 
31 It is an interesting problem whether the emergence of a system broker was a historical accident or 
whether it was a product of the system. We argue that the more advanced the educational and research 
organizations are in the system, the higher the chances for entrepreneurs to emerge. 
32 See Frischtak (1992) for a comprehensive analysis of the crisis. 
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Figure 12 R&D Expenditure and R&D intensity of Embraer, 1983-2007  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: own compilation based on Embraer annual reports and Frischtak (1992) 
 
The survival of the production and innovation system was at stake. A more than 40% 
drop in patenting by foreign companies marks a significant lack of trust in the SIS 
(Figure 13). Although patents are less appropriate measure of innovativeness in the 
aerospace industry33, the trend of foreign companies patenting34 in Brazil is a crude 
indicator of technology flows and technological learning in the innovation system. 
Given a strict intellectual property regime, foreigner’s patenting activity reflects their 
estimation of local technological capabilities. During the 1980s nearly 40 patents a year 
were added to the stock (Figure 13), followed by a sharp, four-year interruption.  
 
Figure 13 Number of patents in the field of aerospace granted by year of application (1974-2007) 
 
Source: Brazilian Patent Office via Esp@cenet 
                                                 
33 Patents are less meaningful indicators in the aerospace industry as compared to other high-tech 
industries such as biotech, since innovations are preferred to be protected by secrecy (Niosi and Zhegu, 
2005), which is a rather efficient way given the high capital barriers. 
34 We distinguished patents in aerospace (classification B64) filed at the Brazilian patent office by the 
nationality of applicants. The two groups are: all-foreign, where there is no Brazilian applicant, and the 
rest, where there is at least one Brazilian applicant. Note that change in the trend can also be caused by an 
overall change in innovative performance of foreign firms. 
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By that time, the technological challenges of aircraft manufacturing changed from 
priorities of economy and fuel efficiency to cost, noise and capacity (Sehra and Whitlow, 
2004). The global industry had already introduced new ways to cut costs. These 
included the geographical expansion of supply chains and sharing development costs 
with component manufacturers, and the development of aircraft families of high 
commonality between models. Embraer still vertically integrated all design and 
production phases and performed R&D activities in too many different directions 
(Frischtak 1992). In short, following an external political and macro-economic shock 
the Brazilian aerospace industry lost its competitive edge and the innovation system was 
not able to help it regain. 
 
 
 
5.4 A radical change in the Brazilian sectoral innovation system  
 
The solution to overcome the crisis was a change in ownership that fundamentally 
altered the pattern of interdependencies in the sectoral innovation system. In 1994 
Embraer was privatized to a consortium of domestic investors. Although the 
government did not use military procurement for launch support, it continued to fund 
part of Embraer’s R&D activities and exports35 (through FINEP, BNDES and Banco do 
Brasil). At the same time, spin-off enterprises (with former Embraer employees) joined 
the local supplier chain. Privatization resulted in capital injection as well as in greater 
flexibility to sign partnership agreements to jointly develop a family of regional jets. 
Risk-sharing partnerships (see Figueiredo et al, 2008) reduced R&D costs for Embraer 
and became an important new source of technology. Embraer changed redefined its core 
competence as aircraft designer and system assembler.  
The results of these institutional changes are remarkable. Between 1994 and 2000 sales 
rose on the wings of the ERJ-145 regional jet family from less than 200 million to over 
2.8 billion US dollars, more than 97% of which came from exports; value added 
increased to 2.3 billion USD (Figure 14). At the same time while Embraer’s R&D 
expenditures increased, the R&D/Sales ratio decreased from over 30% to less than 5% 
(Figure 12), even though Embraer was developing a new family. The larger E-170-190 
product line can accommodate up to 120 passengers making Embraer a direct 
competitor of Airbus and Boeing in their smaller product line. Embraer introduced over 
a dozen new models of regional and executive jets since the system transition and 
became third largest manufacturer of jet aircraft worldwide in terms of delivery. 
  
                                                 
35 The PROEX export financing scheme was contested in a WTO trade dispute by Canada, but after the 
settlement a slightly modified version still remains in place (see Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). 
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Figure 14 Aerospace industry Value Added in Brazil, China and Indonesia, 1970-2007 
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Brazil: IBGE yearbooks, China: CNBS yearbooks, Indonesia: UNIDO yearbooks.  
Note: The following industry-specific conversion ratios were applied (updated or backdated to 2000): 
BRL/USD: 1.09 (Vertesy and Szirmai 2010); CNY/USD: 4.6 (Szirmai et al, 2005); IDR/USD: 4201 
(Stuivenwold and Timmer, 2003). 
 
 
5.5 A new transition? 
 
Companies in the Brazilian supply chain benefited from the growth during the late 
1990s. However, the share of Brazilian content decreased with the new product line and 
between 2002 and 2005 value added fell back to 2 billion USD.36 There are several 
signs of shortcomings of the SIS that may signal some further changes, albeit less 
fundamental than those in the 1950-60s or in 1994.  
The Brazilian aerospace industry recovered from the post-9/11 demand shock relatively 
rapidly. However, the crisis of 2008-09 showed greater vulnerability of an industry 
dependent on regional and executive jets. The relatively outdated technological 
capabilities, the lack of sufficient credit lines and venture capital make it difficult for 
local SMEs to become competitive and join global supply chains as risk sharing 
partners (ABDI, 2009). To boost the competitiveness of local SMEs is a major concern 
for the government. There is a growing consensus about the need to modernize the 
education and training system, to support innovativeness through new aircraft 
development and procurement policies or offset agreements targeting the supplier chain 
to create a globally competitive center of excellence in aerospace.37 As a first response, 
in 2009 the government officially commissioned Embraer to development a military 
transport and tanker aircraft (the K/C-390).  
In the meantime, the global competitive landscape is changing and new planes need to 
be even more fuel efficient to reduce operations costs and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Latest large civilian aircraft designs use composite materials at an unprecedented scale, 
                                                 
36 For a discussion of trends in value added and labour productivity, see Vertesy and Szirmai (2010). 
37 Clearly indicated by recent detailed, comprehensive studies, see ABDI (2009) and Montoro and Migon 
(2009). 
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in which Embraer is lagging behind.38 The cost share of avionics in a new aircraft has 
reached unprecedented heights. Brazilian companies in these two rapidly growing 
technology domains have no frontier capabilities to offer for foreign system assemblers. 
In the regional aircraft market new players (including Comac in China, the Russian 
Sukhoi and Mitsubishi in Japan) have made significant investments to break the 
Bombardier-Embraer duopoly. Thus the competitiveness challenge might call for a new 
innovation system transition. 
We have yet to see major institutional changes in the Brazilian innovation system. What 
changed after the crisis was the launch of the military transport project which indicates a 
replacement of commercial investments with (potentially in the short term) public 
investments (to be phased out by export to the military market in the long run).  
 
The overview of the history of the industry helped us identify historical turning points 
of interruption, crisis and transition. Such turning points (often not single moments but 
periods lasting several years) are the post-WWII crisis in the early 1950s, the creation of 
Embraer in 1969, the interruption following the financial crisis in 1989-90 and the 
transition connected to the privatization of Embraer in 1994. The changes in innovation 
system size and performance are charted in Figure 15 within an interrupted innovation 
framework. 
1. From the 1950s until 1969, the growth in size of the system exceeded its 
performance growth, although both were positive. Size expanded due to 
technology inputs from foreign designers and the work of CTA and new skilled 
labor inputs from ITA. The performance increased owing to a few new designs, 
but as production was limited to a few small planes, we assume that less process 
innovation took place. 
2. A transition to another innovation system was finalized in 1969. A state-owned 
company was created that specialized in commercial and military aircraft 
development, production and marketing. Embraer became the single most 
important corporate actor in the system receiving most inputs into innovation.  
3. From 1969 and 1990, both the size and the performance of the system increased 
hugely. (This trend is not linear. The figures presented earlier showed that R&D, 
employees, new products, patents, and sales fluctuated from year to year.) Based 
on the relatively high global market share of two of Embraer’s commuter aircraft, 
we conclude that the performance of the innovation system was close to its 
frontier. 39 
4. The interruption between 1990 and 1994 is evidenced by the decrease in system 
size (due to decrease of R&D expenditures, employment and increase of debts) 
and performance (lack of new patents, new product sales or new process 
innovation). It became clear to the major actors that a return to the old system of 
innovation would be insufficient to sustain competitive advantage. 
5. After 1994, both the size and the performance of the innovation system grew at 
an unprecedented rate, made possible by a transition to a new system based on 
strategic alliances in R&D as well as in production, which allowed the input of 
frontier technologies from the best global suppliers. The size and performance 
increase was once again not linear (with a significant break in 2002-3), but 
overwhelmingly positive. 
                                                 
38 When deciding for the use of composite materials, there is of course a tradeoff between production and 
spare-parts costs and operating costs.  
39 See Marques 2004 for more details on the system. 
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6. The 2003 drop in value added indicates a new crisis in the industry. This 
primarily concerns companies other than Embraer (which still increased sales 
and export until 2007). However, Embraer’s R&D intensity remained at a low 
level. Until now, no fundamental institutional changes have occurred. 
 
 
Figure 15 The interrupted trajectory of the development of the Brazilian aerospace industry 
 
Source: Authors 
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6 China 
 
6.1 Introduction: from military to civilian innovations 
After entering the aircraft manufacturing industry in the 1950s,40 China has become a 
producer and – to a lesser extent – exporter of fighter jets (Figure 17), bombers and light 
transport aircraft during the Cold War (CIA 1972, Allen et al, 1995, Frankenstein and 
Gill, 1996). Since the 1990s firms of the Chinese aeronautical conglomerates have 
joined the global supply chains as manufacturer of commercial aircraft parts and 
components for western producers, including Airbus and Boeing (KPMG, 2004). In the 
last decade foreign manufactures (Embraer, Airbus) brought final assembly work to 
China and the Chinese company (Comac) designed and produced a prototype of a 
regional jet (Goldstein 2006) 
A case of system transition. In this section we focus on the lengthy crisis and slow 
transition that started in the late 1980s and established a dualist structure by today. The 
opening up of the military-industry complex (MIC) and the expansion of civilian 
production brought along fundamental institutional and organizational changes in an 
industry that at some point during this process employed over half a million people. 
 
6.2 The Sectoral Innovation System in the emergent phase: an 
inward­looking innovation system 
6.2.1 Legacies of the Military­Industry Complex (MIC)  
Although China at its peak in 1974 produced over 500 aircraft per year, these were 
always at least a generation behind the global technology frontier due to difficulties in 
acquiring the required technologies (Frankenstein and Gill, 1996). Chinese design and 
production plants had to substitute the previously available Soviet technology through 
reverse-engineering after the 1961 Sino-Soviet split. The military-industry complex, 
created but also hindered by national security concerns, has never emerged as a fully 
functional sectoral innovation system. Unlike in Brazil where the aerospace industry 
concentrated around the single Sao Jose dos Campos cluster, at least a dozen of centers 
were created all over China involved with aeronautical R&D, maintenance and 
production work. The most important production facilities were located in Shenyang 
and Harbin in the northeast, Chengdu in the southwest, as well as around Shanghai, 
Xian and Taiyuan. Aircraft factories oversaw hundreds of enterprises and also produced 
non-aviation products to utilize idle capacities. Productivity was not a major concern for 
the division of labor between these factories and multiplication of tasks was common 
due to lack of linkages between parallel projects. The organization of the industry 
showed a ‘satellite pattern’, decisions were made in Beijing and there was little 
interaction among the facilities. 
 
Supervision and coordination of R&D and production activities was the responsibility 
of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence 
(COSTIND), a body reporting both to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as to 
                                                 
40 Due to lack of space, we do not discuss here the emergence of the Chinese aerospace industry and 
innovation system. 
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the State Council. The only source of finance was the government (the Military or State 
Council), and the expenditures on various projects remained concealed. The production 
cycle of military aircraft is clearly influenced by political events (Figure 16). 
 
While research and engineer training was located around the production facilities, 
university level education in disciplines related to aerospace were offered in Beijing 
(BUAA) and Nanjing (NUAA). 
 
Figure 16 Estimated Chinese Jet Fighter Production, 1960–1995 
 
Source: Allen et al (1995, Fig.17, p.162) 
Note: This figure clearly indicates the influence of major political events: the Sino-Soviet split of 1961, 
the Cultural Revolution during the late 1960s and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping following 1978. 
 
6.2.2 The origins of commercial production 
Even before the more fundamental institutional changes of the 1990s, there were several 
attempts to diversify into the production of commercial aircraft. The Y-10 project of the 
1970s proved that Chinese engineers were capable of designing prototypes of a large 
civil aircraft that were able to fly.41 However, the project never reached the phase of 
series production and was cancelled in 1983. It did not turn out to be commercially 
viable and the Aviation Administration of China preferred to import more modern 
planes.42 
 
The MD-80 assembly project was the first bold sign of opening up the industry to 
western technology and commercial production. In 1985 China signed a license 
agreement with McDonnell Douglas (MD) to assemble the MD-80-series medium range 
jets in Shanghai. The airplanes were assembled from kits with some components 
fabricated in China. MD provided technical data, training, and on-site assistance. 35 
planes were produced between 1985 and 1994, mostly for the local market (30 were 
sold to China Northern and China Eastern and 5 were exported to the US). The 
Shanghai-produced planes were however repeatedly experiencing technical failures and 
                                                 
41 Although the Y-10 shows a high degree of similarity to the Boeing B-707, Chen (2009) argues that 
some of its features even outperformed the B-707. Thus it was innovation, not merely imitation. 
42 It was based on 1950s technology and Boeing stopped producing the 707 in 1979 due to its high fuel 
consumption. Political reasons might also have played a part: possible pressure from the US as well as the 
end of influence of the ‘Gang of Four’ who were behind the project. 
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clocked only a modest amount of flying hours. A renewed contract for 20 Chinese MD-
90s Trunkliner with an indigenously produced share of 80% resulted in only 2 planes 
delivered for China Northern in 2000. Despite low productivity43 and quality problems, 
the technology acquired through this endeavor gave a major push to the industry, and 
also found its way to the first indigenous design, the ARJ-21 regional jet. 
 
Quality problems hampered the success of a smaller-scale project, the multiuse 
turboprop military / civilian transport plane based on Soviet Antonov design, the Xian 
Y-7, later the MA-60. These projects already included collaboration with Western 
partners. But these Chinese made planes had limited success on the export markets since 
western administrations did not certify the planes due to quality concerns. Most of them 
were eventually grounded for safety reasons or lack of spare parts.  
 
6.2.3 Main features of the innovation system44 before the changes of 
the 1990s 
Self-reliance was the most primary goal underlying innovative activities in Communist 
China before the 1990s, for considerations of national defense. This did not preclude 
cross-border technology flows and even import of components such as jet engines for 
Chinese-made fighter jets, or the use of reverse-engineering of imported aircraft (in 
order not to reinvent the wheel). However, channels were not established for intensive 
knowledge exchange and new aircraft development was a rather isolated activity, 
resulting in innovations being at least a generation behind the global frontier. Secrecy 
prevailed and hampered interactions even between various regional aerospace clusters. 
A division of labor based on the purpose of aircraft45 resulted in duplications of tasks 
and lack of use of economies of scope – again, for strategic reasons. Financing of 
innovative and productive activities by the state council or the PLA was not transparent. 
 
6.3 The crisis in the inward­looking innovation system 
By the early 1990s, the mismatch between the institutions of the inward-looking 
innovation system and the competitive landscape became large. After the end of the 
Cold War Chinese fighter and transport planes would not sell on foreign markets, not 
even in the Third World countries. Producers were lacking knowledge, skills and 
financial capacities to participate in higher tiers of the newly forming, vertically 
cooperating global industry. Due to lack of intensive interaction with producers on the 
technology frontier, aeronautics and astronautics education lagged behind the West. At 
the same time, the demand for commercial aircraft in China grew sharply.   
                                                 
43 During the twenty years period of its production, the US produced over 1000 of these planes making it 
the third most successful jets in history, China only assembled 35, most of which were very soon 
grounded. 
44 The pragmatic approach of Radosevic (1997) to see socialist techno-economic networks as innovation 
systems is applicable in the Chinese case as well, since knowledge creation and new product design was 
an explicit aim, even if the incentives and a number of institutions differed profoundly from a capitalist 
system. 
45 For example, fighter aircraft was produced in Shenyang, Chengdu, Guiyang and Nanchang; light and 
medium transport aircraft in Harbin and Xian; helicopters in Harbin and Jingdezhen; bombers in Xian. 
(Medeiros, 2005) (And this list is not complete). 
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6.4 A radical change in the Chinese sectoral innovation system in 
the 1990s 
The transition in the aerospace industry and innovation system was part of broader 
market reforms in China. The iterative but fundamental institutional changes in the 
national innovation system were correctly described as ‘adaptive learning’ (Gu and 
Lundvall, 2006). Certain heavy industries (including automobile) were consolidated in a 
shorter time, but aerospace remains a slow mover, given its sheer size (it employed 
nearly 600,000 workers in 1995) and the reluctance of chief financing and regulating 
bodies of the military to change their mindset. Following a 1991 order of the more 
demand-conscious government, the PLA was to shift 80% of defense manufacturing 
projects to commercial products (Allen et al, 1995), in order to tackle financial 
difficulties. The successful transition of other industries certainly serves as an example 
for aerospace. 
 
Demand for air travel spurred by growth of the economy has been a major driving factor 
of industrial change. Both international and domestic air traffic have increased 
dramatically since the late 1980s.46 However, the Chinese air transport market remains 
tightly regulated and aircraft load factors and flying hours remain suboptimal, airport 
capacities underused (Goldstein, 2006). 
 
6.4.1 Empirical evidence of interruption and transition 
 
Value added. We estimate that aerospace value added exceeded 4.8 billion dollars in 
1983. Following a sudden drop in fighter aircraft production, it fell to 2.1 billion by 
1987 and continued to decrease to a low of 1.4 billion USD in 1996. After a turnaround, 
with an average growth of over 16%, the value added of Chinese aerospace industry 
exceeded the levels of the early 1980s by 2005. In 2007, it reached a historic 7.1 billion 
USD (Figure 2).  
Exports. The composition of the industry’s exports shows a striking change. Between 
1970 and 90, China exported an annual average of 0.5 billion dollars worth of (mostly 
locally manufactured) military planes. During the following two decades this amount 
was halved. At the same time commercial aircraft parts and components exports grew 
from some 100 million dollars at the beginning of the 1990s to over 1 billion USD by 
2007 (Figure 17). Nevertheless, China continues to import almost all of its commercial 
aircraft47;  
 
                                                 
46 Passenger air traffic doubled between 1985 and 1990 to 23 billion passenger kilometer. This value 
nearly tripled by 1995 to 68 billion, still merely 10% of US air traffic. It further tripled to 200 billion by 
2005 and latest figures show 290 billion by 2008 (CNBS). 
47 Import (of mostly complete aircraft) grew from 1.6 billion in 1992 to over 8.4 billion USD in 2006.  
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Figure 17 Export of Chinese Military and Commercial Aircraft, 1955-2008  
(USD Millions, Constant = 2000) 
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Source: SIPRI; UN COMTRADE (data only available from 1992) 
 
R&D. Data on aerospace R&D is available from 1995. From an annual average of 100 
million USD until 199948 the launch of major national aircraft development projects led 
by 2007 to an increased R&D expenditure of 430 million USD49. Comparing industrial 
R&D expenditure to aggregate sales shows relatively little fluctuation and an increasing 
share of R&D (Figure 18).   
 
Figure 18 R&D Expenditure and R&D per Sales in Chinese Aerospace Industry, 1995-2007  
(USD Millions, Constant = 2000) 
 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics.  
Note: Annual Average exchange rate in 2000 of 8.28 CNY/USD was applied (IMF). 
 
                                                 
48 For a comparison, during the same period Embraer alone spent the same amount on R&D. 
49 In comparison, in 2000 the US spent a total of 10.3 billion USD on aerospace R&D, and 14 billion in 
2006. 
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6.5 The new Chinese aerospace innovation system 
6.5.1 Foreign aircraft manufacturers in China 
While importing most of the aircraft from Boeing and Airbus, China pushed for offset 
agreements to simultaneously support the technological upgrading of the industry. At 
first this meant less technology-, more labor-intensive parts (hardware) manufacturing 
at dozens of locations across the country.50 Production quality increased substantially as 
a result of these deals since Chinese suppliers had to deliver according to the same strict 
standards as other producers faced in the West. The initial political necessity to produce 
in China soon became an economic advantage for western manufacturers as they reaped 
the benefits of lower labor costs (notwithstanding the initial learning costs). However, 
Chinese contribution remained at the lower tiers of the earlier discussed, newly 
established global industrial structure. A first risk sharing partnership venture was only 
signed by a Harbin-based consortium and Airbus for the A-350 XWB project in 2009. 
 
The first foreign manufacturer to commence final assembly of jets in China was 
Embraer. The Harbin Embraer joint venture51 of 2003 allowed the Brazilian company to 
deliver ERJ-145 regional jets for the Chinese market by avoiding import taxes while 
acquiring certain parts manufacturing and systems assembly activities was a major 
technological boost for the Harbin plant. The results of the venture were mixed: by the 
end of 2009 only 33 of the original order of 50 jets were delivered52 although the 
company had a capacity to produce 24 a year and was expecting new orders. The last of 
the ERJ-145 is expected to be produced in 2011 and Embraer is now awaiting a 
government decision to approve a shift to ERJ-190 production. Otherwise it plans to 
close down the plant.53 The Chinese government is hesitant since it would be a direct 
competitor of the locally developed ARJ-21 (Asian Regional Jet for the 21st Century), 
due to enter series production in the same time horizon. 
 
Airbus also established a joint venture for final assembly in China. 54  Operations 
commenced in 2008 at the Tianjin final assembly line (FAL), a replica of Airbus’ 
Hamburg plant. The first A320 was delivered mid 2009. At the moment, production 
capacity is four aircraft per month. Airbus initially assembled aircraft from kits 
delivered from Europe, gradually changing to locally made parts.55 The total investment 
in the Tianjin FAL amounted to 1.47 billion USD56. While Boeing was not ready to take 
the risk of going to China, Airbus expects that the long term benefits of market access 
exceed the initial investments.57 
                                                 
50 See KPMG (2004) or Boeing (2008). 
51 The joint venture is special since it allowed a 51% majority ownership for a foreign company. For more 
details on the 50 million USD deal, see Goldstein (2006). 
52 “Harbin-Embraer’s fate rests with China talks” AinOnline, 28 Jan 2010 
(http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/harbin-embraers-fate-rests-with-china-talks-
23599/) 
53 “Chinese govt to decide on future for Harbin Embraer: Curado” Air Transport Intelligence News 25 
May 2010. 
54 Airbus owns 51% share while the rest is divided by a consortium of AVIC and Tianjin Free Trade Zone. 
55 Avoiding double shipment by directly using components i.e. wing boxes produced by Xian Aircraft 
Industry Group. 
56 “Airbus delivers first China-made jet, underlining its Asian thrust”, Agence France Presse, 23 June 
2009. 
57  Production is cheaper in China mainly because of (some) reduction in import taxes and duties. The 
lower labour costs in China are however not necessarily realized in the short run given the high training 
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6.5.2  ‘Indigenous’ aircraft development 
Chinese ambitions to boost the industry have been high. The 11th Five-Year Plan for 
2006-2010 included the completion of the ARJ-21 regional jet project and the launch of 
a large aircraft development project for civil and military use, supposed to fly by 2015.58 
Although indigenous in name, both projects utilize global technological and investment 
capacities, following the risk sharing partnership practice of Western aircraft producers. 
The ARJ-21 project that started in 2002 still reflects many of its local technological 
origins. Coordinated by a government-led commercial aircraft company (ACAC, later 
COMAC)59, the four plants involved (Shanghai, Xian, Chengdu and Shenyang) were 
the same as the ones in the MD-90 Trunkliner project. It is hard not to notice the 
resemblance of certain sections of the plane60. The largest share of development costs of 
the first regional jet project, the ARJ-21 were provided by the public aerospace R&D 
supporter COSTIND, but leading transnational companies participate in financing the 
development.61 The US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has been involved in the 
development process in order to facilitate certification. The fact that the “First Chinese 
Made Plane” will not bear “Made in China” tags indicates of the maturity of Chinese 
design and organizational capabilities. The arrangement of acquiring technology and 
finance through risk sharing partnerships is similar to the strategy Embraer chose in the 
mid 1990s, but for the arrangement to work efficiently, private ownership of Embraer 
was crucial.  
 
The ARJ-21 made its maiden flight at the end of 2008 and four prototypes are currently 
undergoing tests. Series production and the establishment of a distribution network has 
not even begun when the government announced the plans to develop a large civil 
aircraft 62  in the 168-190 seats category. The COMAC C-919 63  would be a direct 
competitor of the smaller Boeing and Airbus jets (B-737 and A-320 family), bringing 
new turbulence to a consolidated duopolistic market.  China has yet to gain experience 
in setting foot on the international aircraft market, which involves winning the trust of 
passengers and airlines, establishing the maintenance, repair and overhaul network, and 
efficient supply chain management. This step is crucial to recover the huge sunk costs 
of development, and still requires vast investments domestically and overseas. 
                                                                                                                                               
costs for local labor force and the cost of expatriates (125 of the 500 employees). (“Airbus’ China 
Gamble” Flight International 28 October 2008) 
58 “Official identifies eight goals for China's aviation, aerospace industry”, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
9 Nov 2006 
59 ACAC, or ‘AVIC-I Commercial Aircraft Company’ was a consortium of four main companies under 
the AVIC I conglomerate, designated to oversee the development, certification and marketing of 
commercial aircraft. In 2009 the company became part of COMAC, the ‘Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China Ltd’ established in 2008. 
60  Highly similar parts include the nose, produced by Chengdu, the fuselage by Xian, the tail section by 
Shenyang or the horizontal stabilizers by Shanghai (Andersen 2008). The aircraft was thus aptly named 
Xiangfeng (flying phoenix), as it was revived from the ashes of the failed MD-90 Trunkliner. 
61 Foreign partners include Antonov (wing design and testing), General Electric (regional jet engine 
development), Rockwell Collins (avionics), Hamilton Sundstrand (electric system and auxiliary power 
unit and fire protection system), Eaton (control panel), Liebherr (landing gear). Boeing has been 
providing engineering consultancy and cockpit design assistance. 
62 ‘Large civil aircraft’ is a more appropriate term for this narrow-body jet than the often used ‘jumbo’, 
which normally refers to Boeing B-747s with a seating capacity in the range of 500. 
63 The list of collaborating partners has not been finalized yet; currently Hongdu (Nanchang), Xian, 
Shenyang and Chengdu Corporations are the Chinese companies involved (“China’s Comac brings more 
suppliers in, Flight International, 24 Sept 2009”), while foreign companies already chosen include many 
of the ARJ-21 partners: General Electric, Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, Liebherr Aerospace and 
Parker Hannifin (based on respective company press releases). 
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The Chengdu and Shenyang plants at the same time continued to produce enhanced 
versions of existing fighter jets and introduced new models, such as the Chengdu J-1064 
or the FC-1 Brave Dragon. This latter aircraft is a joint development project with 
Pakistan and is intended for low-cost military markets (Medeiros, 2005) 65. A fighter-
bomber (JH-7) was developed in Xian during the 1980s and 1990s. Both the existing 
stock of aircraft and the latest developments represent is at least one generation behind 
the technological capabilities of the US while onboard systems and mass-production 
capabilities are still further behind. But the real competitor of China is not in America 
but in Asia: “Right now, the only arms race China is really facing is with India, and 
[Beijing is] winning,” quotes the influential industry journal Aviation Week and Space 
Technology 66 with regard to the development of a fifth generation stealth fighter. 
 
6.5.3 Organizational changes 
These developments in the accumulation of technological capabilities were set against a 
dynamically changing organizational structure. The first sign of opening up the MIC 
was the creation of Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) conglomerate in 1993 
(controlling all the aeronautic research and production facilities) and China Aerospace 
Corporation (CASC, in charge of the astronautic programs and missile system 
development and production). Driven by the need to plant the seeds of competition, 
AVIC was split into two in 199967. Duplications and a lack of transparency and unclear 
assignment of responsibilities still remained in the system which eventually led to a 
2008 decision to once again merge the two. One clear result of these bureaucratic twists 
is a drastic decrease of employment. As Figure 19 shows, employment in the industry 
shrunk in a decade from some 600,000 in 1995 by half to a stable 300,000. Labor 
productivity increased from 1995 to 2000 by 87%, between 2000 and 2007 by 366%. 
These are evident signs of consolidation in the industry, even if this might not remain 
the final setup. Nevertheless the structure remains “extremely complex” with cross-
ownership and a long line of cascading subordinates (Nolan and Zhang, 2002). Non-
aviation business still makes up 80% of AVIC’s business (Medeiros, 2005).68 
 
                                                 
64 The J-10 is an F-16-class fourth generation light fighter jet with fly-by-wire control and a Russian 
engine, launched in 1988, first flew in 1996. It is believed to have received direct technological input 
from the Israeli Aircraft Industries’ discontinued Lavi program (which received input from the F-16 
program), though it was denied by both parties as it would imply American technology transferred to 
China. (Medeiros, 2005 and “Chinese J-10 'benefited from the Lavi project”, Jane’s Defense News, 19 
May 2008; http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080519_2_n.shtml ) 
65 The aircaft’s Pakistani designation is JF-17 Thunder, and development partners included Chengdu 
Aircraft Industries Corp., the Pakistani Air Force and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex; is equipped with a 
turbofan engine from the Russian Klimov. Design began in 1994 but the aircraft first flew only in 2003, 
produced in limited numbers since 2007/8 in China and Pakistan, while modifications are still underway.  
66. “China Promises New, Advanced Fighter”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Nov 2009.  
67 In general, AVIC I was responsible for producing larger planes, AVIC II for smaller, including 
helicopters. For details on the distribution of companies within, see Table 3 and 4 in Andersen (2008). 
CASC was also divided in 1999 into China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (also CASC, 
in charge of the space programs) and China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC), 
later in 2001 renamed China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). 
68 Nolan and Zhang reports that automobiles, components and motorcycles alone accounted for 62% of 
AVIC’s revenue in 1997. 
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Figure 19 Employment and Labour Productivity Growth in the Chinese Aerospace Industry, 1995-2007 
(Thousand USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: CNBS,  
Note: for value added figures see notes of Fig.14. 
 
6.6 Interrupted innovation in the Chinese aerospace industry 
6.6.1 Summary of the transition 
The crisis of the inward-looking innovation system was caused by exogenous political 
and macro-economic changes in the environment in which endogenous forces played 
little if any role. The interruption can almost entirely be explained by China’s transition 
into a market economy. Yet the speed of the transition that took place in the aerospace 
industry was much slower than in many other industries that have become globally 
competitive by today. This points to sector-level institutional explanations. Even if 
market institutions only emerged gradually in the Chinese economy, the aerospace 
industry showed excessive institutional inertia. This of course hardly comes as a 
surprise in an industry that employed hundreds of thousands of employees, and where 
the role of the military remains influential. On the one hand, export is a good indicator 
of the transition; both in terms of total values and composition. As the export of military 
planes dropped, parts and components slowly replaced and overtook them (Figure 17), 
revealing a greater integration in global supply chains. Increasing labor productivity 
since 2000 (Figure 19) on the other hand shows learning in the new system created 
during the transition. 
 
However, it is a Chinese peculiarity that old structures still survive parallel to new ones 
in a dualist style, even within regional clusters. This is due to the privileged position of 
national defense on the political agenda. The incentives differ hugely for units 
producing for the export markets and those for closed military installations. Openness in 
the innovative process has clearly increased in the commercial segment, indicated by 
the large number of foreign partners used in the ARJ-21 project (and the readiness to 
involve foreign aviation authorities in the design phase). Self-sufficiency is not an 
imperative anymore, even if techno-nationalist rhetoric remains in place. However, 
foreign ownership of private enterprises is only allowed in a limited fashion and 
excessive bureaucracy is still seen as a barrier to innovation. Military aircraft design and 
manufacturing remains still very closed and primarily domestically oriented. The 
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transition affected mostly the civilian segment but left many areas open for further, 
incremental adjustments (i.e. 50% state ownership and approval requirement hinders 
fast corporate decision-making). 
 
The transition was governed (and cushioned from shock) by the government. But top-
down forces (changed strategies and incentives) were met with initiatives of foreign 
producers who were ready to enter into offset deals to produce parts locally or to even 
bring final assembly to China. This, in the end, shows that the transition was carefully 
constructed in order to support the accumulation of technological capabilities. 
 
The evolution of the innovation system and the interruption is summarized in Figure 20. 
The most relevant break in the trajectory (disregarding the Sino-Soviet Split of 1961 
and smaller, “uncharted adjustments” over the 1970s) is the interruption in the mid 
1980s that lasted until the mid 1990s (the years given in the graph are only approximate 
in the case of the innovation system). The drop in the performance of the system refers 
to a drop in exports and value added as an ultimate indicator, even if some new (or 
modified) products were introduced during this period. The change in the size of the 
innovation system is a slight contraction based on the assumption that military financial 
input into innovation decreased as the budget constraints became tighter and as foreign 
capital was not yet invested. The number of employees working on innovation was also 
reduced. Even if the employees stayed within the same factory, many were reassigned 
to non-aviation engineering and design activities. Subsequently both public and private 
funding increased and so did innovative performance (as shown by an increase in labor 
productivity and exports). 
 
Figure 20 Interruptions and transition in the Chinese aircraft innovation system 
 
Source: the authors 
 
6.6.2 Remaining institutional challenges 
The aggregate, industry level figures hide much of the details and internal structural 
changes and remaining hurdles that make the transition process last so long. Detailed 
information is still unavailable, but we can to point out the main institutional challenges 
IS size
IS
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
1. The defense-oriented IS 
2. The partially open IS 
mid-1980s
2007 
1950s
mid-1960s 
1961 
mid-1990s
 42
and blockages that impede improvement in the performance of the sectoral innovation 
system. 
1. Ownership: Decision making in the state-owned conglomerates remains slow 
and heavily laden with politics; foreign ownership in the sector is generally 
limited to less than 50% (exceptions are the case assembly facilities of Embraer 
and Airbus).  
2. Competition: There is little competition between the producers. 69  Military 
procurement policies create sufficient domestic demand for local products. The 
latest Chinese products have yet to make gains on the export markets. 
Competition does not appear to provide incentives for the rather well-cushioned 
R&D institutes. Interaction between users and innovators are still less intensive. 
It is unclear how much freedom various plants and R&D institutes have in 
defining the direction of research for new technologies and to what degree is 
there a domestic competition for government funds. The protective measures 
continue to keep the industry’s marketing capabilities at a less advanced level, 
but this is compensated for by the size of the domestic market. 
3. Access to technology: the arms embargo by the USA and the EU remains to be a 
major restriction on the flow of technology. 70  Technology flows between 
military and civilian projects are expected to be limited, although interaction 
among the geographically dispersed units appears to be increasing in both 
domains.  
4. Flow of skilled labor: labour compensation in the aerospace industry is not 
competitive with wages in coastal cities and foreign-owned enterprises; salaries 
are often still not determined by performance (Medeiros 2005). Considering 
international flows, brain drain is more common than brain gain.  
 
The transition of the innovation system will remain incomplete as long as many of these 
barriers are in place. The speed of institutional change is defined by the government 
(and the PLAAF) which is pursuing a strategy of slow transition. As long as the 
industry continues to grow at a rate faster than that of other industries and as long as the 
government has no problem in raising the vast sums for new R&D projects, there will 
be no incentives to make changes in the innovation and production system. 
  
                                                 
69 Military production appears to be divided by “market segment” served: light fighter jets are produced 
in Chengdu, heavy fighters in Shenyang, bombers in Xian; commercial projects are shared among the 
biggest factories. 
70 The EU appears to be more flexible in its interpretation of the embargo and is more ready to consider a 
reform. See more details at Sipri “EU arms embargo on China”, (URL: 
www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/arms_embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/china) 
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7 Argentina: The case of a languishing aerospace innovation 
system 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Despite a very promising start, a fully functioning aerospace innovation system never 
emerged in Argentina. Local aircraft design and construction activities started before 
World War II in Córdoba where an advanced plant employed over 9000 employees by 
1950.71 However, it was a military plant and export considerations played little role in 
new product development. The inward-looking economic strategy soon proved to be 
unsustainable, creating a crisis in a still infant industry. In the absence of a transition to 
a different growth trajectory, the industry languished. Subsequent efforts in the 1960s 
and 1970s by military governments to pump more money in an unchanged innovation 
and production system once again resulted in a short-lived success. Technological 
capabilities continued to erode. Attempts at privatization in 1987 and concessions in 
1995 were not combined with well-designed, radical institutional changes. As a 
consequence only around 1000 employees work in the aerospace industry, which does 
not mean more than maintenance and overhaul activities in Córdoba. 
 
In 1969, when Embraer started, Argentina had the largest aircraft industry in Latin 
America in terms of employees (value added is not known). In 2003 value added was 70 
million USD, equal to less than 3% of Brazilian value added (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Comparison of Argentina’s Aerospace Value Added, selected years  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
Country 1984 1993 2003 
Argentina 40 9 70 
Brazil 242 260 2,581 
China 3,599 1,692 3,392 
Indonesia 12 192 n/a 
USA 48,281 53,218 47,949 
Source: Argentina: UNIDO (for years 1984, 1993) and INDEC (2003); Brazil: IBGE; Chile, Colombia: 
UNIDO. 
Note: PPP/UVR applied for conversion of local currency to USD: Argentina: 0.846; Brazil: 1.09; China: 
4.6; Indonesia 4201.2. 
 
Since its founding in 1927, the plant giving home to aerospace manufacturing and 
related activities in Córdoba has often changed name, internal organizational structure 
and external dependence. Table 2 provides an overview of the changes in scale and 
name. 
 
                                                 
71 The sources on Argentina can at best be called patchy. Production statistics are almost non-existent. 
Hira and Oliveira note that “there is no documentation regarding audits or financial reports to be found 
regarding the Fábrica; no systemic evaluation appears to have taken place” (2007:344).  Limited national 
statistics on the sector at 3-digit level are only available for the years 1983, 1994 and 2003. We therefore 
rely on secondary literature, including industry journals (e.g. various editions of Flight International), the 
Chronicles of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Province of Córdoba (Arreguez, 2007) and 
the insightful comparative analysis of Hira and Oliveira (2007). 
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Table 2 Name and size changes of the aircraft manufacturing plant of Córdoba 
Year Name of Organization (Abbreviation) 
Number of 
Employees 
Construction 
Floor (m2) 
 1927 Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) 193 8,340 
 1931 (FMA) n/a 34,000 
 1943 Istituto Aerotécnico (IAe) 3,070 265,000 
 1952 Industrias Aeronáuticas y Mécanicas del Estado  (IAME) 9,550 n/a 
 1957 Dirección Nacional de Fabricaciones e 
Investigaciones Aeronáuticas  
(DINFIA) 8,273 217,000 
 1967 Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) n/a n/a 
 1968 Area de Material Córdoba  (AMC) 7,507 n/a 
 1987 Fábrica Argentina de Materiales Aeroespaciales (FAMA) ~3,000a n/a 
 1991 Area de Material Córdoba (AMC) n/a n/a 
 1994b (AMC) 2,200 n/a 
 1995 Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina S.A. (LMAASA) 1,250 ~220,000 
 2002 (LMAASA) 900 n/a 
 2010 Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) 1,100 ~220,000 
Source: Own compilation based on Arreguez (2007); Arroyo Arzubi (2004) various articles of Flight 
International  
Notes: (a) Estimate based on 1985 UNIDO figure of 3,092 for the entire aerospace industry;  
(b)before privatization. Note that sources differ on the actual number of employees reduced over the 
privatization period. Scheetz (2002) reports that “the plant’s 2950 workers were immediately reduced to 
1950 (and then to 950)”, whereas LMAASA director Radcliffe reports a reduction of workforce from 
around 2200 to 1250 when Lockheed Martin took over operations72.  
 
 
7.2 The emergence of a sectoral aerospace innovation and 
production system in Argentina 
7.2.1 The emergence of aircraft manufacturing in Córdoba 
The Fábrica Militar de Aviones (FMA, Military Aircraft Factory) was established in 
Córdoba in 1927,73 more than 700 kilometers northwest of Buenos Aires. The plant was 
and Army depot under the supervision of the War Ministry. Operations began with 193 
workers on a construction floor of 8,340 m2. The following year the complex was 
expanded with a number of laboratories, workshops and auxiliary buildings. Initial 
production of small planes under license (e.g. the Avro K-504 Gosport, Bristol F.2B, 
Dewoitine D-21 or the Focke-Wulf FW-44 Stieglitz) was soon complemented with local 
designs. The first one was the AE C-1 Triplaza biplane from 1931. Other notable 
designs include the 5-seater transport plane AE T-1 from 1932, some 61 military 
observer monoplanes AE MO1 and the FMA 20 El Boyero (see Table 3). Licenses were 
acquired by FMA to locally produce engine designs of Lorraine Dietrich, Wright and 
Siemens. This provided the know-how to develop the Ae R-16 El Gaucho and I.Ae R-
19 El Indio engines. 
 
By the end of World War II FMA had produced around 400 planes (Table 3), about half 
of the Brazilian production in the same period. In both countries the military was the 
main user of locally made planes. But while Brazil was producing for the allies, 
                                                 
72 “Pampa production could roll again” Flight International 20-26 Mar 1996 
73 A few smaller, private workshops constructing simple aircraft had already been operating in Argentina 
since 1910, but the scale of their industrial activities were less significant compared to the one established 
in Córdoba. 
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Argentina declared itself neutral during most of the war. Argentina was therefore not 
receiving post-war aid from the US and cheap supply of aircraft, which, ironically, 
meant that its aircraft industry did not experience the post-war crisis that hit Brazil until 
1960.74 Fueled by the isolationist economic and foreign policies of President Perón, the 
aircraft industry was designated strategic and was given high priority even after the war. 
Already in 1943 FMA was renamed as ‘Instituto Aerotécnico’ (Aero-technical Institute, 
IAe), with a mission to develop aeronautical production in Argentina and unite the 
related industrial activities, deemed strategic for national defense. The institute 
combined research, design, production and maintenance work. Army major San Martin 
became the director of I.Ae. At the same time there were significant infrastructural 
developments, including the addition of a new 20,700 m2 assembly hall (the largest so 
far in South America). 
 
A first local product of this techno-nationalist period was the IAe 22 D.L.75, a trainer 
inspired by the North American T-6 Texan. By 1950, this was the most produced plane 
in Argentina. Between 1944 and 1950 two batches of 100 IAe 22 D.L. planes were 
delivered. The 22 D.L. used parts and materials produced domestically. The number of 
private companies supplying the aeronautical industry increased from 5 in 1941 to over 
100 by 1945, as a result of a new boost to increase public-private linkages (Arreguez, 
2007). In 1946 the first bomber in Latin America flew for the first time, the twin-engine 
IAe 24 Calquin (Royal Eagle), of which the military procured a series of 100.  
 
Migrant European aircraft designers (linked to Germany) during and after the war were 
important sources of technological expertise for both Argentina and Brazil. A team 
under the supervision of Emile Dewoitine designed and built the IAe-27 Pulqui (Arrow) 
jet fighter which successfully accomplished its maiden flight in 1947. Although only 
one prototype was built of this rather peculiar design, it was a major milestone that 
made Argentina the fifth country in the world (and the first in Latin America) to 
construct a turbojet fighter. In 1947 the former technical director of the German Focke-
Wulf aircraft manufacturing company, Kurt W. Tank and his team of some 60 engineers 
were invited by Perón to work at Córdoba.76 The team developed a new jet fighter, the 
IAe-33 Pulqui II (first flight 1950). This was a highly advanced fighter, matching 
capabilities with the Soviet Mig-15 and the American F-86 Sabres. The design and 
adjustment of the technology took several years, and by the end of 1956 the first four 
prototypes crashed or were damaged beyond repair. The air force showed interest to 
procure of the Pulqui IIs even after the regime change following 1955. But the project 
continued at a very slow pace once its German designers left and the aircraft industry 
lost political support. Eventually the project was discontinued and the fifth prototype 
was parked in a museum in 1960 when the government chose to import the F-86 Sabre 
fighters from the US.  
 
                                                 
74 Although other sectors, especially the agriculture, did experience detrimental effects of Argentina being 
left out of the Marshall Plan and the loss of North American and European markets. 
75 D.L. stands for “Dientes de León”, or lion’s teeth, in response to US Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s 
earlier reference to Argentina as a “toothless lion”.  
76  This fits in Perón’s strategy of acquiring former German (Third Reich) expertise to boost the 
development of the “New Argentina”. Together with Tank came for instance Ronald Richter, a nuclear 
physicist of Austrian origin with the promise to be the first to produce nuclear fusion in the world. Perón 
gave Richter virtually unlimited resources to develop the technology for a new energy source (and 
potentially for a nuclear weapon) in the ‘Huemol Project’. 
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Table 3 Serial Aircraft Production in Argentina 
Aircraft Model Type Engine 
First 
Flighta 
Number 
built 
Series 
Production Notes 
Local Designsb 
AE MO1 Military observer Piston (Wright) 1934 61 (1934–37) First local design produced in 
series 
AE C 3 Two-seater monoplane (Piston, Armstrong 
Siddeley) 
1934 16 (1934–?)  
FMA 20 ‘El Boyero’ General Aviation Piston (Continental) 1940 131 (1949–51) Designed by FMA, produced by 
Petrolini Hermanos 
I.Ae. 22 D.L. Trainer Piston (IAe and 
Hamilton Standard) 
1944 200 (1944–50)  
I.Ae.24 ‘Calquin’ Attack/Light Bomber Piston (Pratt & 
Whitney) 
1946 101 (1947–50)  
IA 35 ‘Huanquero’ Multi-purpose aircraft Twin-Piston (IAe) 1953 47 (1957–62) Designed by Kurt Tank 
IA 46 ‘Ranquel’ General Aviation Piston (Lycoming) 1957 220 (1958–?)  
IA 50 ‘Guarani II’ Utility Twin-Turboprop, 
(Turbomeca) 
1963 48 (1966–?) Seats 12 passengers 
IA 58 ‘Pucará’ Ground attack and 
counter-insurgency 
Twin-Turboprop, 
(Garrett, Turbomeca) 
1969 106 (1974–86) The only “exported” model 
IA 63 ‘Pampa’ Advanced trainer, light 
attack 
Turbofan (Garrett) 1984 24 (1988–90,  
2006–07)  
 
Produced under license 
K-504 Avro 
‘Gosport’ 
Biplane Piston (Gnome, 
Rhone) 
(1926) 33 (1928–?)  
Bristol F.2B Biplane Piston (Hispano S.) (1916) 12 (1930–?)  
Dewoitine D 21 Monoplane Piston (Armstrong 
Siddeley) 
(1925) 32 (1930–?)  
FW-44 ‘Stieglitz’ Biplane trainer Piston (Siemens) (1932) 190 (1937–?) Licence acquired in 1937 
Curtiss ‘Hawk’ 75 Fighter Piston (Wright) (1935) 21 (1940–?) Manufactured entirely at FMA. 
Licence originally acquired for 
200 planes, but lacked material 
to complete. 
Beech T-34 ‘Mentor’ Trainer Piston (Pratt & 
Whitney) 
(1948) 75 (1957–65) Designed by Beechcraft, 
produced from kits 
MS-760 Jet trainer Twin-Turbojet  
(Turbomeca) 
(1954) 36 (1958–64) Designed by Morane-Saulnier, 
produced from kits 
Cessna-182 General Aviation Piston (Continental) (1956) 40 (1969–72) Designed by Cessna, produced 
from kits 
Locally Converted  
A-4AR 
‘Fightinghawk’ 
Ground attack Turbojet (Pratt & 
Whitney) 
(1954) 28 (1997–
2000) 
A-4M 'Skyhawk II' modernized 
in Argentina with US 
components; additional 8 
modernized in the US 
Sources: own compilation based on information from Arreguez (2007); SIPRI and Jane’s. 
Note: (a) First flight in brackets indicates the first flight of the original model; (b) The list excludes 
models of which only a few prototypes were built.  
 
The failure of the Pulqui II project has technological as well as political reasons. On the 
one hand the design was well beyond the level of existing local technological 
capabilities. Tank’s team worked in a virtual enclave and the German team made little if 
any efforts to integrate local workforce to facilitate learning-by-doing. In this respect 
the project was more an offshoot of the WWII German innovation system than a 
product of Argentinean innovation system. It did little to advance the latter (apart from 
possible inspiration of future scientists through demonstration effects). On the other 
hand the project depended on Perón himself and the success of the Peronist economic 
and foreign policies. The industrialization strategy focusing on the domestic market 
failed after a short-lived post-war success, demand for intermediate imports skyrocketed 
and the economy found itself in stagflation (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003). Even 
before the “Liberating Revolution” ousted Perón it became apparent many of the 
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extravagant projects (including the nuclear endeavor and the jet fighter) were not 
sustainable. Increased pressure from the US following the revolution also contributed to 
bringing the projects to a standstill. 
 
Despite the growing demand for air transport services, the design and production of 
aircraft in Argentina was only destined for military use. Following the first air postal 
services77, passenger air routes were established in the 1930s. Joint stock companies of 
regional airlines formed in the 1930s were nationalized in 1949 into the new Aerolíneas 
Argentinas (AR). In 1956 the new government broke up the monopoly but AR remained 
the dominant airline (also becoming the largest airline in South America), the most 
significant domestic competitor was Austral. Supplying AR or Austral by locally made 
planes was never a real option for FMA or its successors. The primary goal was 
supplying and maintaining the Air Force fleet. 
 
The military ownership of the aeronautical industry is also reflected in the education 
and training of future labor force. The Air Force operated pilot training schools. The 
initially ad-hoc training of engineers and workers of the industry was replaced in 1941 
by regular theoretical and practical courses in aeronautics. The Escuela de Ingeniería 
Aeronáutica (Aeronautical Engineering School)78 was established in 1947 in Córdoba 
under the supervision of the Argentinean Air Force. The most important non-military 
graduate training center for aeronautical engineers was the Engineering Faculty at the 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata near Buenos Aires. As shown in Table 4, the number 
of graduates was very low, creating an obvious bottleneck for the emerging innovation 
system. Although 864 engineers were trained by 1990, by comparison, in Brazil over 
3000 engineers graduated from ITA alone until 1988. 
 
Table 4 Cumulative stock of aeronautical engineering graduates of higher education programs in 
Argentina (1950-2007) 
Graduate stock Estimate of 
Year UNLP IUA Total active stocka 
1950 18 14 32 32 
1955 54 76 130 130 
1960 59 136 195 195 
1965 86 165 251 251 
1970 142 197 339 339 
1975 218 239 457 457 
1980 275 277 552 552 
1985 343 336 679 647 
1990 472 392 864 734 
1995 614 425 1,039 844 
2000 727 473 1,200 949 
2005 821 554 1,375 1,036 
2007 866 584 1,450 1,068 
Sources: Instituto Universitario Aeronáutico (IUA), Departamento Egresados, Universidad Nacional de 
La Plata (UNLP), Lista de egresados en nuestra base de datos.  
Note: a) active stock is estimated by assuming 35 years of active career for a graduate. 
 
                                                 
77 The perils of aviation in Argentina in the 1920s and 30s are illustrated by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry in 
his 1931 novel Night Flight. 
78 It was renamed in 1993 as Instituto Universitario Aeronáutico (University Institute of Aeronautics, 
IUA). 
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A research and testing center was already established under the War Ministry during 
the late 1920s, with its mission encompassing the design, development and construction 
of various prototypes of aircraft, engines and instruments. R&D was subsequently 
incorporated into FMA and its successors.  
7.2.2 Incomplete emergence (1927­1952) 
Even with the scant statistical data about the early growth of the industry, the contours 
(and the deficiencies) of an emerging innovation system are apparent. It never 
functioned properly as a fully developed system, as the following overview of its main 
building blocks during the period of 1927-1952 reveals: 
• Actors. The most striking feature of the emerging innovation system is the 
absence of private companies. Research, design, engineering and production, but 
also education and training were all “integrated” in the military complex at 
Córdoba.  The Argentine Air Force oversaw the plant, financed its research and 
production activities and appointed the managers. Tank and his team, a 
potentially rich source of foreign expertise, had very little interaction with the 
rest of the actors in the system. Even though they were located at FMA, they 
were supported by and reporting directly to the president.  
• Institutional set-up. Ever since its origins, FMA and its successors were run as a 
military unit. Technological independence (following the import-substitution 
strategy) and increasing Argentina’s military capabilities were the prevalent 
objectives, not commercial success. This did not prove to provide successful 
incentives for innovation. External relations of the system were determined by 
the current governmental strategy, including the degree openness to foreign 
technology and the selection of technological partners (orientation shifted from 
the British to the Axis powers during the war). Internal relations were cloaked in 
secrecy, which greatly reduced the potential of establishing linkages with other 
domestic or foreign industries. It reinforced the hurdle to commercialization of 
technological results. 
• Capital input. Lack of rigorous accounting makes it impossible to trace the 
amounts invested in development projects. It is only clear that innovative 
activities were financed by the government – as in all other emerging innovation 
systems –, although these were determined by political aims rather than 
economic ones. The lack of financial transparency ensured a culture of 
corruption already from the very beginning. 
• Technology base and input. At the time of the establishment of FMA in 1927, 
technological capabilities in aircraft construction and maintenance were existent 
although very limited. It is worth noting that the related automotive 
manufacturing industry was already present in the country with models of 
leading foreign producers being assembled under license. 79  Similarly in the 
aircraft industry production licenses of small planes (e.g. Avro, Bristol, 
Dewoitine, Focke Wulf, Curtiss and Beechcraft) provided access to foreign 
technology. After WWII European designers (such Dewoitine and Kurt W. Tank 
and his team) brought along not only their knowledge and skills but also 
blueprints of new aircraft. These frontier technologies were incompatible with 
existing local knowledge and no serious measures were taken to help acquire the 
tacit knowledge. Technology deals were not signed strategically with capability 
accumulation in mind, but rather for short-term political purposes. 
                                                 
79 By 1930 the Argentine car park amount to over 400,000. 
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• Skilled labor input. The labor force was almost exclusively trained by the 
academies of the military in Córdoba, first in ad-hoc training courses, later in 
regular engineering program. Shortly after the end of the war an aeronautical 
engineering school was established by the air force (see above) and civilian 
courses started at National University of La Plata. But the number of 
aeronautical engineering graduates did not reach 100 until 1954. As opposed to 
Brazil, the lack of a dedicated aerospace school (such as ITA) became a major 
shortcoming in the innovation system. 
 
In the absence of statistical data, we can only indirectly deduce the performance of this 
emerging innovation system.  
• New products. Most of the new products before WWII were small planes 
carrying maximum five persons, capable of very simple, mostly observation 
missions or to be used for pilot training (Table 3). The Pulqui I and II jet fighters 
designed in the post-war era represented near-frontier technologies, but they 
remained inventions rather than innovations, as they never reached series 
production. 
• Output and Market share. We estimate that by the end of WWII Argentina had 
produced some 400 planes (see Table 3). However, none of them were sold 
outside Argentine or for domestic or foreign commercial use. We have no 
information on aircraft import before 1950s; when the military started to import 
aircraft from the US during the late 1950s it considerably reduced the high 
market share of locally produced military planes. 
 
7.3 Crisis in the Industry: Replacing wings with wheels 
The initial rapid growth of the industry slowed down by 1950 and the industry was soon 
in a serious crisis. Import substitution with a domestic orientation meant that export 
revenues could not finance the purchase of foreign raw materials and intermediate 
inputs on which aircraft production and other industries depended. Trade deficits and 
lack of growth of manufacturing industries forced Perón’s second government80 to make 
major changes in industrial policy. The survival of the Argentinean aircraft 
manufacturing industry was in jeopardy. In order to save the Córdoba plant, San Martin, 
the head of the plant (and also the Minister of Aviation since 1951) agreed with Perón to 
diversify activities into automobiles (as well as tractors, motors, motorcycles and arms) 
production.81 Resources devoted to aircraft design and production were significantly 
reduced as political discontent with the national aircraft endeavor increased, which was 
further aggravated by a growing macroeconomic crisis.  
 
In late 1955 Perón’s government was overthrown in a coup. The following 
governments82 aimed to reverse the major projects associated with Perón, including the 
aerospace endeavors. A large part of the military management was replaced and aircraft 
and automotive productions were separated. Tank and his team abandoned work on the 
                                                 
80 After 5 years in office, Perón was reelected in 1951. 
81 Perón was also seeking to supply cheaper, domestically made cars to offset the ever more expensive 
import and the reluctantly growing assembly work of foreign subsidiaries. By the end of 1953 some 2000 
cars were produced by IAME. (FMA was renamed to Industrias Aeronáuticas y Mécanicas del Estado – h 
IAME, Aeronautical and Mechanical Industries of the State). 
82 The “Liberating Revolution” was followed by the military gaining control over the government. The 
first elected president was the right-wing Frondizi, still favored by the armed forces (1958-62).  
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jet fighter and other experimental designs and left Argentina in the unwelcoming 
political climate after the dismissal of Perón.83 
 
The car and aircraft industry of Córdoba was soon formally separated. In 1957 the 
automotive industry was transferred to a separate organization, and aeronautical 
research and production activities were reorganized in the Dirección Nacional de 
Fabricaciones e Investigaciones Aeronáuticas (National Directorate for Aeronautical 
Production and Research, DINFIA), which remained under the supervision of the Air 
Force. When established, DINFIA had 8,273 workers, a floor space of 217,000 m2 and 
3,500 machine tools in total of 19,500 Horsepower. At the same time the Instituto de 
Investigación Aeronáutica y Espacial (Aeronautical and Astronautical Research Insitute, 
IIAE) was established and designated to carry out R&D activities in aerospace.84  
 
However, neither the national governmental, nor DINFIA leadership had a consistent 
strategic vision on the development of the industry. Between 1955 and 1960 the 
organization had 9 directors and many parallel projects. The military decided to follow 
up on a design by Tank’s team of which a first prototype was already flown in 1953. An 
order of a 100 was placed for the multi-purpose twin-engine propeller plane, the IA 35 
Hanquero, but only 47 were eventually built starting from 1958.85 At the same time the 
right-wing governments forged closer ties with the US and signed deals to procure US 
trainers and fighters.86 Many of the received trainers (such as the North American T-6 
Texan or T-28 Trojan) and fighters (e.g. the North American F-86 Sabre, which 
Argentina received in the form of assistance) were in the same size range as the ones 
produced in Argentina (e.g. the IAe-22 D.L. or the IAe-33 Pulqui II), but the (older) 
US-made planes showed superior performance characteristics. The new foreign 
purchases were not coordinated with the strategies of domestic aircraft industry 
development and siphoned much of the resources from procurement of locally-made 
planes. The innovative designs such as the Pulqui IIs would have required more 
investment to be improved to a level that was marketable abroad. New prototype 
development was largely discontinued. As there was no strategic aim to make the 
Argentinean production competitive, the technological capabilities started to erode from 
the 1960s onwards.  
 
7.4 Interruption without transition 
7.4.1 The first interruption in the innovation system: the 1950s 
The industry’s crisis due to macroeconomic and political factors caused an interruption 
in the innovation system. The lost financial and political support of grand design 
projects were not replaced by other sources. Capabilities at the macro level eroded with 
the departure of the German engineers, even if they were less connected with the other 
                                                 
83 Tank himself went to India in where he designed a jet fighter-bomber, the Marut for Hindustan 
Aeronautics. 
84 Space research culminated in 26 rocket launches between 1961 and 1981. 
85 A number of derivatives made of this model, in the direction of a transport aircraft (e.g. the Guarani I, 
with a capacity to seat 11 persons). A successful plane from these years was the IA 46 Ranquel, a small 
utility plane used by aero-clubs and for agricultural purposes. (Table 3). 
86 The US government was suspicious of both the Argentinean nuclear and military aircraft development 
projects and was therefore rather willing to sign export deals if that meant an alternative to local plans. 
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actors in the system,87 and they were also not replaced. By this time the global industry 
was entering the jet age and the Argentinean innovation system’s distance to the global 
technology frontier was increasing rapidly.  
 
A radical transition would have been required,88 but instead attempts were made to 
sustain the industry without major institutional changes. The industry and innovation 
system were still emerging and lacked important actors, including private firms, 
education and training institutes, but most importantly, a development strategy 
combining industrial, science and technology and education policies. It follows that 
both the size (lack of technology and financial inputs) and the innovative performance 
(very few new designs created) of the system decreased. 
 
The rest of the history of Argentinean aerospace industry shows how heavy a price the 
country paid for trying to patching a decaying system. 
 
7.4.2 Lack of strategic leadership 
Argentina after Perón did not give up on aircraft manufacturing. An alternative to local 
design was to return to local manufacturing of foreign-designed planes. DINFIA 
acquired licenses from Beechcraft (US) to produce 75 propeller-driven T-34 Mentor 
trainers and from the French Morane-Saulnier to produce the MS-760 twin-jet trainers. 
A decade later Cessna (US) gave a license to AMC for 40 C-182s aircraft. However, the 
only local content in these activities was labor. All the components were shipped in kits 
from the USA and France. While in Brazil license-production activities over the 1960s 
and 1970s were part of a strategy to acquire specific know-how, Argentina lacked an 
overarching plan at the government level and lacked entrepreneurs at the firm level.  
 
The difference between the history of the industry during the 1950s and 60s in Brazil 
and Argentina is striking. Brazil, although also with many often conflicting goals at that 
time, was making significant efforts to create the foundations of an aerospace 
innovation system in the Sao Jose dos Campos cluster. Argentina was conducting 
research into military aircraft design, produced a number of them, but made insufficient 
efforts to create an innovation system. The failure of the Pulqui II project proved that 
the Córdoba plant has not succeeded in integrating foreign frontier technology, and only 
relatively simple aircraft were produced locally under license. Even this expertise was, 
however, already declining during the 1950s. In both countries the military was a major 
source of finance for education and R&D in aeronautics. While the sector was seen 
everywhere as strategic, neither country formulated a well-defined mission for the 
development of the industry. In Brazil a “public entrepreneur”89 emerged to fill the gap 
of lack of strategic vision on commercialization. The reason why such a turn did not 
happen in Argentina cannot be merely attributed to bad luck. The institutional 
framework of the Argentine aircraft innovation and production system did not allow the 
                                                 
87 It is interesting to point out the differences between the Soviet engineers and technical staff leaving 
China after the Sino-Soviet Split in 1961 and Tank and his team Argentina: Argentinean technological 
capabilities were more advanced without the guests, but China made more efforts to reverse-engineer and 
regain the lost capabilities afterwards. 
88 Diversifying into the automobile industry was an interesting alternative, nonetheless a genuinely radical 
shift – maybe too radical –, but it did not concern the entire industry. 
89 Using the term coined by Ramamurti (1987), however, referring to the team of aircraft engineers 
working on the design and marketing of the future Embraer Bandeirante. 
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emergence of such an entrepreneur. First, the Argentinean aerospace “enterprise” was a 
military installment and not a company with commercial aims. It had no influential 
private actors with experience in commercializing the products. Second, the frequently 
changing governments were incapable of providing financial and political support for 
the infant industry. It was partly due the secretive nature of the military, but it was also 
in the culture of the public science and technology community to be more cautious with 
commercial valorization of applied technology. 
 
Table 5 Military aircraft import to Argentina (1950-2009) 
Types Model Year 
 
Number 
of planes 
Exporter 
Trainers T-6 Texan 1956 
1959 
5 
5 
USA 
T-28 Trojan 1959-60: 45 USA 
T-28 Fennec 1966 45 France 
Aermacchi MB-326 1969-70 
1983 
8 
11 
Italy 
T-34C Turbo Mentor 1978 16 USA 
Aermacchi MB-339 1980 10 Italy 
EMB-312 Tucano 1987-88 30 Brazil 
Su-29 1997-98 8 Russia 
Fighters F-4U Corsairs 1956-58: 62 USA (used in WWII, Korean War) 
F-9F Panthers 1957-58: 20 USA 
F-86 Sabres 1960: 28 USA 
F-9 Cougars 1962: 2 from the US; although did not 
receive spare parts for the plane 
later… mistakenly Argentina became 
the only foreign recipient of these 
planes 
A-4P ground attack 
Skyhawks 
1966-7 
1970 
1972 
1976 
1997 
25 
25 
16 
25 
36 
USA 
 
 
 
 (28 of which modernized locally) 
Mirages 1972-3 
1980 
1983 
12 
7 
2 
France 
Nesher (=Mirage 5) 1978-82: 39 Israel 
Mirage 3 1982-83: 22 Israel 
Mirage-5s 1982: 10 from Peru (loan for Falklands war, 
later bought) 
Bombers Canberra B(I)-8 and -12 1970-71 12 UK 
Transports Shorts Skyvan SC-7 1971 5 UK 
F-27 1968-81 21 Netherlands 
C-130 Hercules 1968 
1971-72 
1975 
1979 
1992-94 
3 
3 
2 
2 
5 
USA 
 
 
(KC-130H tanker/transport) 
Alenia G-222 1977 3 Italy 
Multi-purpose 
transports / 
coast guard 
CASA C-212 1989-90 5 Spain 
Source: SIPRI 
 
Already by the 1960s DINFIA had cancelled the development of jet fighters and 
focused its activities on transport, counter-insurgency and training aircraft (Milenky, 
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1980). In addition to the Sabres received in 1950, between 1966 and 76 the military 
governments of Argentina imported some 90 modernized Douglas A-4 Skyhawk ground 
attack jets in several batches, 8 C-130 Hercules transport planes in 3 batches and a 
number of small planes. But the US was not the only supplier. Argentina opted for 
French Mirage III fighter jets in 1970, and despite more ambitious plans 21 fighters 
were acquired between 1972 and 1983 in batches of 12+7+2. These were complemented 
with a 1978 deal with Israel on 26 refurbished IAI Nesher planes (which were largely 
identical to the French Mirage V jets, but equipped with Israeli avionics). (See Table 5 
for an overview of imported aircraft.)  
 
7.4.3 Renewed efforts  to build up domestic  technological capabilities 
in aerospace 
 
In 1967 aerospace development and production activities were reorganized after a 
transition year into Area de Material Córdoba (AMC). The plant continued to be run by 
the Argentinean Air Force. Yet reorganization also meant renewed interest in boosting 
the industry’s design output. There were significant technological achievements during 
between the 1960s and 80s.  
 
The IA 50 Guarani II, a small utility aircraft, seating 12 passengers was also capable of 
limited troop transport, medical and search and rescue operations. The prototype was 
based on Kurt Tank’s IA 35 Huanquero, and first flew in 1963. Two years later The 
Guarani II was presented at the Paris Air Show. This could have been an aircraft for 
commercial use (and indeed after the first series of 18 built for the military between 
1966 and 1970, a second series of 14 planes were constructed between 1971 and 1974 
for the civilian market)90. According to the published specifications, the Guarani II 
outperformed aircraft in its league. It could fly higher, faster and further than Embraer’s 
star, the Bandeirante (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6 Main features of the Guarani II in comparative perspective 
 DINFIA IA 50 Guarani II  
Embraer EMB-110 
Bandeirante 
CASA C-212  
Aviocar 
Capacity (crew+passengers) 2+15 2+21 2+26 
Dimensions (m):  
(length/wingspan/height) 14.9 / 19.5 / 5.81 15.1 / 15.4 / 4.9 
 
15.2 / 19.0 / 6.3 
Empty weight (kg) 3,924 3,500 3,700 
Maximum takeoff weight (kg) 7,120 5,900 6,300 
Power plant 2x694 kW  
Turbomeca Bastan 
VI-A Turboprop 
2x559 kW 
P&W Canada PT6A-
34 turboprop 
2x580 kW 
Garrett AiResearch 
turboprop 
Max speed (km/h) 500 460 370 
cruise speed (km/h) 450 326 315 
Range (km) 1,995 1,964 1,760 
Service ceiling (m) 12,500 6,900 7,900 
First Flight 1963 1968 1971 
Total Number Built 35 500 435 
Sources: Jane’s, Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar, Airliners.Net 
 
                                                 
90 Source: “Guaraní” Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar  
URL: http://www.aeromilitaria.com.ar/ind/aviones/gii/index.htm (page last updated: 3 Mar 2007). 
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Puzzling as it may first seem, it is important to note that the aircraft was not responding 
to what commercial markets demanded. None of the 34 planes that are believed to have 
been built 91  were exported or sold to airlines. Most of them were used for aerial 
photography, calibration of navigation instruments and various transport services. 
Without sales revenues and with an aggravating economic crisis, production was not 
sustainable and Perón’s new government stopped further support in 1974. Figure 21 
shows the drastic difference in the production cycle of the Guarani II and the 
Bandeirante. Nothing emphasizes better the capacity of the newly emerging Brazilian 
producer to design an aircraft for commercial markets and construct it in great quantities, 
and the laggard position of its older Argentinean counterpart that showed more 
resemblance to the also emerging Indonesian plane maker. 
 
Figure 21 Comparison of annual production of commuter-size aircraft  
by FMA, Embraer and Nurtanio (first 20 years of production) 
 
Source: Cabral 1987, Cassiolato et al 2002, Airlinerlist.Com, Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar 
Note:  The FMA and Embraer aircraft were designed and produced domestically. The CN-235 was co-
designed and co-produced by CASA and IPTN; the figures presented show the number of aircraft finally 
assembled in Indonesia. The production of the IA-50 stopped in 1974. 
 Year 0 refers to the year of first flight of the prototype (EMB-110: 1969; CN-235: 1983; IA-50: 1963). 
 
 
The zenith of the Argentine defense industries coincided with the military dictatorship 
of 1976-83 (Scheetz, 2002). It was a time of increased military spending amounting to 
as much as 6% of the GDP between 1981 and 83 (see Figure 22). Details of the 
expenditure are not known, but the air force evidently managed to corner a large share. 
First of all, it should be noted that the junta’s increased military expenditures were 
unsustainable due to the macroeconomic instability. Still the availability of new funds, 
had they been channeled into the innovation system, could have resulted in increased 
innovative performance of the aircraft industry. However, foreign procurement and 
corruption absorbed a larger share of the available budget. Over these years Argentina 
modernized its fleet with about 80 Mirage fighter jets (including the Israeli derivative 
Nesher) and a number of trainer and tanker aircraft (see Table 5).  
                                                 
91 The Argentinean Air Force reportedly used 29 of them, but little is known of the operating history of 
the plane. Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar 
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Figure 22 Argentine Military Expenditures, in millions of constant (1970) Australs (1969-1987) 
 
Source: Scheetz (1992, Table I, p.186) 
 
 
AMC in Córdoba was commissioned to produce a hundred of the IA-58 Pucaras. This 
two-seater twin-prop ground attack and counter-insurgency aircraft was first flown in 
1969. Its main features were the capability to operate in unfavorable conditions, simple 
airfield infrastructure requirement and good maneuverability. But it was using already 
dated technology. 106 units were built between 1974 and 1986, and it was the only 
Argentine aircraft “exported”, even though none through regular market transactions.92 
Due to the limited availability of spare parts, the exported planes eventually did not 
collect many flying hours. Their capability to land and take-off on short runways made 
the Pucara the only aircraft the Argentinean Air Force could deploy to the Falkland 
Islands during the 1982 war, where they carried out reconnaissance and light-attack 
operations. However, the Air Force’s national technological pride did not stand the test 
of war and many were soon written off. 
 
The subsequent Pampa project was a technologically even more challenging venture 
rather successfully realized. Once again it became a victim of changing strategic vision 
and macroeconomic and political instabilities. As of 1978 AMC was looking for 
solutions to produce a new advanced jet trainer to replace the nearly 20 year-old locally 
assembled Morane-Saulnier MS-760s jets. Aiming to follow international standards (to 
facilitate foreign sales) and expand existing expertise in license production, AMC 
signed a partnership agreement with the German manufacturer Dornier to assist aircraft 
development.93  The resulting prototype of the IA-63 Pampa trainers showed many 
                                                 
92 SIPRI counts a total of 10 exported aircraft. Six were delivered to Uruguay in 1981 as part of a 6.5 
million USD deal from the previous year. In 1992 Argentina signed a deal with Sri Lanka to the tune of 
12.7 million dollars to deliver four aircraft over the following two years for counter-insurgency operations. 
Additionally, the Air Force offered 3 of its Pucaras in 1990 in the form of aid to assist anti-narcotics 
operations in Colombia and leased one for a year for Uruguay (Based on SIPRI Arms Transfer Database; 
values are expressed in constant 2000 USD, applying deflators of 0.54 for 1980 and 0.86 for 1992 (WDI). 
Note that industry insiders question many of the details of these deals. 
93 Together with Dassault, Dornier had been producing the Alpha Jet since 1973 but the production run 
was nearing its end.  
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similarities to the Alpha Jet, but it was a simpler and more cost-efficient design, 
equipped with a single Garrett turbofan engine. By the time the plane first flew in 1984, 
the military junta has already fallen following the disasters of the lost Falklands War, 
the shrinking economy and the debt crisis. 
 
7.4.4 An incrementally changed innovation system (1960s­1983) 
The realization of the Guarani II, Pucará and Pampa projects marked the revival of the 
aerospace innovation system. Innovative performance increased with the 
accomplishment of complex engineering achievements. This raises a question. Was this 
performance caused by increased learning and interactions within a system defined by 
more or less the same actors and institutions? Or does it mark a transition to a new 
system?  
 
In our interpretation the innovation system did not change radically. The main actors 
remained the same, even if some additional foreign sources of technology were added 
(but with less intensive and rather unidirectional interactions). The major arrangements 
in the industry were hardly modified. Whatever the name of the Córdoba plant was, it 
was still run by the military. The system continued to be serving the needs of the Air 
Force, and despite some weak attempts to realize foreign sales, economic considerations 
had little influence. Moreover, the long lead times of projects indicate that the system 
was still in its infancy, still not close to the performance frontier. Yet the technological 
characteristics of the products were matching (or even exceeding) those of other 
latecomers. What we can observe here is that increased inputs (finance) could boost 
learning and result in performance increase in an incrementally changed innovation 
system.  
 
The problem with an only incrementally changed innovation system was that even if it 
reached the performance frontier through learning, it was not competitive anymore. It 
could still add to the accumulation of technological capabilities needed for an emerging 
industry, but those capabilities were already obsolete. That it was not sustainable any 
longer was not only proven by the economic crises, but also in combat.  
 
7.5 Failure to radically change an ailing innovation system 
 
7.5.1 A new crisis: the end of the military regime and struggles with 
privatization 
 
In order to address the debts and respond to the pressures of the international monetary 
institutions, the Alfonsín government that rose to power in 1983 cut military 
expenditures and made an attempt to privatize AMC. Under the new name of Fábrica 
Argentina de Material Aeronáutico (Argentine Aeronautical Materials Factory, FAMA) 
44% ownership was sold to a consortium of Aeritalia and 10% to Techint.  
 
The Alfonsin government continued to see potential in military aerospace and gave 
support to both the Pampas as well as a new medium-range ballistic missile program, 
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the Condor II94. AMC produced a first batch of 18 Pampas between 1988 and 1990. 
The actual design and adjustments made to this took place during times of economic 
trouble in the country. AMC could not secure any foreign sales, although it attempted to 
apply for trainer procurement competitions in the US (in partnership with LTV), New 
Zealand and Australia. Especially in case of the US application, the chances of a foreign 
producer of trainers have always been very low. The already dated technology of the 
planes and the fact that the Argentinean government was unable to offer competitive 
export credits were certainly not making it a serious contender. 
 
An overture to commercial production at the end of the 1980s was also not successful. 
FAMA and Embraer decided to co-produce a commuter aircraft, the CBA-123 Vector. 
This was a major step in a new direction for FAMA and it offered the potential of 
acquiring newer capabilities as well as Embraer’s already established knowledge of how 
to market planes. However, the project did not become a success because production 
costs were too high, making the plane uncompetitive. Embraer criticized FAMA for not 
being able to deliver the required modules in time and according to quality expectations. 
Argentina also had difficulties in financing its one-third share of the estimated 300 
million dollar development costs.95 The government’s hands were tied in the midst of 
monetary and fiscal troubles. 
 
The 1994 privatization of Embraer in Brazil offered a capital injection and new source 
of dynamism for regional jets production. However, while the sectoral innovation 
system in which Embraer was embedded may have meant an external asset to potential 
investors, the lack of such a system in Argentina decreased the value of FAMA (or 
AMC) 96, which was hardly more than a military depot seen as a burden to the state. 
Unsurprisingly, the Menem government’s new attempt to inject capital into AMC in 
1995 was less successful than the privatization of Embraer. First, the local aircraft 
industry could not show any commercial success similar to what Embraer achieved with 
its commuter planes during the late 1970s and 80s. The latest trainers of AMC were at 
least a generation behind the technology frontier, and were yet to be promoted on low-
cost markets. Second, the core competence of the “company” was in military 
aeronautics, Argentina’s options for a potential investor were limited to a few global 
defense companies, which were also experiencing a downturn after the end of the Cold 
War. Finally, the main asset of AMC was its 2,200-strong skilled labor force, but 
whether they provided a solid base for lower cost production is doubtful. Hira and 
Oliveira (2007:342) mention a consultancy report that suggested half of the work force 
was “surplus to requirement”.  
 
An in-depth analysis of the political background of the negotiations and the interests of 
the various stakeholders is beyond the scope of this study. After lengthy negotiations 
Lockheed Martin (LM) won a 25-year concession to operate the Córdoba aircraft 
factory, linked to a deal to upgrade 36 of the A-4 Skyhawks of the Air Force and to a 
promised 14 million dollars worth of investment.97 Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina 
                                                 
94 It succeeded a 1970s ballistic missile program and was developed in close collaboration with Egypt and 
Iraq, as the Middle East was seen as its potential market. The project was halted by the Menem 
government in 1993 following pressure from the US. 
95 Two prototypes were made in 1990 but the project was cancelled due to insufficient market demand. 
96 The enterprise was once again  renamed to AMC in 1991. 
97 Part of the deal was to seek to reactivate the manufacturing of the IA-63 Pampa jets and carry out 
maintenance and overhaul operations for both the Air Force and commercial airlines. 
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S.A. (LMAASA) assumed operations on 1 July 1995 and soon reduced the work force 
to 1,250. 98 Following the arrival of 8 A-4 Skyhawks upgraded in the US, the first locally 
converted A-4s Fighting-hawks were delivered in 1998.  
 
The government retained the right to renegotiate the deal every five years. While the 
signing of the original contract was widely criticized on grounds of corruption, 
incompetency or (at best) acting under pressure, the revision in 2000 expanded the 
responsibilities of LM and was financially more beneficial for the government as it was 
hedged against currency fluctuations. LMAASA now signed up to upgrade the IA-63 
Pampas and produce 12 additional aircraft99 and carry out the maintenance of the Air 
Force’s fleet and produce spare parts. Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) became 
the core activities of the Córdoba plant, which also offered the potential to serve airlines 
in the region. But the diversification to the commercial segment was not so successful, 
mainly because of the poorer performance of local airlines.100 Manufacturing remained 
a small scale activity, with no new aircraft designs. Lockheed indicated that it was 
expecting a domestic launch order of at least 100 Pampas to make use of scale 
economies, but the government (tackling a financial crisis) was struggling to meet their 
existing commitments. 101  The concession-adventure ended in 2009 as the Kirchner 
government nationalized the plant. Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (Argentinean Aircraft 
Factory, FAdeA), according to the new name, is once again a subject of the Defense 
Ministry and there is little sign of any new strategy102, new management routines or 
greater transparency.  
7.5.2 Failed transitions to a more open innovation system (after 1983) 
In 1983, with the lost war, the fall of the military dictatorship and a macroeconomic 
crisis, yet a second interruption hit the (emerging) innovation system. Military 
expenditures and AMC’s labor force were halved and no new foreign technological 
collaboration deals were signed. But the Air Force continued to be influential even 
during the Alfonsín government so the Condor II and Pampa projects were not shelved.  
 
The attempt to introduce private capital in the newly formed FAMA could have initiated 
major changes leading to a transition. However, basic incentive structures and selection 
processes were hardly modified. Private firm actors were still not significantly present, 
education and training institutions were not reinforced and no long-term industrial 
policies were devised in concert with innovation and science and technology policies to 
                                                 
98 “Lockheed nears AMC deal” Flight International 19-25 October 1994; “Pampa production could roll 
again” Flight International 20-26 Mar 1996, p.9. A different source on the number of employees, Scheetz 
(2002) reports a decrease from 2,950 to 950 (See note (a) to Table 2). 
99 Test flights of the Pampas with enhanced avionics and radar began in July 2005; the first delivery took 
place in December 2005 (“Upgraded Pampa trainer begins flight-test work” Flight International 12 Jul 
2005; “Lockheed Martin advances Pampa push in Argentina” Flight International 11 Apr 2006) 
100 LMAASA had around 58,000 m2 floor space for MRO activities in Cordoba. It has gained type 
certificates for a number of planes, including the C-130 Hercules and Aerolineas Argentinas’ B-737s, as 
well as ISO 9001 from TÜV. The local workers accumulated experience in the repair works of the F-27, 
F-28, IA 50 G II, IA 58 and IA 63 types of the Air Force as well as in engines. 
101 For instance, in October 2003 LMAASA sent home its entire 900-strong staff for 6 days to reduce 
losses; at the same time, the government owed the company 47 million USD. 
102 The activities of the plant still include providing maintenance services for the Air Force’s fleet 
(amounting to about half of the revenues), upgrading the Pucuras and making  new efforts sell the 
Pampas. At the same time the air force’s entire fleet is aging: only a small share of the fleet was active in 
2007 and some 15 planes crashed in recent years. There have been plans to develop a new trainer to 
replace the ancient T-34s. 
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make the industry competitive. FAMA’s entering into commercial production was not 
viable without such broader-scale changes, but Argentina could not afford these 
(especially in the context of neoliberal policies it was obliged to follow). Only 
incremental institutional changes took place. But at the same time, mostly due to 
insufficient funding, these were not followed by increased learning or a movement 
closer to the performance frontier. Thus, the macroeconomic changes at the end of the 
1980s and the failure of the CBA-123 Vector project also mark an interruption in the 
innovation system, since the inflow of R&D funds and new technology from partners 
was significantly reduced. What remained after the break was an innovation system 
serving an industry with a “core competence” in maintenance, repair and overhaul (of 
both military and commercial aircraft).  
 
The 1995 concession deal with Lockheed Martin has stopped further decline, but did not 
bring system-wide institutional changes. It provided access to technology, but hardly 
more than earlier license agreements; and it did not even secure capital investment for 
technological upgrading. These were improved with the renegotiated deal of 2000, 
which resulted in some increase in system performance. The 2009 renationalization was 
once again not a trend break for there is no sign of realigning the industry on a 
competitive growth path.  
 
7.6 Interrupted innovation in Argentina: The rise and fall of an 
innovation system 
 
This historical overview shows that a fully fledged sectoral innovation system in 
aerospace has never emerged in Argentina, in a sense of providing competitiveness and 
sustained growth. In the 70 years of its evolution there have been some periods of 
increased innovative activities, with tangible results of technologically complex new 
products, but no commercial breakthroughs. 
 
A summary of the development trajectory of the innovation system is shown in Figure 
23. The emergence of the system was interrupted in 1952 because import substitution 
with a domestic orientation caused a macroeconomic and later a political crisis. Yet 
there has been no transition to a new growth path, based on a strategy of export-
orientation and the involvement of actors other than the military, most importantly, 
private companies. More investment pumped into an incrementally changed system 
proved to be unsustainable and led to new crises and other interruptions after the failure 
to enter into commercial production. 
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Figure 23 The Emergence of the Argentine Aerospace innovation system 
 
Source: The authors 
Note: The abbreviations in brackets indicate the name of the main organization. 
 
7.6.1 General conclusions 
 
Although the ideas of 1927 envisaged the construction of a factory with the long-term 
aim of making it a motor of industrial progress of Argentina, much of the history of 
aerospace in Argentina is the outcome of ad hoc and short-sighted decisions. 
Formulating and adhering to a strategy of what to make locally and what to import is 
just as urgently needed as it has always been since the 1950s and 60s. In the end, it is 
too costly to keep supporting an infant beyond the age of 50. The following lessons can 
be derived from the Argentinean experience. 
 
1. Nascent innovation systems are excessively vulnerable to exogenous shocks 
Since the accumulation of technological capabilities has remained insufficient to 
design, produce and commercialize aircraft in Argentina, interruptions are results of 
events occurring in the macroeconomic or political context. This is especially typical of 
systems in their infancy, where the performance is excessively dependent on one source 
of finance and technology. (An example of such an interruption was the nascent Chinese 
aerospace industry after the Sino-Soviet split.) The reason is the lack of available 
institutions and actors to counterbalance the declines in government support. In 
conclusion, macroeconomic stability is crucial to provide a sustainable and credible 
source of government finance, political stability and a wide-spread agreement (possibly 
across party lines) is required to formulate and implement a long-term development 
strategy. Without such checks and balances the industry can still grow, but only slowly, 
at high cost and it can easily become a playground for short-term rent-seeking and 
power struggles. 
 
2. Make competitive planes or do not make planes at all 
Argentina never had a strategy to sell its products on the market (domestic or 
foreign). If the aim is to produce only for domestic military use, importing planes would 
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have been a less costly option, creating a maintenance, repair and overhaul facility only 
would have been more lucrative. 
After the ill-fated Pulqui fighter jet, the planes built in Córdoba were of obsolete 
technology. All the planes Argentina imported or produced under foreign license were 
also near the end of their production run. Although more affordable for domestic 
purposes, if the aim is to acquire technology to produce planes that sell even on low-
cost markets, a country can’t afford not to invest in acquiring more recent technological 
vintages. 
Even an emerging industry needs to pay special attention to what products and 
technological solutions are required by the market (domestic and foreign users), and to 
identify possible niches. It is too late to try to sell the obsolete Pampa trainers in the 21st 
century. 
The argument that the presence of a high-tech industry boosts science and 
engineering education is shaky. The far-from-frontier knowledge and skills of the staff 
makes them less competitive even when they shift to other sectors, while the low 
payment (Scheetz, 2002) deters new students from choosing a career in aerospace. 
 
3. A military-only innovation system is bound to fail 
The emergence of an innovation system will be unsuccessful if all the sources of 
technology and knowledge, all the interactions are controlled by the military. 
Channeling in investment and technology from private sources ensures not only more 
transparency, but also a more dynamic circulation of ideas. It also helps increase the 
number of actors in the innovation system who can better read the more complex signals 
of market demand than the air force decision makers alone. 
Conversely, the number of new aircraft designs during the post-WWII years 
indicates a superior performance of an innovation system that is open to new actors 
(such as experienced foreign designers). However, the centralization of the selection 
process of new designs by the military hampers further growth in innovative 
performance. These routines and practices also hamper the ability to shift to commercial 
designs and the output of aircraft with potential commercial applications will be inferior 
to that of a genuinely commercially oriented firm (see Figure 21). 
 
4. An emerging innovation system and industry need stability and long-term goals 
A lack of overall agreement on the strategies of policies related to industrial 
development, science, technology and innovation, or national defense by the main 
political actors of a country is a source of institutional instability and turbulence. The 
lack of institutional stability undermines the accumulation of technological capabilities, 
and innovative performance cannot increase even during the emergence phase. Goals 
and strategies that depend on state financing are worthless if new governments easily 
cancel the ones formulated by their predecessors. 
 
5. The ‘lost decade’ in aerospace was the 1950s 
For Argentina, the 1980s are generally referred to as the ‘lost decade’. For the 
aerospace industry in Argentina, the decade of lost opportunities was the 1950s. Apart 
from the first Perón government, the industry never received sufficient resources and 
attention to allow it to reach a mature, competitive growth trajectory based on 
commercial sales. The distance to the technological frontier appears to have been 
growing ever since. 
The attempt to close the gap during the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
overshadowed by the Falklands war and the debt crisis. Even if entrepreneurs had the 
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foresight to make the crisis-hit industry ride the waves of the just emerging global trend 
of outsourcing components manufacturing by US and European producers to low-cost 
countries, the macroeconomic conditions of Argentina and the insufficient capabilities 
(that became clear during the CBA-123 Vector project) would have posed too big a 
challenge. 
In other words, the case of Argentina shows that without innovation system 
transition the aircraft industry can only survive on a lifeline. At such a low performance 
many more decades are being lost. 
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8 Indonesia 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In a country with a total area of 1.9 million square kilometers spread over 17,500 
islands, the geographical setting itself makes the development of air transportation an 
obvious policy goal. Yet the development of the aircraft manufacturing industry would 
seem a less obvious choice for a developing country which was in the mid-1960s, 
according to Hill “perhaps the least industrialized of the world’s large developing 
nations” (2000: 155) and where natural resource-based industries accounted for 80% of 
total output (Hill, 1990).  
 
The overall purpose of focusing on aerospace among other high-tech industrialization 
projects was to accelerate the social and economic transformation of Indonesia from an 
agricultural to an industrial society. Dr. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, the aeronautical 
engineer and later president of Indonesia summarized Indonesia’s ambitious technology 
strategy in his famous phrase: “start from the end, end at the start”. Accordingly, in 
1976, IPTN, the state-owned aircraft manufacturing enterprise began to produce 
helicopters and airplanes under Western license. In less than half a decade it moved on 
to jointly develop a modified version of the plane, which successfully completed its 
maiden flight in 1983. It started the indigenous development of a commuter plane in 
1989 that first flew six years later. However, Indonesian-made planes never sold 
successfully in foreign markets. It became clear during the South East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 that the government lacked the funds to continue supporting an industry 
employing around 16,000 workers. Since 1998, Indonesian aerospace manufacturing 
has been struggling to survive. The case reveals how a sectoral innovation system that 
never fully developed, failed to transit to a new, sustainable growth path after being 
confronted with a crisis. 
 
 
8.2 The emergence of the Indonesian aerospace industry and 
innovation system103 
 
8.2.1 The origins of Indonesian aircraft manufacturing 
Aviators and aircraft designers were already active in Indonesia well before the 
establishment of IPTN. Their activities were limited to the design and testing of gliders 
and small plane prototypes, far from what could be referred to as an industrial scale of 
production. Their main contribution to the conception of the industry was spreading the 
idea that aviation can bridge distances in Indonesia. 
 
One of the key designers of this period was Nurtanio Pringgoadisurjo. Nurtanio was 
involved in the construction of a number of simple gliders (following the famous 
German Zögling design) and a few single-seat aircraft at the Aircraft Research, 
                                                 
103 The history section relies primarily on five studies: Hill and Pang (1988), McKendrick (1992), 
Goldstein (2002), Eriksson (2003) and Amir (2007). 
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Experiment and Construction Depot (DPPP) for the Air Force in Bandung. In 1954, he 
designed the Si Kumbang (beetle) all-metal plane of which 3 prototypes were built. In 
1958 he produced the basic trainer Belalang (locust) prototype, of which 5 units were 
produced later. In the same year the prototype of the Kunang (firefly) sport plane made 
its first flight. In 1960, Nurtanio and three colleagues were sent to Manila, the 
Philippines to study at the FEATI Institute of Technology in the field of aeronautics.104 
 
In the meantime, not only the Air Force, but also president Sukarno became interested 
in the achievements of Nurtanio. The Preparatory Agency for Aviation Industry 
(LAPIP) was set up in 1960 under the supervision of the Air Force. A year later it 
signed an agreement with Poland about a loan of 2.5 million USD to construct a 
manufacturing facility near Bandung airport, for training personnel and to license 
produce a slightly modified PZL-104 Wilga plane developed by the Polish Cekop. The 
44 Indonesian-made versions, known as the Gelatik (rice bird), served for agricultural, 
light transport and aero-clubs purposes. Yet the small plane production has never 
become a commercial success. 
 
There were several organizational attempts to establish the foundations of an aerospace 
industry industry. The National Council for Aeronautics and Space (DEPANRI) was 
created in 1962 and mandated with national aerospace coordination and policy 
formulation. In 1963 the National Aeronautics and Space Institute LAPAN was founded, 
a research institute designated to develop aerospace technology and advise on national 
aerospace policy. After Nurtanio died in 1966, while testing one of his planes, LAPIP 
was renamed in his honor to Nurtanio Aviation Industrial Institution (LIPNUR). The 
Berdikari Aircraft Industry (IPTB), founded a year earlier, was merged into LIPNUR, 
which was assigned with the task to produce a basic military trainer aircraft and build 
workshops for after-sales-services, and maintenance, repair and overhaul. To cater to 
the human resources needs of a newly emerging industry, the government launched an 
overseas student scholarship programme as early as 1958, financing aeronautical 
engineering studies in Europe and the United States.105 Aeronautics education within the 
country was rather limited. A sub-study programme on aviation engineering was formed 
in 1962 at the Bandung Institute of Technology. Since there was no clear government 
strategy and LAPIP was a military unit, only a handful of students graduated from there 
during the 1960s. Thus in comparison with Brazil, where local engineer training was 
highly advanced even before Embraer was established, human capital formation in 
Indonesia was significantly weaker. 
 
A key promoter of industrial-scale aircraft manufacturing in Indonesia was B.J. Habibie. 
After becoming a doctor of aeronautical engineering at the Technische Hochschule 
Aachen in 1965, he remained in Germany and worked for over 10 years in Hamburg for 
Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) where he became vice president and director for 
technology application. He returned to Indonesia in 1974, accepting the call of President 
Suharto to become his technology adviser. Habibie’s long term family ties to the 
president were a key source of trust, and he soon took on high level positions in the 
New Order government. In 1978, he became State Minister for Research and 
                                                 
104 There is a bit of confusion in the literature, Amir dates this event 10 years earlier. 
105 The appearance of aviation on the political agenda may be linked to a 1956 speech by Sukarno on the 
occasion of the fifth year of independence, in which he highlighted the strategic nature of aviation for the 
Indonesian military, economy and politics. 
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Technology, and was given the oversight of a number of high-technology projects as 
chair of the Agency for Strategic Industry (BPIS).  
 
Habibie’s industrial development strategy involved four steps. Phase 1 involved 
technology acquisition by transferring already existing technology through licenses. In 
Phase 2, previously acquired technology would be integrated into the design and 
production of new products. In Phase 3, the existing technology would be further 
developed and investment would be made into new technologies to design and produce 
new products. Finally, in Phase 4, large-scale basic research capability was to be 
acquired and implemented to generate new, competitive generic technologies (Steenhuis 
et al, 2007). 
 
Despite the lack of existing technological base and an underdeveloped capital goods 
sector, the Indonesian government did not hesitatate to formulate ambitious high-tech 
mega-projects, including telecommunications, shipbuilding, the nation car project, 
nuclear energy and aircraft manufacturing. The late 1960s and 1970s marked a period of 
rapidly growing inflow of oil revenues as a result of the exponential growth of oil 
production.106  The New Order government expressed its intention to invest the oil 
revenues into enhancing domestic technological capabilities. 
 
8.2.2 From licensed production to co­development 
IPTN was founded in 1976 by a presidential degree as a state-owned enterprise with the 
merger of the assets of the Pertamina oil and gas company107 and LIPNUR. Habibie, 
who was appointed as the director of the company, had initially chosen a location near 
Jakarta. He later accepted the Air Force’s offer to use the Bandung facilities of LIPNUR 
(180 km from the capital) in return for including ‘Nurtanio’ in the name of the new 
company. Nurtanio Aircraft Industry (IPTN) commenced operations in two small 
hangars of 11,000 m2 on a 45,000 m2 site outside Bandung on 23 August 1976 and in 
the same year counted 860 employees. Within two decades, IPTN’s facilities had 
expanded to 437,000 m2 and the number of employees had risen to 16,000. (see Table 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 Indonesian oil production increased threefold from 486 thousand barrels a day in 1965 to 1.5 million in 
1976 (BP, 2009). 
107 Pertamina was established in 1957 to extract and refine Indonesia’s oil and gas reserves in 1957. Its 
revenues allowed it to have assets in many other fields including telecommunication, real estate or airline 
business but it also became a source of funding for Indonesia’s ruling elite without accountability, leading 
to debts amounting to 10 billion USD by 1975 in a time of rapidly expanding oil production. For more on 
the Pertamina debacle, see McCawley (1978). 
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Table 7 Key financial figures of IPTN, 1976-89. Compared with the first years of Embraer  
(Thousand USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
IPTN 
Years  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Employees 860 1,279 1,695 2,362 3,162 4,742 7,853 10,774 11,713 12,596 13,000 13,300 14,100 14,200
Sales 15.6 15.1 34.0 30.9 43.5 102.7 106.0 67.5 46.9 86.9 73.4 124.3 149.1 223.7
Profit (after tax) 1.5 1.2 6.9 7.5 0.9 2.0 7.4 9.5 13.3 0.3 -16.2 1.8 0.4 5.0
Investment 49.2 19.2 11.4 23.7 41.3 84.1 141.8 139.7 119.4 79.8 205.9 85.8 42.7 54.5
Inv/Sales (%) 315.5 126.7 33.5 76.6 95.1 81.9 133.7 206.9 254.3 91.9 280.6 69.1 28.6 24.4
Sales/Emp (1 USD) 18.1 11.8 20.1 13.1 13.8 21.7 13.5 6.3 4.0 6.9 5.6 9.3 10.6 15.8
Embraer (EMB) 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Employees 589 n/a n/a 2,021 3,323 3,353 4,225 4,104 4,300 4,987 5,957 5,414 6,732 6,877
Sales 25.6 21.4 100.6 120.4 199.9 228.3 295.7 256.0 269.3 375.5 346.1 439.5 348.2
Comparison of IPTN vs. Embraer (%) 
Employees: IPTN/EMB (%) 146.0 n/a n/a 116.9 95.2 141.4 185.9 262.5 272.4 252.6 218.2 245.7 209.4 206.5
Sales: ITPN/EMB (%) 59.2 158.7 30.7 36.1 51.4 46.4 22.8 18.3 32.3 19.5 35.9 33.9 64.2
Source: Hill and Pang, 1988, Table 4, p.159; McKendrick, 1992, Table 4, p.60.; Ramamurti (1987) 
Note: Prices updated using GDP deflators from the World Development Indicators; official exchange rate 
for 2000: 8421.8 IDR/USD applied.  
 
IPTN and two other institutes, PUSPIPTEK and BPPT formed the basis of the 
integrated aerospace program in Indonesia. The Center for Science and Technology 
Development (PUSPIPTEK) was established in Serpong, close to Jakarta, providing 
research and testing laboratories. The Agency for Assessment and Application of 
Technology (BPPT) took over policy coordination of national technology development 
in aerospace and other high-tech industries. At the same time the domestic supply of 
aerospace engineering graduates was only slowly catching up with demand. Enrolment 
at ITB only numbered some 30 plus students in 1980.  
 
Habibie was very successful in securing deals for technology sourcing. In line with his 
technology strategy of “start from the end and end at the beginning”, IPTN embarked on 
license manufacturing. Already in 1975108 a contract was signed with Habibie’s former 
employer, the West German MBB about the assembly of the BO-105 helicopters in 
Indonesia under license. It is estimated that over a hundred of these models (NBO-105 
under Indonesian designation) were built over a quarter of a century, making it the most 
successful product of IPTN. In 1982 a subsequent deal was signed with MBB to 
assemble the BK-117, a more advanced helicopter, but it is estimated that only 3 of 
these were produced in Indonesia. In 1977, IPTN acquired license from the French 
Aerospatiale to produce the Puma SA-330 (NSA-330) and later the Super Puma AS-332 
helicopters (NAS-332 under local designation) in Indonesia, from kits shipped from 
France. Some 20 of these helicopters were produced according to estimates109. The third 
rotary wing producer IPTN signed a contract with was Bell Textron (US) in 1984. 
Production of NBell-412 helicopters started in 1986, with two units produced in the first 
four years. (See Table 8 for an overview of the aircraft and helicopters produced in 
Indonesia) 
                                                 
108 Since IPTN was not existing at that time, the Indonesian partner organization in this deal (and in a later 
with the Spanish CASA) was Advanced Technology &  Teknologi Penerbangan Pertamina (ATTP). 
109 While the exact numbers are some, based on data from IPTN staff McKendrick (1992, fig.1, p.50) 
reports 11 NSA-330s and 6 NAS-332 assembled by 1990. SIPRI estimates 9 NAS-330s assembled 
between 1981 and 84 and 4 plus 7 NSA-332s over the periods 1984-87 and 2001-07 (SIPRI, 2009). 
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Habibie’s primary interest was in producing fixed-winged aircraft. The key technology 
contract that came to shape the trajectory of Indonesian aircraft production and 
development was signed with the Spanish Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA), 
the company that Goldstein (ibid, p.528) referred to as “the smallest of the independent 
European aerospace firms”. The 1975 deal permitted Indonesia to produce the C-212 
Aviocar 19-seater turboprop under license. This design was relatively new (flown first 
in 1971) and belonged to the expanding niche of commuter aircraft with low airport 
infrastructure requirements (very similar to Embraer’s Bandeirante) and offering a 
versatile utilization for both commercial and military purposes. CASA sent a staff of 30-
40 technicians to Bandung to facilitate learning to produce, but it was the C-212’s 
“simplicity in design and construction” (McKendrick, ibid, p 43) that contributed to the 
relative success of the project. The newborn Indonesian aircraft industry had produced 
five of these aircraft by the end of 1976 and production of the type peaked at 17 in 1981. 
Most of the Indonesian-made NC-212 airplanes served domestic demand110. IPTN had a 
license to produce 108 NC-212s and had completed 95 by the year 2000.111 Due to a 
variety of reasons, 16 of these planes were involved in accidents. (See Figure 24 for an 
overview of Indonesian aircraft production.) 
 
Table 8 Number of aircraft delivered and helicopters produced by IPTN (1975-98) 
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Aircraft (Total) 2 3 1 6 3 6 20 7 9 8 10 3 3 4 9 6 2 10 6 7 2 0 0 0 
  NC-212 Total 2 3 1 6 3 6 20 7 8 8 10 2 2 1 4 3 0 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 
Domestic 2 3 1 4 3 6 18 7 7 8 10 2 2 1 4 3 0 1 2 3 1    
Export 2 2 1    
  CN-235 Total 1 1 3 5 3 2 9 4 4 1    
Domestic 1 1 3 5 3 2 9 1 0 0    
Export 3 4 1    
  N-250a Total 1 1   
Helicopters (Total) 6 7 5 6 5 6 10 14 20 21 7 10 4 6 2 3 2 1    
  NBO-105 6 7 5 6 5 6 8 8 18 14 7 8 1 2 0 1 2 1    
  NSA-330 2 6 2 1    
  NAS-332 6 1 2 0    
  NBell-412 2 2 2 2 2    
Source: Aircraft delivery figures from Airlinerlist.com (retrieved 2010 Jul); Helicopter production figures 
from McKendrick, 1992, Fig.1,p.50 (IPTN). 
Note: a) only prototypes were built of the N-250, it was not produced in series. 
 
IPTN’s cooperation with CASA advanced to another level when in 1979 the two 
companies agreed to form a joint venture to design and manufacture a 38 to 44-seater 
twin-prop commuter, the CN-235 (CN stands for CASA/Nurtanio). Entry into the 
emerging aviation market of Indonesia and the readiness of the Indonesian counterpart 
to invest in research and development triggered the interest of CASA. For for IPTN the 
deal meant advancing to the second stage of Habibie’s technology transfer ladder 
(‘technology integration’, or the development of new-product using already proven 
technology). This was considered as an in-between stage on the route towards 
indigenous design capabilities. 
 
                                                 
110 McKendrick reports only 6 planes exported by 1986, 5 for agricultural use in Thailand and 1 for Air 
Guam; SIPRI lists only the 4 exported to Thailand.  
111 “Toughing it out”, Flight International, 25-31 July 2000 
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In 1979, Airtech was established in Madrid with 70 million USD to coordinate the 
project. CASA and IPTN became equal partners. McKendrick called the division of 
labour on the CN-235 “quite unusual”, because work was divided in a way that IPTN 
designed and produced the outer wing sections, the rear fuselage, the tail and the interior 
while CASA was responsible for the (technologically more demanding) inner wing 
sections, forward fuselage, centre wing and engine nacelles (ibid, p.45). These parts 
were then exchanged and final assembly took place both in Spain and in Indonesia. 
 
The design phase (1979-82) allowed an active knowledge exchange. CASA sent some 
60 employees to IPTN to assist design and further support on aerodynamics engineering 
was received from Boeing. The project was important for IPTN in terms of acquiring 
and upgrading machinery and tools as well: it started using touch numerical controlled 
(TNC) machinery in 1981 and by 1985 24 computer numerical controlled (CNC) 
machines allowed high precision work. CASA also received assistance on wing design 
from MBB.  
 
The share of foreign components was high: engines, communications and control 
systems, landing gear and base metal had been produced in the US and Europe. For 
IPTN, this was reduced over the years to 20 percent, although the reduction only 
affected the airframe. 
 
Figure 24 Aircraft Production cycles in Indonesia (1975-2006) 
Source: IPTN, Airlinerlist.com (retrieved: 10 Jul 2010) 
Notes: Year of delivery is a close proxy to year of production, for which there is a lack of information. 
Since many of the planes produced were not sold immediately, there are potential discrepancies, e.g. in 
1981, at least 3 of the NC-212s delivered may have been produced in the previous year. In the case of 6 
CN-235s produced during the crisis years of 1997-98 for Malaysia, but only delivered later are listed for 
1998 based on information from Flight International112. There are reports of NC-212 production in 
Indonesia after 2000, but exact number and year are unknown. 
 
 
Two prototypes were produced by CASA and two by IPTN. One of the Spanish planes, 
Infanta Elena took off in Madrid for the first time in November 1983, followed by the 
Indonesian Tetuko a month later. The division of labour between the parties became a 
source of major problems for the airworthiness certification. When the CN-235 received 
                                                 
112 “Indonesia tries to rescue Malaysian IPTN deal” Flight International 24-30 Jun 1998 
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certification of the American FAA in December 1986, it was only valid for the 
prototypes assembled by CASA, not by IPTN (Amir, 2007, p.287). Lacking bilateral 
agreement between Indonesia and the US (the US was demanding an independent 
aviation authority in Indonesia), IPTN had to turn to other agencies, and finally received 
certification from the British Aviation Authority in 1995. This was crucial to access 
foreign markets. However, customers remained cautious and preferred the planes 
assembled in Spain to those made in a developing country. However, Eriksson (2003) 
notes that by this time CASA had cleared the market. Export of the Indonesian-made 
CN-235 planes covered Southeast Asia (Brunei, Malaysia and South Korea, with a total 
of 17 planes) as well as Pakistan (3) and the United Arab Emirates (7)113. On the global 
market the (Indonesian and Spanish made) CN-235s achieved only moderate success, 
with around 5% share in the 20-45 seat segment by 1990 114 . By 2007 a total of 
approximately 234 CN-235s have been produced by CASA and IPTN together. 115 
Analysts considered the realization of the CN-235 venture as a success116 for the newly 
emerging industry of Indonesia and it brought significant prestige for Habibie.  
 
In comparison with similar aircraft, the technological level of the CN-235 in many ways 
met industry standards. In the early 1980s, almost exactly at the same time as the CN-
235, five major aircraft projects were launched in the 30-50 seat range around the world. 
The competitors of CASA and IPTN were Embraer’s EMB-120 Brasilia, the Swedish 
Saab SF-340, the Dash-8 by de Havilland from Canada, and a French-Italian venture’s 
ATR-42. The CN-235 compares rather favorably in terms of fuel consumption and 
range, but this comes at a cost of speed and cruising altitude (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9 Key performance characteristics of IPTN’s and competing aircraft 
Manufacturer / Aircraft Type First 
Flight 
(Year) 
Max 
number 
of seats 
Max 
take-off 
weight 
(tons) 
Max 
cruise 
speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
consumptiona  
(kg/h) 
Max 
Cruise 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Max 
Range 
(km) 
Embraer  EMB-120 Brasilia 1983 30 11.5 300 340 25,000 3,600 
Saab SF-340 1983 37 12.9 282 350 25,000 3,500 
de Havilland  Dash 8-100 1983 39 15.6 269 393 25,000 2,800 
CASA-IPTN CN-235 1983 45 15.1 248 348 18,000 4,900 
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia ATR-42 1984 50 16.7 265 385 25,000 4,600 
        
de Havilland  Dash 8-300 1987 56 18.6 287 457 25,000 2,400 
Canadair CRJ-100 1991 56 21.5 460 928 37,000 3,400 
Embraer ERJ-145 1995 50 22.0 447 n/a 37,000 3,200 
IPTN N-250 1995 56 22.0 300 n/a 20,000 2,000 
Source: Regional Airliner Directory, Flight International 10-16 June 1992; producers  
Note: a) at long-range performance 
 
Figure 25 and Figure 26 shows the cumulative output of the same aircraft during the 
first 20 years of production in Indonesia and in Spain, transposed to a common starting 
point (year 1 refers to the year of the first delivery). The steeper growth of Spanish 
output in the initial years indicates the difference in manufacturing capabilities and the 
flatter learning curve of the Indonesian industry. The fact that Indonesian production 
                                                 
113 Figures are based on SIPRI estimates.  
114 Goldstein (ibid, p.529 referring to Dagnino) 
115 “Status Of Programs” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 November 2008. 
116 In 1991, CASA even sold the license to produce 50 CN-235s by Turkish Aerospace Industries in a 550 
million USD deal. As for the safety record of the plane, out of the 43 assembled in Indonesia, 3 aircraft 
were lost in accidents; and another 6 of the Spanish-made planes were involved in crashes. 
 70
flattens out sooner (at around 90 deliveries in the case of the C-212 and around 60 in the 
case of the CN-235) while CASA’s delivery is still growing reveals Indonesia’s sales 
problems. 
 
Figure 25 Cumulative production of the C(N)-212 aircraft in Spain and Indonesia 
 
Source: http://www.airlinerlist.com (Retrieved: 16 Dec 2009) 
 
Figure 26 Cumulative production of the CN-235 aircraft in Spain and Indonesia 
 
Source: http://www.airlinerlist.com (Retrieved: 16 Dec 2009) 
Note: Spanish production does not contain the 50 aircraft produced in Turkey under license 
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External knowledge flow was also promoted at the government level. A 1979 
technology transfer agreement resulted in collaboration in higher education with the 
Delft Technical University and the Dutch Aerospace Research Institute NLR and was 
subsequently renewed as ISARD in 1985 and as APERT in 1990. These last two 
agreements were supported by Fokker until the company went bankrupt. The 
collaboration with TU Delft was crucial, since ITB did not offer higher than masters 
level programs in the 1990s. 
 
IPTN signed a number of other contracts that were important for the company to gain 
access to technology, mostly relatively small scale subcontracts and offset agreements 
with leading western manufacturers. An important agreement was signed with Boeing in 
1982 on management assistance. Over the years, around fifty advisers came to IPTN 
and trained IPTN staff in Seattle, including the son of Habibie, who later became the 
director of the company. In a small offset contract in return for the flag carrier Garuda 
acquiring Boeing aircraft, IPTN was selected to produce the trailing edge flaps of the B-
737s (to a value of 30m USD) and to assemble stowage bin frames for B-767s (for 1m 
USD). In a 1986 agreement, Grumman of the US agreed to train IPTN engineers at its 
home plant. In 1986, Indonesia signed a deal to purchase 12 F-16 fighters from General 
Dynamics and to produce parts and components to offset the 337m USD deal The 
components included forward engine access doors, wing flaperons, fuel pylons, main 
landing gear doors, graphite epoxy skin, and vertical fins in a value of 52m USD117. A 
1990 deal with the Dutch Fokker included a 35 per cent offset arrangement for any F-
100s bought by Garuda, including the production of wing, tail and other primary 
components. However, the expected full order was never realized. A 1980 deal with 
General Electric resulted in the establishment of a Universal Maintenance Center in 
Indonesia six years later, to perform maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of aircraft 
and industrial engines in the region made by GE. This deal is significant for making 
Indonesia a competitor of Singapore which focused on becoming a regional MRO hub 
for the aviation industry.  
 
8.2.3 Going it alone till the abrupt end 
 
Once the CN-235 development project had been realized, Habibie believed that IPTN 
was ready to develop an aircraft independently. His intention was to launch a 
commercial aircraft with dual military and civilian use 118 . The initial plan of the 
engineering team was to design a 30-seater replacement for the aging Fokker F-27s 
flown by Indonesian airlines, but a subsequent market research found that demand is 
greater for a 50-seat commuter. Habibie announced the launch of the N-250 project at 
the 1989 Paris air show.  
 
IPTN signed an important technological agreement in October 1994 with Lucas 
Aerospace Flight Control System to develop an advanced flight control systems for the 
N-250 using the fly-by-wire system developed by Lucas and Liebherr Aero Technik. 
The 3-axes system was an innovation for propeller-driven planes. To further emphasize 
that commercialization was the cornerstone of the N-250, IPTN opened a branch office 
in Seattle and in 1995 made a number of agreements with the local government of 
                                                 
117 Sources contradict on the value of the offset deal; McKendrick reports 17.7m (ibid, p.44), SIPRI 
reports 52m USD (ibid). 
118 Amir’s interview with Habibie (ibid, p.287) 
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Mobile, Alabama and US investors to produce the N-250 in the USA at the to-be-
established ‘American Regional Aircraft Industry’. In addition, British Aerospace 
showed interest in manufacturing the N-250 under license in the UK. Habibie claimed 
that orders amounted to 189 planes by the 3 Indonesian airlines and a European leasing 
company. 
The project budget was initially planned to be 600 million USD, however it increased to 
1.2 billion USD along the road. The work started with a team of 30 engineers and grew 
to over 1,500. To fill the gap President Suharto decided to allow IPTN to use an 
interest-free loan of 185m USD from the reforestation fund119 (and offered a 5% royalty 
from all sales to the Forestry Department in return). With this cash injection IPTN 
succeeded in rolling out Gatotkaca, the first prototype of the N-250 on Patriots Day in 
November 1994. The plane completed its maiden flight in August 1995. So far, only 
two prototypes have been built. Work on a third one came to a halt in 1998. The first 
two airplaces clocked around 850 flight hours, half of what would have been required 
for certification. The plane never received an airworthiness certificate 120  and the 
financial crisis of 1997-98 brought the project to an abrupt end.  
 
The unsuccessful commercial launch of the N-250, an apparently technologically 
innovative plane, points in the direction of systemic failures in the Indonesian aerospace 
innovation system. First of all, the idea of ‘going it alone’ was in sharp contrast with the 
strategy of other foreign producers as well as airlines’ expectations, at a time when the 
global landscape was being dramatically reshaped by the post-Cold War recession. The 
list of confirmed orders for N-250 was alarmingly short on foreign buyers. Airlines 
were increasingly opting for regional jets instead of propeller planes, and to cut 
operating costs preferred manufacturers that offered a whole range of product lines of 
one family. As the lower rows of Table 9 show, the N-250 fitted more in the product 
lines of the 1980s than of the 1990s . While the propeller-driven commuters’ market 
was shrinking, the novelty it offered (fly-by-wire system) was not enough to please 
buyers. Cross-border R&D and production ventures were the new source of innovative 
solutions in  new planes. While the vertical integration of the design and production of 
almost all of the modules (except for the engines) was functioning in the 1970s and 
1980s, it became too expensive a solution in the 1990s. Over the 1990s, the changes to a 
system of increased global competition and collaboration caused many famous 
European and North American producers to be taken over or to go bankrupt.  
 
Still, IPTN took the risk of going against the trend, and getting saddled with 
development expenses that by far exceeded its profits and even its turnover. The reason 
such an endeavor could go ahead was due to the very nature of the innovation system. It 
was not a system aiming at greater market success by commercial and technological 
interactions, but more a rather expensive public experiment to prove Habibie’s theory 
that technological capabilities can be acquired through ‘learning-by-doing’. The tougher 
global competition in the industry was no longer favorable to these kinds of experiments. 
The influence of one strategist on determining the technological capabilities was 
                                                 
119 The fund was established to finance preservation and rehabilitation of Indonesian forests in which all 
forest concessionaires had to contribute. A subsequent lawsuit against President Suharto by a group of 
NGOs was dismissed and IPTN never eventually paid back the loans as the loan was converted into 
government shares. Devastating forest fires in the following years were grim testimonies of the 
misconduct. 
120 Major causes for delay were partly of organizational, partly of technological nature (including 
concerns with the application of the fly-by-wire system). 
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excessive, and correcting mechanisms, institutional checks and balances were missing 
from the system of innovation. These are exemplified by what McKendrick (1992) 
showed to be as underdeveloped managerial capabilities. The lack of foreign sales of 
existing aircraft should have alerted the staff to international market signals.  
Sufficient foreign demand for a new plane can accelerate certification in the respective 
country. But since this was not the case and since the domestic certification process 
revealed the need for further technological adjustments, the Indonesian aircraft industry 
started to fall behind the global leaders. 
8.2.4 The emerging innovation system: increases in size and 
performance  
 
There is, nevertheless, historical evidence that an aerospace innovation and production 
system was emerging in Indonesia. This evidence is summarized below.  The main 
elements (input resources) that increased the size of the innovation system are the 
following: 
• Actors. The two main (interrelated) actors providing financial input in the 
system were the Indonesian Government and the Air Force. IPTN was assigned 
with the entire range of industrial activities from design to production and 
marketing. The actors that influenced the course of innovation included foreign 
technological partners, such as MBB, CASA, Boeing and other manufacturers 
offering parts and components production for IPTN. A major gap in the system 
was the lack of domestic private actors and private capital investment. 
• The institutional set-up. Government legislation provided a protective 
environment favorable to an infant industry. This included an import ban on 
competing airplanes and a guaranteed domestic market (the Air Force and state-
owned carriers were forced to buy domestically produced aircraft), as well as an 
exemption from the “buy Indonesian” policy that compelled other state-owned 
enterprises to purchase domestic inputs. State ownership of IPTN coupled with 
Habibie’s influential role in multiple capacities121 ensured a rather soft budget 
constraint for the company.  
• Capital input. Investment totaled at 6.5 billion dollars by 1989. The exact use of 
this amount remains unknown (including what was spent on technology 
acquisition or R&D), but it roughly indicates the cost of technological capability 
accumulation. Additionally, at least 1 billion dollars were spent on the 
development of the N-250.  
• Technology input. Even before the establishment of IPTN, the Air Force had an 
R&D depot and a few small planes were designed in Indonesia. Between 1975 
and 1986, licenses were acquired for four helicopter types (from MBB, 
Aerospatiale and Bell) and one aircraft (from CASA). In connection to these 
projects, at least 50 foreign experts worked at IPTN. A team from Boeing was 
providing organizational support for the management. As a result of offset deals, 
IPTN produced components for Boeing, British Aerospace, Fokker, General 
Dynamics aircraft in the late 1980s and 1990s. A Universal Maintenance Center 
was also established with the help of General Electric in 1980. 
                                                 
121 Apart from being CEO of IPTN, Habibie was the chair of the Agency for Strategic Industry (BPIS), 
the Technology Adviser to the President and held the position of Minister for Technology and Research 
between 1978 and 1998. Following two months of Vice Presidency, Habibie became the President of 
Indonesia in May 1998, which lasted until October 1999. 
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• New machinery. By the end of 1985 IPTN operated 63 computerized numeric 
control (CNC) and 51 touch-in numeric control (TNC) machines, 156 
conventional milling machines, 1 chemical milling machine and 3 autoclaves for 
plastic bonding. By the late 1990s, nine additional TNC machines and 24 
milling machines had been added (Table 10). 
• (Skilled) labor input. By 1989 the workforce of IPTN grew to 14,200, peaking at 
at 16,000 in 1997. Many employees were blue-collar workers who received in-
house training, but a large share of the engineers was trained in Europe and 
North America. Partners (including CASA and Grumman) also offered 
additional in-house training for IPTN staff. University graduates constituted 
around one-sixth of the employees of IPTN in the 1980s. Many of these had 
studied abroad with government or company scholarships. Locally, the Bandung 
Institute of Technology was offering an ‘Aerospace Engineering’ optional 
program from 1962 onwards, which was formalized in 1991. A department of 
aerospace engineering was only created in 1997. A ‘Materials Engineering’ 
program has been offered since 1993, although scholarships were given a decade 
earlier to assist the formation of the program.122 However, in comparison to 
other aircraft producing countries, the provision of high skilled labor had major 
shortcomings, mainly due to the fact that all high-tech industries were developed 
at the same time virtually from scratch, where a philosophy of learning-by-doing 
prevailed. 
 
 
Table 10 IPTN’s machinery for aircraft manufacturing 
 Computerized Numeric 
Control (CNC) 
machines 
Touch-in 
Numeric Control 
(TNC) machines 
Conventional 
milling 
machines 
Chemical 
milling 
machines 
Autoclaves 
for plastic 
bonding 
1985 63a 51 156 1 3 
2000 63 60 180 1 3 
Sources: McKendrick (1992) and “Toughing it out” Flight International, 25-31 Jul 2000 
Note: (a) Number of CNC machines expanded in 1985 from 24 to 63 
 
 
The significant innovative efforts made over the first two decades of coordinated 
industrial development activities had tangible results. Here is an indication on the 
performance of the aerospace innovation system: 
• New products. Direct outputs of the innovation system are the co-developed CN-
235 and the N-250 prototypes, both highly complex technologies that were even 
new to the world. A number of new-to-the-country innovations included the 
aircraft and helicopters produced under license as well as the parts and 
components produced for foreign manufacturers. 
• New production processes. Although there were some changes in the production 
processes along a product cycle, McKendrick (1992, fig 2, p.54) shows no 
evidence of efficiency gains. 
• Market share. IPTN has produced almost 100 of the NC-212 aircraft and more 
than 140 of the helicopters under license, almost entirely for the Indonesian 
market. The CN-235 cornered 5% of the global market, mostly due to the sales 
of the Spanish-made planes. 
                                                 
122 Information retrieved from BIT’s website; “Faculty of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, 
General Information and History” (www.itb.ac.id) 
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• Sales and value added. Within ten years of its operations, IPTN’s turnover 
increased to 87 million dollars. In comparison with the Brazilian national 
champion, IPTN average sales in the first decade of production, grew slower, 
hardly reaching one third of the sales levels of Ebraer.123 By 1993, IPTN’s sales 
increased to 193 million USD. By 1996 the total Indonesian aerospace 
industry’s value added increased to 433 million USD. Yet the industry has not 
become competitive and Indonesian exports were restricted to a few barter deals 
of 5 NC-212s and 8 CN-235s. 
 
8.3 Crisis and interruption without transition 
 
8.3.1 Crisis in a still emergent industry 
 
Already during the lengthy final design and certification process of the N-250, in 1995, 
at Indonesia’s 50th anniversary of independence, IPTN announced the development of a 
new regional jet, the N-2130124. Had it been successful, the financing scheme of the 
project could have been called ‘innovative’. In 1996 a separate financing company was 
created, PT DSTP125, to raise the estimated costs of 2 billion USD by selling shares to 
domestic investors, state-owned companies as well as for families (Mursjid, 1998). PT 
DSTP would own the prototypes as well as any intellectual property related to the 
aircraft. The investors were supposed to receive royalty payments from the time when 
the N-2130 would enter production (not before 2003, according to a 1998 schedule). 
The company failed to raise more than around 1/20th of the required capital, no potential 
foreign partners showed serious interest in investing, analysts also dismissed what 
Goldstein (2002: 530) called a “folly”. In the meantime, while IPTN was also looking 
for an investor to finance the remaining 90m USD required for the certification of the 
N-250, Suharto signed a letter of intent to the IMF agreeing to stop financing the grand 
projects, including the aircraft industry, in return for a bail-out from the crisis, which hit 
Indonesia the worst among the East Asian economies (Hill, 2000). Even Habibie 
becoming president of Indonesia in May 1998 for over a year could not provide more 
funds for the industry, which by 1999 accumulated 570m USD in debts (Goldstein, 
2002). In September 1999 DSTP was dissolved, the investment into the N-2130 aircraft 
was written off as sunk cost. 
 
The crisis not only prompted all the development projects of IPTN to be suspended, but 
it affected its sales as well. The Malaysian air force was renegotiating a deal on 6 CN-
235 aircraft that were not delivered on time in 1997. IPTN had to pull out from bidding 
for an Australian air force contract due to its inability to offer a competitive financing 
scheme126. In response to the crisis, IPTN was diversifying into non-aviation related 
                                                 
123 The total sales of IPTN between 1977-86 was around 607 million dollars, for Embraer (1970-79) it 
was 1893 million dollars,  We converted current sales figures to US dollars and deflated to constant 2000 
series using WDI data. 
124 N stands for Nusantara, 2 for twin engines and 130 for the number of passengers (The plane would be 
offered in 3 sizes, with 80, 100 and 130 seats). (See Goldstein 2002 footnote 2 p 530 for a more critical 
interpretation.) 
125 DSTP is short for “PT Dua Satu Tiga Puluh”, or “2130 Company”. Its mission was to provide finance 
for high-tech endeavors in the fields of aerospace, maritime transportation and communications. 
126 “IPTN Phoenix falls before Australian competition decision” Flight International, 8-14 Jul 1998 
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products (car and agro industry) and cut its workforce from 16,000 in 1997 to 10,598 in 
2000 (by more than 4,000 from 1999 to 2000). 127  IPTN changed its name to PT 
Dirgantara Indonesia (Indonesian Aerospace, IAe) in the same year. Shifting to the core 
activities of manufacturing aircraft parts for Boeing, Airbus and British Aerospace, IAe 
also made further attempts to market the CN-235s and has produced a few, it is 
struggling to find investors for the N-250 (an attempt of a partnership with China failed). 
While there are still further attempts to launch a new 19-seater aircraft, the N-219, the 
most lucrative business for IAe may well be the MRO activities. Today, the company 
employs some 3,700 persons and produces the military version of the CN-235 and also 
the NC-212 (license extended for the -400 series in 2006) and NAS-332 Super Puma 
under license128. Most recently a new agreement was signed with Eurocopter in 2008 to 
construct the tail booms and fuselage of the latest version of this helicopter, the 
EC725/EC225, production of the first of the 125 units planned began in January 2010. 
The deal also included assistance during the early stage of cooperation.129 
 
At the same time, it is interesting to see the contrast in the follow-up story of the CN-
235 at CASA. The Spanish partner also chose to go alone with the further development 
of the aircraft. The resulting stretched military transport version is capable of carrying 
50% more payload with new engines. The C-295 made its maiden flight in 1998 and has 
been selling rather successfully, owing partly to the boost brought about by CASA’s 
merger into the Europe defense corporation EADS. Further modified versions of the 
CN-235 were instrumental in providing EADS a foothold on the American defense 
market by providing maritime patrol planes for the coast guard130. 
 
8.3.2 Interruption in an emergent innovation system 
 
The industry lost steam during the mid-1990s. Despite all the efforts and achievements, 
the innovation system was not mature enough to ensure competitive sales in the 
commuter market. At the same time, the direction of search for new innovative 
solutions was in mismatch with the global competitive landscape. The Indonesian 
strategy of self-reliance was diametrically opposite to the alliance-favoring trends the 
global aircraft industry was transiting to already a decade ago. The decision to develop 
the N-250 almost alone made the project too expensive and technologically less reliable 
compared to competitors using risk sharing partnerships for co-development and co-
production (see Embraer’s success with the E-145 regional jets). Even access to the 
blatantly unlimited government resources was insufficient to gain certification and a 
critical mass of foreign export deals. Consequently, without fundamental institutional 
changes the industry had little chance to continue to grow. 
 
In this setting the aircraft industry was unprepared to face the East Asian financial crisis 
and to lose its only financial resource. The attempt to raise “private” capital through the 
DSTP project and the efforts to find foreign investors indicates that IPTN and the 
government were aware of the problem. However, these small steps were not enough 
for the company to weather the crisis in which both innovation and production came to 
                                                 
127 “Toughing it out” Flight International, 25-31 Jul 2000 
128 Flight International 28 Oct 2008 
129 “PT DI makes components for France's Eurocopter” The Jakarta Post 28 Jan 2010 
130 “EADS-CASA all at sea” Interavia, Summer 2006 
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a still stand. The effect of the interruption was hardly as devastating in any other 
country as it was in the case of Indonesia: 
• Reduction in the capital flows. In accordance with the agreement with the IMF, 
all government support to IPTN was cut, leaving the company virtually without 
any source of finance. Part of the equipment and machinery in research institutes 
was also dismantled and sold abroad. 
• Reduction of human capital inflow. The crises had major consequences on the 
aeronautics education system. In 2000 the enrollment in aeronautical 
engineering at ITB was reduced from 70 to 50, while the program was given a 
more general profile. Many of the staff were forced to take a sabbatical years 
abroad, a number of experts left to Malaysia or the Netherlands. 
• Halt of innovative activities. As a result of lack of funding, IPTN shelved the N-
2130 project and the certification of the N-250.  
• Production output. Apart from the planes already in an advanced stage on the 
production line, the factory came to a halt. 
• Sales and value added. Value added further plummeted from as low as 24 
million USD in 1998 to 4 million in 1999. Most indicative of the lack of 
transition ever since is that it could not exceed 37 million in 2005. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
8.4.1 Emergence and interruption 
 
Based on the findings in section 8.3, Figure 27 provides a summary overview of the 
emergence, growth, stagnation and eventual collapse of the Indonesian aerospace 
innovation system. In the years preceding the establishment of IPTN in 1976, we can 
see an increase in both the size and the performance of the system. The increases were 
due to the establishment of a manufacturing facility and the inflow of Polish technology. 
This resulted in new-to-the-country products and presumably process innovation along 
the learning curve.The institutionalization of innovative activities, through the 
establishment of LAPIP in 1960 did not start from scratch, since Nurtanio had already 
been active during the late 1950s and had designed a number of new small planes.  
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Figure 27 Emergence of the Indonesian aerospace innovation system 
Source: The authors 
 
 
Between 1976 and 1996 the innovation system’s size continued to increase and 
performance improved to hitherto unprecedented levels. The expansion of the system 
was driven by the expansion of IPTN. Though the share of investment dedicated to 
R&D is unknown, we may assume that learning by was associated with increased 
resources to assist learning, see Table 7). New technology was provided through 
licenses for helicopters and aircraft and international exchanges of staff. The improved 
performance of the system manifested itself in increased production figures (Table 8). 
The arrow to 1996 hides the winding growth path, but the growth trend only seems to be 
interrupted with the maiden flight of the N-250. The mounting expenses, the failure to 
certify the plane and failed attempts to commercialize previous ones indicates a 
stagnating or slightly declining system that reached its critical turning point with the 
financial crisis in 1998, followed by a sharp drop in physical and human capital 
available in the system, which halted all work on new products.  
 
8.4.2 Why did Indonesia fail to make the transition to a new growth 
trajectory? 
 
The development of the Indonesian aircraft industry stalled during the emerging phase. 
It remained an infant industry and was unable to make the transition to sustained 
competitiveness.. Why did it fail to do so? 
 
First of all, creating a viable aerospace industry is never an easy task. Aircraft 
manufacturing is among the technologically most complex, highly capital-intensive 
industries. For a country with no experience in high-tech manufacturing to enter this 
industry, it  had to take extreme risks and deal with a great deal of uncertainty.  
 
Coping with this uncertainty and overcoming the lack of infrastructure, human and 
physical capital, were theoretically sound arguments for government intervention. 
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Indeed, there was a congenial political environment during the whole development of 
the industry right until the crisis (McKendrick, 1992). Many comparable policies were 
applied by Western and emerging country government to support their aerospace 
industries. 
 
The need for long-term strategies and solid institutions is crucial, as the failed case of 
Argentina indicates. In this respect, there is no doubt that Indonesia was diligently 
following a clearly formulated strategy (Habibie’s four steps) from the mid 1970s to the 
late 1990s. The problem with the strategy was that it was a technology push strategy. It 
gave too much priority to technology development over financial and marketing 
considerations (Goldstein, 2002). In particular it was not compatible with the changing 
global competitive environment. However, there is ample evidence that both at the 
company and at government level Indonesia made serious attempts to sell IPTN’s 
planes and to take market demand into consideration. It is essential to prove the 
company’s technological know-how in order to attract private investors, which, to a 
certain degree, justifies Habibie’s obsessions. Yet, the problems with the certification 
process of the N-250, the integration of the fly-by-wire system and the underdeveloped 
managerial capacities indicate serious shortcomings in IPTN’s technological capabilities. 
A possible strategy to realize a transition to more sustained competitiveness would had 
started with the identification of the desired core competences of Indonesian Aerospace. 
This might not have been the manufacturing of complete aircraft, but rather the 
production of parts and components, with which the company could have participated in 
global supply chains. 
 
In order to secure new sources of capital sources IAe will need to convince investors of 
its existing and future capabilities. The fact that these are still underdeveloped, 
especially given the technological advances of the industry leaders, calls for a major 
role of the government in supporting the potential creation of a new innovation system. 
The government’s role should however not only focus on financing productive activities, 
but also providing a flow of highly trained, highly skilled labor and access to 
technology and markets. 
 
Excessive government attention for aerospace in a developing country has had the 
unintended consequence of shifting much needed resources (including policy focus) 
from other promising sectors. A look at Indonesia’s industrial development in a broader 
context justifies these fears. According figures presented by Hill (1990), the 
disproportionately high levels of protection for engineering and metal manufacturing 
industries received were not justified by the growth of their relative size in Indonesia. 
We do see aircraft manufacturing value added increase between 1975 and 986 from 
almost nothing to 22 million USD, which exceeded the average industrial growth rate of 
14.6 per cent per year. However, the share of the capital-goods industries (including 
transport equipment) actually declined from 14% in 1975 to 13% in 1986 (Hill 1990 
Table 2 p.87).  
 
One should also note that it is easy to overestimate the real output performance of 
Indonesia. Even at the peak of production in 1996, Indonesian value added in aerospace 
was only 433 million USD. This is only 20 per cent the value of Japan and 30 per cent 
of Chinese value added. During the 1990s it was trailing Singapore, though producing 
more  than Malaysia and,for  a few years, even more than South Korea (Table 11). 
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Aerospace manufacturing may have been too big a jump for Indonesia. The industry 
was established as an island of high-tech in a sea of low-tech. Technological capabilities 
in manufacturing in general were low in Indonesia, not to mention in the capital goods 
industries. By the time Brazil started to produce commercial aircraft, the states of Sao 
Paolo or Rio de Janeiro hade already accumulated four decades of experience in a 
broader range of industrial activities. In 1970, one year after Embraer was established, 
metal products, machinery and transport equipment industries accounted for nearly 29% 
of Brazilian output (Katz 2000, Table 6 p.1592). Not only was the relative size of the 
same industries in Indonesia half of Brazil’s, but the technological levels were also 
much lower. In this respect, the nascent Indonesian aircraft industry was at a 
disadvantage when it came to attracting experienced engineers, managers or investors 
from other technologically advanced sectors. 
 
The foregoing analysis shows that the Indonesian aircraft industry has not succeeded in 
learning to compete. It has accumulated significant manufacturing capabilities in a 
remarkably short period of time, but has remained commercially weak. Securing foreign 
sales is paramount to decreased reliance on government funding and for recovering at 
least part of the huge sunk costs of the development of the industry. In the end, even the 
technological capabilities seemed insufficiently attractive for potential investors. The 
industry never managed to move beyond the emergent phase and was not able to survive 
any crisis. Even without the Asian crisis, innovation was not sustainable in the system. 
Since 1998, it continues to decay. 
 
Table 11 Value added in East Asian and the Brazilian Aerospace industries (1990-2005)  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2005 
China (P.R.) 2,402 1,758 1,775 1,692 1,692 1,587 1,445 1,951 1,795 1,950 2,297 2,787 5,098 
Indonesia  48 75 167 192 46 206 433 177 24 4 227 191 37 
Japan 1,642 1,786 1,979 2,235 2,145 2,272 2,217 2,261 2,796 2,851 2,449 3,031 2,985 
South Korea 216 263 109 144 283 216 202 236 262 297 487 536 523 
Malaysia 38 32 37 35 34 43 37 47 39 49 71 59 128 
Singapore 403 403 575 638 653 673 732 974 854 1,004 1,034 1,364 1,880 
Brazil 630 442 338 260 166 278 357 641 845 1,855 2,348 3,556 1,783 
Source: UNIDO; CNBS; GGDC 60-Ind.; IBGE  
Note: PPPs from GGDC (updated to 2000) applied are 4.6 CNY/USD; 4201.2 IDR/USD;  
125.2 JPY/USD; 905.9 KRW/USD; for Brazil 1.09 BRL/USD applied; PPPs from World Development 
Indicators applied: 1.68 MYR/USD and 1.19 SGD/USD 
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9 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In section 4.9, we formulated three questions which served as a guideline for the case 
studies. 1. What trajectories did the latecomers in aerospace follow? 2 What caused the 
interruptions in the development of the sectoral innovation system? and 3. What were 
the characteristics of the transition period? Here we summarise our findings and 
conclusions under the same headings. 
9.1 Latecomer trajectories 
Trajectories of latecomer industrialization in aerospace followed a pattern of interrupted 
innovation. Countries narrowing the technology gaps with the lead countries did not 
simply accumulate capabilities in an incremental fashion as suggested by stage theories 
of catch up. Rather, the accumulation of capabilities was a process which was 
repeatedly interrupted by external macroeconomic and political crises and changing 
market conditions. Radical transitions in sectoral innovation systems were followed by 
periods of industry growth and more incremental changes in size and nature of 
innovation systems. These transitions entailed a reconfiguration of the routines, rules 
and norms governing the interactions among existing and new actors in a catching up 
system, in line with demands and requirements of changing market conditions.  
 
Our empirical evidence shows that sustained growth in latecomer aerospace industries is 
not possible without substantial changes in the aerospace innovation system in the 
country. The literature on sectoral innovation systems has emphasized the sector-
specific co-evolution of “technology, demand, knowledge base, learning processes, 
firms, non-firm organizations and institutions” (Malerba and Mani 2009: 11). But it has 
remained less articulate about the actual patterns of co-evolution. The conclusion of this 
paper is that while the industry co-evolves with technological change and 
macroeconomic and political events, this does not happen in a smooth incremental 
fashion. It co-evolves in a series of distinct cycles, interrupted by crises and transitions. 
The cyclical changes in the performance of the sectoral innovation systems are closely 
interconnected with cyclical swings in value added in the industry.  
 
Measuring innovation system performance in an unambiguous manner turns out to be 
difficult, as the changes in performance are too complex to be captured in a single 
composite indicator. Long-run changes in innovation inputs (R&D expenditures, 
R&D/sales ratios, technology licensing, number of graduates in aeronautics programs, 
trends in foreigners’ local patenting) and output indicators (such as new product sales or 
composition of exports) chart the trajectories and reveal interruptions and periods of 
transition. Trends in production system indicators such as value added and productivity 
can also be used to identify interruptions in the innovation system. All indicators are 
very context-specific, and the identification of historical turning points requires both 
quantitative data and in-depth qualitative studies of institutional and organizational 
changes in the industry. 
 
It is important to be able to predict crisis and transition periods. Archibugi et al (1999) 
criticize the Galli and Teubal model (1997) for its lack of predictive capacity and the 
lack of evolutionary elements in it. We argue that a careful selection of indicators can 
reveal structural problems in a sectoral innovation system. We assume that major 
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incumbent actors and potential new entrants can also read these signals. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that change will actually take place.  
 
The length of periods of growth between interruptions varies from country to country, 
although the increased internationalization of production and consumption has resulted 
in increasing overlaps between the country experiences. The end of the Cold War 
caused a major crisis in the global aerospace industry and countries that entered the 
industry at different times and had acquired different levels of capabilities, all 
experienced a crisis during the mid-1990s.131 But in Argentina, Brazil and China major 
interruptions had already occurred well before the end of the Cold War. This indicates 
that country-specific factors matter at least as much as industry-specific ones.  
 
Country-specific factors appear to matter similarly for the length of the period between 
the beginning of an interruption (indicated by a significant drop in output) and the start 
of the transition (the creation of a new institutional arrangement in the innovation 
system). The longer the period, the less flexible an innovation system is to adjust, using 
the terminology of McKelvey et al (2006).  
 
In this paper we have distinguished two phases in the development of an aerospace 
industry: an emergent phase and a phase of sustained competitiveness. It is an 
interesting question whether the end of the emergent phase in aerospace evolution is 
necessarily associated with an interruption (section 4.9, question 1.b). This seems not to 
be always the case. In the case of Brazil, the sectoral innovation system had already 
developed and was functioning well by the early 1980s, before the crisis and 
interruption around 1990. Nevertheless, a transition provides an opportunity to decrease 
the participation of the state in financing innovative activities. 
 
The trajectories of our case study countries show that in all countries public funds were 
indispensable for the emergence of an innovation system.132 In Brazil CTA and ITA 
were funded by the government and so was Embraer at the time of its establishment. 
Private capital was not channeled into the Chinese innovation system before the 1990s. 
Similarly, the emergence of the innovation system was funded by public sources in 
Argentina and Indonesia.  
 
However, while state support is essential during the early years of entry into aerospace, 
state bureaucracy becomes an obstacle as the infant industries become more mature. 
The sudden withdrawal of the state from a system centered on government (or military) 
financing – witnessed for instance in Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina – itself represents 
a system shock, which ultimately requires radical institutional changes – and thus a 
transition. In this sense, the transition was unavoidable in Brazil. The question is 
whether it could have been managed more smoothly. 
 
                                                 
131 And experience one even more simultaneously during 2008-09, although this remains beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
132 In fact, the emergence of an innovation system, which is required to provide the resources needed for 
competitiveness is what Gerschenkron referred to as the need to substitute the missing institutional 
prerequisites to growth.   
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9.2 Causes of interruptions  
The framework of interrupted innovation focuses on the evolution of innovation 
systems and not on technological change alone. Evidence from the case studies showed 
that innovation system changes were not triggered by internal factors, such as a 
slowdown of innovation dynamism as the innovation system comes close to its 
innovation performance frontier, or domestic innovation at the frontier. Instead, 
exogenous system shocks play a crucial role in interruptions. This is due to the 
latecomer setting and the capital- and technology intensity of the aerospace industry,  
Outside shocks, either in the form of falling sales revenues or the drying up of available 
public funding, can result in the depletion of resources available for innovation and the 
inability of the industry to respond to competitive challenges.  
 
With regard to external shocks, we conclude that first, radically new technologies need 
not originate from within a latecomer industry to revolutionize the industrial structure. 
None of the four countries we examined introduced technologies that made leading 
producers’ technologies obsolete. On the contrary, changes in the production structure 
(the increased use of hierarchical global supply chains by American and European 
producers) triggered changes in Brazil and China. Thus, Embraer endorsed the risk 
sharing partnership model and China shifted track to become a major component 
supplier. Second, even if technological change in the leading countries plays a role in 
radical institutional change in emerging producer countries, these changes are more 
likely to be triggered by economic and political events external to the industry. This is 
due to the fact that during the emergent phase the industry relies heavily on government 
support as both investor and customer. Third, key players are rarely replaced. Major 
incumbent aerospace manufacturers in emerging economies are very likely to survive 
interruption, transition and subsequent consolidation periods. This may be a 
particularity of the industry, where huge sunk costs and power relations provide 
sufficient incentives not to let national champions go under.  
 
We conclude that the causes of interruptions were almost always exogenous to the 
sectoral innovation system, rather than endogenous. The financial crises and the fall of 
the military regimes in Brazil and Argentina, the economy-wide changes of introducing 
market-mechanisms in China or the Asian financial crisis in 1997 were all external to 
the industry.  
9.3 Characteristics of sectoral innovation system transitions 
 
Common features of transition 
There are surprisingly many common features in successful transitions across countries. 
First, there is a tendency to shift from a military to a civilian innovation system. Second, 
there is a trend towards increasing participation in international R&D and production 
networks. This is in accordance with the internationalization of the global industry both 
in development and production (many of the “organizational innovations” were initiated 
earlier by dominant American and European manufacturers). For the sectors in 
transition this implies establishing connections with foreign sources of technology and 
shifting towards more production for export markets. In the following paragraphs, we 
address four subquestions with regard to the characteristics of innovation system 
transitions (see section 4.9).  
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a. How did interruptions and transitions affect the accumulation of technological 
capabilities?  
Every time an innovation system changes, the competitive challenges change as well. 
This requires innovating actors to develop different technological capabilities. It 
depends on the nature of transition how much of the capabilities acquired in earlier 
growth periods, can be applied in the following one. If the mismatch between already 
acquired capabilities and the requirements of the new competitive landscape is too great, 
this prolongs the period of transition. This could be clearly observed in China in the 
1990s. On the other hand, much of the existing capabilities of the Brazilian innovation 
system could be applied after 1994 as well. The role of educational institutes and R&D 
labs are undoubtedly important in the transition process. 
 
b. Who were the actors governing the transition period?  
The competitiveness of the industry during the subsequent growth period depends 
largely on which actors play the leading role during the formative and transition periods. 
Especially during the emergence phase, the government is indispensable. The type of 
government (military or civilian), its position in the decision-making hierarchy, and the 
nature of government involvement (did the government impose institutions or did it 
facilitate the creation of interactions) makes a difference in the structural and functional 
outcomes of the new innovation system (in the incentive structure, variety creation and 
selection mechanisms). Countries, where private actors and entrepreneurs were more 
involved in the creation of institutions, performed more successfully. The comparison of 
Argentina and Brazil in terms of governance is very telling. In both countries the 
military played a crucial part in the establishment of aerospace research and production 
activities. But the success of Brazil already in the 1970s owed a lot to entrepreneurial 
participation and the inclusion of players with a market-oriented mind-set. Similarly, the 
privatization of Embraer was once again driven by entrepreneurs and was crucial to the 
elimination of inefficiencies.  
 
c. Factors contributing to the success and failure of transitions 
It is a crucial point in interrupted innovation that the emergence of an innovation system 
does not yet guarantee sustained competitiveness. Only if a system survives an 
interruption can growth restart following a transition, resulting in sustained 
competitiveness. A successful transition depends primarily on how well key current and 
potential actors understand the causes of the crisis and the new competitive environment, 
and how they are able to overcome institutional inertia. In the four country cases, 
transition did not happen without some form of policy intervention. The question is how 
to achieve “good governance” of the transition that creates the institutions for long-term 
growth.  
 
Successful Transition – with coordinated intervention 
Transition processes are uncertain and changing established routines and laws is costly. 
However, if an interruption occurs, the cost of “non-transition” increases rapidly. There 
are negative external effects, due to growing unemployment, loss of expertise that 
cannot be directly transferred to other industries, deteriorating export performance, and 
increasing debt burdens in the supplier chain and for development banks. Since the 
social costs of failure are so high, the government has a legitimate mandate to try to 
initiate systemic change. But firms and entrepreneurs also have an important role given 
the competitive challenge the industry faces.  
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Both the emergent and the transition phases require coordinated action by the key 
stakeholders, involving the identification and creation of missing institutions. Transition 
will not occur unless there is sufficient will. This may require the formation of explicit 
or implicit “coalitions” of major actors who can ensure financial and political support 
for the new system and who can expect major returns from the new system. Firms and 
entrepreneurs intrinsically have a better understanding of the competitive landscape and 
can act as ‘lobbyists’ for system-wide change (cf. Athreye, 2010). Entrepreneurship can 
also play an important role in identifying the capabilities in the old system that are 
worth preserving. However, since it is still a catching up system in an emerging 
economy, underdeveloped infrastructure and missing institutions remain significant 
impediments to change. For instance the shortage of venture capital was often pointed 
out in even the best performing country, Brazil.  
 
The nature of entrepreneurship also makes a difference. Short-term rent seeking resulted 
in less effective concession agreements in Argentina, while aiming for a long-term 
solution was instrumental for the successful privatization of Embraer. To some extent, 
competition can also promoted by the government, as the case of China shows. But the 
lack of competitiveness-driven firms and the absence of an entrepreneurial culture in the 
Chinese aerospace system may well be the reason why the transition took almost two 
decades following the interruption in the 1980s. 
 
Failure of transition: interruption during the emergent phase 
The timing of interruption is one of the important factors explaining the success or 
failure of transitions. We identified an emergent or formative phase at the beginning of 
the evolution of the industry and its sectoral innovation system. During this phase the 
industry has to acquire a minimum level of technological capabilities required to 
produce aircraft or components utilizing current (or older) technology. Acquiring a 
threshold level is particularly costly in the capital and skilled labor intensive aerospace 
industry. It involves the creation of some elements of a sectoral innovation system (i.e. 
firms, aeronautical engineering curricula in higher education, public research 
organizations, and so forth).  
 
In section 3.1 we criticized the appropriateness of stage theories to describe the 
evolution of aerospace industry in latecomer countries and argued that the ability to 
innovate is essential for growth. We have seen that production capacity alone was not 
enough to sustain the industry in the long term. Although Argentina produced fighters 
and trainers during the 1970s, and Indonesia produced small transport planes during the 
late 1980s and mid 1990s, these planes did not meet the quality requirements of the 
markets and could only be “sold” to their own governments. This was due to the 
underdeveloped sectoral innovation systems (which lacked a sufficient technological 
base, private actors, and market incentives in Argentina and sufficient skilled labor in 
Indonesia). 
 
Learning by doing is an essential way of accumulating capabilities to innovate. But if 
learning is inefficient due to the lack of capital and skilled labor, the probability of an 
interruption occurring before the innovation system has sufficiently matured is high. 
Such an interruption had devastating effects in Argentina, both at the beginning of the 
1950s as well in the 1980s, and in Indonesia in 1997. Brazil, however, survived the 
interruption in the 1990s because it already had a well-developed sectoral innovation 
system. Still the system transition lasted four years and involved a fundamental 
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reconfiguration of innovative and productive activities. In China, the innovation system 
was quite well developed by the 1980s (even if it was not functioning in a competitive 
way since the incentive was more to achieve a given quantity of output rather than 
quality) and could therefore survive its interruption. 
 
If the main components of an innovation system are in place, a crisis can be overcome 
through redefining the institutions, the functions of the various components and their 
interactions. Had a full-fledged innovation system not yet emerged prior to the crisis, 
more missing components would need to be supplied in addition to redefining the role 
of the already existing institutions. Theoretically, considering the arguments on 
latecomers’ advantages and path dependency, the less developed an innovation system 
is, one might expect that there is less the institutional inertia to overcome. But this 
reasoning does not hold for aerospace. Countries are more likely to fail if the innovation 
system is interrupted by a crisis before the phase of emergence has resulted in a full-
fledged innovation system. This is illustrated by the examples of Argentina and 
Indonesia.  
 
The reasons for this relate to the capital intensity of the industry. Competitive aerospace 
manufacturing depends on sufficient investment capabilities. Following the 
interruptions in Argentina or in Indonesia, the decline of the industry was due to a lack 
of investment. The problem here is that the existing level of technological capabilities 
matters in a crucial way for attracting foreign investment. The more developed an 
innovation system is, the higher its chances to acquire new sources of capital. The cost 
of entering the aerospace industry as a latecomer entails the cost of establishment of an 
innovation system.  
 
d. Transition institutions 
The role the national innovation system is particularly important in times of transition. 
Transitions in aerospace can be inspired and supported by similar institutional changes 
taking place in other sectors of the economy. This was very much the case in China in 
the 1990s, when the success of reforms in many sectors and regions was a motivating 
factor for the transition in aerospace as well.  
 
If national security considerations are more important than commercial ones, the 
chances are high that the institutions created during the transition will not be conducive 
to sustainable growth. This is clearly a lesson from Argentina, but also from the early 
decades of industry development in China. 
9.4 Further research 
In the development of aerospace, the importance of institutions133, capital, skilled labor 
and strategic considerations is probably greater than in other industries. It is an 
interesting question for further research whether the framework of interrupted 
innovation developed in this paper is also applicable to other industries. Latecomer 
sectors that combine high technological and capital entry barriers, distorted markets and 
a high regulatory role of the state (such as other transport equipment industries, some 
specialized segments of electronics (e.g. medical instruments) or energy production) are 
sectors where this framework might well be fruitfully applied. But it is also interesting 
to examine whether the framework is applicable in low-tech industries.  
                                                 
133 See e.g. Texier (2000) 
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